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The social and economic burden of violent conflict for a society is substantial (Gates
et al., 2012). First and foremost, millions of people have died in violent conflicts
and even more persons have been injured (Spagat et al., 2009). Yet, apart from the
battle-related deaths and injuries, the direct and short-term implications of violent
conflict include physical destruction, economic recession, psychological distress,
forced displacement, poverty and famine. But, they reach far beyond these short-term
effects. Their legacy is long-lasting and complex.
After a rather peaceful period in the first decade of the 21st century, the intensity
of violent conflict in the world has risen again in the last 10 years1 (Pettersson and
Öberg, 2020). Major events that contributed to this rise are the Arab spring and the
emergence of jihadist terrorist organizations, especially of ISIS. Currently, Syria, Libya
and Yemen are experiencing devastating civil wars. Hence, violent conflict remains a
challenge.
There are two striking patterns in violent conflict. First, they are regionally clustered.
More specifically, they concentrate among developing countries, showing a clear
correlation with economic wealth (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Second, conflicts are
persistent and recurring (Hegre et al., 2011). Collier et al. (2003) explains this path-
dependent process of conflict with a conflict trap. He argues that the consequences
of conflict increase the risk of another outbreak or ongoing violence, resulting in a
vicious circle. Thus, in order to solve the challenge of violent conflict, this circle has
to be broken.
International organizations and policymakers have faced the challenge with increas-
ing peace-building initiatives, showing rather modest achievements. Promoting a
new direction, the joint initiative by the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank
’Pathways to Peace’ declares "a shift away from [only] managing and responding to
crises [...] toward preventing conflict" (World Bank Group, 2018, p.iii). This highlights
the two possible entry points how to address the vicious circle of conflict. On the one
1Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the recent trend in violent conflict.
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hand, one can approach the structural factors causing conflict in order to prevent con-
flicts and on the other hand, one can focus on conflict resolution and peace-building.
In both cases, a profound understanding of the causes and consequences of violent
conflict is necessary to design effective protective actions and preventative policies.
Over the past decades, much work has investigated the causes and consequences of
violent conflict.
The economic literature on the causes of conflict has identified several structural
factors causing conflict, including poverty, rough terrain or the quality of institutions
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Crost et al., 2016). Based on the greed and grievance theory
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), the recent literature shows that easily extractable goods
such as natural resources (Berman et al., 2017; Lei and Michaels, 2014; Dube and
Vargas, 2013) but also foreign aid (Nunn and Qian, 2014; Crost et al., 2014) provide
economic opportunities that motivate people to fight. At the same time, ideological
reasons and grievance such as income inequality and ethnic or religious divisions
(Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012; Arbatli et al., 2020; Basedau et al., 2016)
determine the probability of conflict. Other theories explain the occurrence of conflict
with the fighting of people over scarce, environmental resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994;
Malthus, 1798). Following this argumentation, population growth (Brückner, 2010;
Flückiger and Ludwig, 2018) and climatic shocks (Hsiang et al., 2013; Harari and
Ferrara, 2018), which reduce agricultural output, contribute to a higher risk of conflict.
Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide a detailed literature review.
Pioneers in the micro-economic literature on the consequences of violent conflict
have analyzed the labor market effects of combat (Berger and Hirsch, 1983; Angrist,
1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1994). The recent literature focuses on the effects on
non-combatants, especially on the identification of long-term effects and behavioral
changes.
Motivated by early childhood development theories and the fetal origin hypothesis
(Barker, 1995; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Almond and Currie, 2011), numerous
empirical papers have investigated the effects of conflict exposure during childhood.
These studies show that persons exposed to conflict during childhood have lower
mental and physical health statuses throughout their lives compared to conflict-
unexposed persons (Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2012; Akresh et al., 2012; Valente, 2015;
Kesternich et al., 2014; Singhal, 2019). They also suffer from worse labor market
outcomes in adulthood (Kondylis, 2010; Annan, 2010). With respect to the human
capital consequences, the findings of the studies are controversial. Some show
substantial educational losses (León, 2012; Shemyakina, 2011; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014;
Bertoni et al., 2019; Di Maio and Nandi, 2013), whereas others find positive effects
(Arcand and Wouabe, 2009; Valente, 2014).
The surge in behavioral economics has stimulated the analysis of conflict-induced
behavioral changes. The empirical findings are still limited. Using experimental
2
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methods, Voors et al. (2012) find an increase in risk-loving behavior, whereas Callen
et al. (2014) document more risk aversion with conflict experiences. Other behavioral
changes include an increase in altruistic and violent behavior, more political partici-
pation, trust and cooperation (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Gilligan et al., 2013; Bauer
et al., 2017; Blattman, 2009; Jakiela and Ozier, 2019; Bauer et al., 2016; Couttenier et al.,
2019; La Mattina, 2017).
Taken together, the literature has identified numerous causes and consequences,
contributing to the understanding of violent conflict. However, there are still open
questions and considerable gaps. For instance, ’Why are the human capital conse-
quences of conflict so diverse?’ or ’How do climate-related shocks provoke fighting?’.
Moreover, Blattman and Miguel (2010) highlight the gaps on the role of myopic
and selfish leaders and identity in the conflict literature. In this dissertation, I make
empirical contributions to close these gaps.
The aim of this dissertation is to help toward understanding violent conflict by
investigating the complex relationships between conflict and multifaceted factors
that maintain the vicious circle. The objective is twofold. First, to disentangle some
of these interwoven relationships and identify chains of cause and effect. Second, to
discuss the underlying mechanisms and incentives of actors with a focus on the role
of policymakers.
In the research agenda, I present the concept of the thesis and how I approach the
topic, whereas the thesis outline briefly summarizes the chapters.
1.2 Research agenda




Determinants of conflict 
chapter 3 and 4
• Political favoritism 
• Water scarcity
Consequences of conflict 
chapter 5 and 6
• Polarization and segregation 
• Loss of education
 
 
Building and maintaining  peace
Chapter 5
 Social cohesion
For a full understanding, the thesis elaborates on various stages of the vicious circle
and considers individual parts of it independently. Figure 1.1 presents the concept of
3
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the thesis. It illustrates how the chapters are related to each-other and to the conflict
literature, using the framework of the conflict trap (Collier et al., 2003).
The thesis begins with the conceptualization of violent conflict in chapter 2.
The next two chapters serve to display the heterogeneity of causes of conflict by
documenting the identification of two exemplified factors. In chapter 3, jointly with
my co-author Andreas Kammerlander, I analyze the relationship between political
favoritism and conflict. Chapter 4 links climate-related shocks to conflict. More
precisely, it establishes a causal relationship between water scarcity and the likelihood
of conflict.
An explanation of the recurrence of conflict is that the consequences of conflict
provide breeding ground for another outbreak of violence. Therefore, chapter 5 and
6 identify two consequences of conflict. In chapter 5, together with my co-authors
Marcela Ibañez Diaz and Lina Maria Restrepo Plaza, I address the segregation of
populations caused by civil wars. We analyze discrimination and prejudice towards
reintegrating ex-combatants in Colombia. Social exclusion and polarization cause
grievance, motivating violence. The group of former fighters is especially pivotal
as the opportunities and economic incentives to return to violence are often high.
Chapter 6 deals with another potential factor that reinforces the feedback loop, namely
the human capital consequences of conflict.
Peace-building and conflict preventive activities may rupture the vicious circle. Serv-
ing as an exemplar of such an intervention, we test one potential peace-building
mechanism in chapter 5, targeting the conflict-induced segregation of populations.
On a methodological level, the studies use (quasi-)experimental methods to infer
causality. This includes high dimensional fixed effects models, instrumental vari-
able approaches and a lab-in-the-field experiment. In three of the four studies, I
utilize novel, large-scale and spatial datasets, including satellite data on water mass
movements, nighttime lights or irrigation, and newspaper collected information on
geo-localized conflict events to investigate micro-economic questions at the macro
level. Moreover, I combine multiple sets of geo-referenced survey data from the
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) or Afrobarometer to get precise information
on individuals at a large scale. These new datasets allow me to establish a geograph-
ically precise link between conflict and other factors, improve the precision of the
estimates and secure the external validity of the results. When necessary, I apply
spatial econometric methods to address spatial dependence in the measurement. In
chapter 5, I document a lab-in-the-field experiment, in which I collected my own data.
The random assignment in the experiment assures a high internal validity. Addition-
ally, micro-founded research complements the average effects found by cross-country





The thesis begins in chapter 2 with a brief description of the concept of violent conflict.
It provides the reader with a definition of violent conflict and an overview of its recent
prevalence around the globe. The main part of the thesis consists of four separate
empirical studies, two of which deal with causes while the other two elaborate on the
consequences of conflict. The studies are presented in a cause-effect order starting
with the determinants and continuing with its consequences.
In chapter 3, jointly with my co-author Andreas Kammerlander, I analyze how
political favoritism affects the likelihood and intensity of domestic conflict around
the globe. The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. It has a close link
to the literature on political favoritism (Hodler and Raschky, 2014b; De Luca et al.,
2018a) and complements the literature on the causes of conflict. To our knowledge,
this is the first study linking political favoritism to conflict. In the empirical analysis,
we estimate the effect of political favoritism on conflict by comparing the leader’s
in-group’s conflict exposure during the leader’s time in office with other times. We
also identify in which settings and through which mechanisms the effect occurs. The
analysis combines self-gathered data on the birthplaces and the ethnic affiliation of
national leaders2 with geo-coded conflict events provided by Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP). Our identification strategy is based on a high-dimensional fixed
effects model with region and country-year fixed effects, and additional controls of
regional, economic shocks. We find that the in-group of an autocratic leader is less
exposed to violence during the leader’s time in office as compared to other times.
Our results indicate that the effect is driven by favoritism in the armed forces and
other coup-proofing strategies.
Chapter 4 estimates the effect of an increase in water scarcity on conflict. It contributes
to a growing literature on the effects of climate change on conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013;
Harari and Ferrara, 2018). The novelty of the paper is that we (my co-authors Tilman
Poser and Krisztina Kis-Katos, and I) can measure changes in water availability at the
local level with the use of an innovative dataset. This allows us to establish a direct
link between changes in available water mass and conflict. We use an instrumental
variable approach for causal inference, instrumenting the shifts in water mass with
the duration of local droughts. Using a grid cell-year panel of 68 countries in Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean over the years 2002 – 2017, the paper focuses on
the differential effects by water supply and demand factors. The results indicate that
water shortages, which are induced by climatic shocks, increase the risk of conflict.
Access to groundwater dampens the susceptibility to climatic shocks, mitigating this
effect. Water demand factors increase the risk of water scarcity, yet they show no
differential effect on conflict.




Chapter 5 focuses on the micro level, in particular on the civil war in Colombia. It also
deviates methodologically from the other papers as it uses experimental methods for
causal inference. In this chapter, Marcela Ibañez Diaz, Lina Maria Restrepo Plaza and
I analyze community support for reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia after the
civil war. We contribute to the literature on peace building, specifically we provide
empirical evidence on the perspective of the civil society towards reintegration
of former fighters. In the experiment, we assess the extent of various kinds of
discrimination and prejudice towards ex-combatants by university students. We also
test whether mediated inter-group contact generates positive attitudes towards ex-
combatants, sensitizing the society for the peace process. We exploit a natural setting
in which trainees at a vocational school have developed business ideas and search
for funding. Some of the trainees are former ex-fighters currently undergoing the
governmental reintegration program. We run a crowd-funding campaign for them
with over 1000 university students, in which we exogenously vary (1) the information
that participants receive on who the beneficiaries are, (2) the information on the
socio-economic characteristics and abilities of the beneficiaries and (3) the contact
to a representative recipient. The 8 different treatments in the experiment, which
uses a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subject design, allow us to measure discrimination towards
former fighters and to evaluate the effectiveness of the inter-group contact. Our
results show that non-discriminatory behavior coexists with discriminatory feelings
of prejudice and fear. The mediated contact treatment increases positive attitudes
towards reintegrating ex-combatants and financial support once crucial skills are
highlighted.
In chapter 6, Krisztina Kis-Katos and I investigate the heterogeneous effects of con-
flict exposure during childhood on long-term consequences of human capital in
Sub-Saharan Africa. We combine 66 rounds of DHS with geo-coded conflict events in
31 countries. Our diverse sample with multiple countries and conflict types allows
us to contextualize the findings of previous country-specific case-studies (León, 2012;
La Mattina, 2018; Shemyakina, 2011) and to elaborate on the role of mediators such
as state capacity and conflict characteristics in the relation between conflict and edu-
cation. Our main identification strategy compares educational losses of youth living
within the same household, while controlling for local weather shocks and country-
wide dynamics in education. We also apply an instrumental variable approach using
the interaction of weather shocks and the distance to the next ethnic border as an
instrumental variable for past local conflict exposure. We find substantial hetero-
geneity in the effect of conflict exposure during childhood on later life educational
attainment. Education is on average unaffected by localized, low-intensity conflict.
In contrast, high-intensity conflicts reduce educational attainment significantly. The
human capital loss of conflict exposure is strongest in weak states and in non-state
based conflicts.





Violent conflicts are diverse in nature and have changed over time. Whereas armed
conflicts between states have declined steadily in the last decades, internal conflicts
have risen. Nowadays, they are the predominate type (Strand et al., 2019). Addi-
tionally, new forms of conflict have evolved such as terrorism and cyber wars. This
diversity is also represented in the multiple definitions that exist of violent conflict.
Its concept is controversial and discussed intensively in the literature especially by
experts in international law (Paulus and Vashakmadze, 2009). The definitions have in
common that two or more parties, mainly of organized character, with incompatible
interests compete against each-other with the use of weapons. They deviate with
respect to the requirements of battle-related deaths, the involvement of a governmen-
tal actor, the degree of organization of the actors or with respect to the inclusion of
one-sided violence.
In this thesis, I follow the definitions of the conflict datasets used for the analysis. This
is in chapter 3 and 6 the conceptualization of conflict by UCDP, and in chapter 4 by
the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD). Chapter 5 deals with the consequences
of the internal conflict in Colombia, which complies with the UCDP definition. In
both datasets, the unit of analysis and conceptualization is the conflict event. The
UCDP defines a conflict event as
“an incident where armed force was used by an organised actor against
another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct
death at a specific location and a specific date.” (Sundberg and Melander,
2013, p.524)
In contrast to the UCDP, SCAD collects information on social conflict. This includes
mainly intrastate conflict events such as protests, riots, inter-communal violence,
government violence against civilians, and excludes forms of armed conflict like
organized rebellions, civil wars, and international war (Salehyan et al., 2012).
As both definitions still include a variety of conflict types, I further subdivide the
events by its intensity and actors in the analysis. I follow the literature (e.g. León,
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2012; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Do and Iyer, 2010) that commonly uses the number
of fatalities or the duration of conflict as a measure of conflict intensity. Moreover, I
classify conflicts into state and non-state based conflict depending on the involvement
of governmental actors in the event.
2.2 Prevalence of violent conflict
In this section, I provide an overview of the temporal trends in violent conflict and its
geographical distribution based on the UCDP data. Graph 2.1 depicts the temporal
dynamic of the prevalence of violent conflicts in the world in the last three decades.
The left graph shows the number of conflict events per year, whereas the right
graph illustrates the dynamics in the intensity of violent conflicts, measured by the
number of battle-related deaths. On top of the total numbers, I present the dynamic
in individual conflict types. Conflict events are classified into three categories: (1)
state-based conflict events including a governmental conflict actor, (2) non-state based
conflict events and (3) violence against civilians.
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Over the last three decades, the number of events has been on an upward trend.
A sharp rise in the number of events occurred in 2011/12 with the outbreak of the
Syrian civil war, the rise of IS and the Arabic spring. It peaks in 2014 reaching over
20.000 events. Though decreasing in the next years, it remains on a relatively high
level. State-based conflicts are the most predominant type of conflict and are driving
the increase.
The intensity of violent conflict follows a different trend. Conflict intensity decreased
in 2000/01 to a long-term low in the first decade of the 21st century but increased
again in 2011. The graph presents two major peaks: one in 1994 and another one in
2014. With over 500.000 deaths, 1994 was the most violent year in the sample period.
The major event that contributed to this high number is the genocide in Rwanda.
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Fatalities sky-rocketed in 2014 with fighting of jihadist groups after the declaration of
an Islamic caliphate by the IS (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020). The drop in casualties
after 2014 is mainly driven by de-escalation of the wars in Syria and Iraq (Pettersson
and Öberg, 2020). Taking both graphs together, one can see that there is a shift from
high-intensity conflict events to low-intensity conflict events over time.
FIGURE 2.2: The geographical distribution of violent conflict
 
Source: UCDP.
Graph 2.2 presents the geographical distribution of violent conflict. It depicts the
number of conflict years during 1989 – 2019 per country. The graph illustrates that
many countries have experienced conflict events in the last decades, and that they are
regionally clustered. Whereas Norway, Finland and Switzerland have been unaffected
by conflicts, others experienced multiple conflict years. Germany experienced three
of them.1 Colombia was affected by conflict in all years except of 2016 and 2017.
With respect to conflict intensity, the most affected countries are Rwanda, Syria and
Afghanistan (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020).
The geographical distribution of violent conflict in combination with data availability
determined the selection of the sample areas of the four studies. Chapter 3 is a global
study taking into account that most countries have experienced at least one conflict
event. The study in chapter 4 focuses on Africa and Central America, mainly driven
by data availability on social conflict events. Chapter 5 deals with the internal conflict
in Colombia, which is one of the longest active conflicts in recent history. Lasting
over 50 years, the conflict officially ended with a peace treaty in 2016, enabling us to
study discrimination in a post-conflict society. Yet after two peaceful years, violence
associated with past conflict actors has increased again in 2018. Chapter 6 investigates
the most conflict-affected continent, namely Africa.
1In 1990, British soldiers were killed by the IRA and in 1992 KDPI politicians by the Iranian govern-
ment on German ground. In 2016, the IS terror attacks in Berlin occurred.
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Sending peace home?! The effects of
political favoritism on conflict
Joint work with Andreas Kammerlander
3.1 Abstract
We investigate political favoritism in armed forces. More specifically, we estimate the
effect of regional and ethnic favoritism on the likelihood and intensity of conflict and
identify the channels of action. In a global sample, we combine geo-coded conflict
data from the UCDP with self-gathered information on the birthplaces and ethnic
affiliation of 836 political national leaders. Our identification strategy is based on a
two-way fixed effects model with region and country-year fixed effects and additional
controls of regional economic shocks.
The results show that regions in autocracies are less likely to experience moderate
to high-intensity conflict years while they constitute the birth region of the national
leader. In these regions, around 10% fewer casualties occur during that time. We also
find evidence for ethnic favoritism. Our results indicate that favoritism in armed
forces and other coup-proofing strategies reduce violence in the home region. Hence,
we provide empirical evidence for an additional dimension of political favoritism.
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3.2 Introduction
Mobutu Sese Seko, ex-president of Zaire, is an ideal example of a national leader
engaging in political favoritism. During his time in office he embezzled more than
US$ 5 billion (Guardian, 2004). A considerable amount of that money went directly
to his hometown Glabolite that prospered extraordinarily during his time in office
and eventually received the by-name “Versailles of the jungle” (Hodler and Raschky,
2014b). People from his ethnic tribe benefited by receiving powerful positions and
public goods. Especially when granting higher positions in the armed forces, Mobutu
relied on people from his home region Equateur and from his ethnic tribe, the Ng-
bandi, in order to secure loyalty (CIA, 2016). The newly created Special Presidential
Division, for instance, consisted only of his own tribesmen and was led by his cousin
(Wrong, 2000). To address internal threats, Mobutu centralized power and demon-
strated the dependence of everyone on his favor by frequently reshuffling senior
commanders and purging officers whom he regarded as politically unreliable (CIA,
2016; Acemoglu et al., 2004). “Personal loyalty to the president [was] the prime
criterion for top military office” (Young and Turner, 1985, p. 274).
A similar story of political favoritism can be told about Saddam Hussein, the president
of Iraq from 1979 to 2003. His hometown Tikrit became Iraq’s city of palaces, where
more than 60 palaces were built during his time in office (BBC, 2015). Under his rule,
powerful positions were mainly given to members of his own Al-Bu-Nasir tribe and
to people from the Tikrit area. More precisely, the residents of Saddam Hussein’s
birthplace, Al-Ujah (south of Tikrit), held power (BBC, 2015). His party banned
tribal surnames possibly to conceal the major predominance of Saddam’s tribe in
government (New York Times, 2003). Moreover, he created the Special Republican
Guard that consisted of members of his own tribe and family. It was installed in
Bagdad and in Tikrit to ensure the protection of himself and his family and act against
enemies of his regime (Malovany, 2017). Resources, such as funds but also skilled
soldiers, were redirected from the regular armed forces to the Republican Guard
(Powell, 2019). Promotions within the armed forces were largely based on favoritism
rather than on competency or merit (Powell, 2019). “Corruption, favoritism, and
nepotism were endemic” (Wright, 2008). These two examples of autocratic leaders
engaging in political favoritism are no exceptions. Further anecdotal evidence is
available about Bashar al-Assad, Muammar Gaddhafi, Eyadema Gnassingbe and
others.
The anecdotal evidence has given rise to field of literature on political favoritism,
highlighting that political leaders favor their in-group with respect to the allocation
of public goods and transfers.1 Hodler and Raschky (2014b) show that economic
development in the home regions of political leaders increases disproportionally
during their time in office. Dickens (2018) and De Luca et al. (2018b) find the same
1We refer to political favoritism as all kinds of actions by political leaders that favor their in-group,
including rent-seeking activities, nepotism and corruption.
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effect for the ethnic and co-ethnic homelands of the leaders. This increase likely stems
from a privilege in the allocation of public transfers (Carozzi and Repetto, 2016),
public goods like infrastructure (Do et al., 2017; Burgess et al., 2015), education and
health care (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016), or aid programs
(Dreher et al., 2019). However, Kramon and Posner (2013) note that in-groups are
favored with respect to certain goods, but not (or even disfavored) regarding other
goods. This indicates substitution between goods that all contribute to economic and
social well-being.
A dimension that has been disregarded by the literature is favoritism in armed forces
and with respect to security precautions. Favoritism in armed forces is especially
likely if political leaders fear a coup d’état. As the in-group is expected to be more
loyal and well-disposed towards the leader, the recruitment process for crucial posi-
tions in the armed forces is potentially based on favoritism and personal connections
rather than on merit. Whether these kinds of favoritism change the regional likelihood
and intensity of conflict, and if so in which settings and through which mechanisms,
are the research questions of this paper. More specifically, we identify the effect of
political favoritism on conflict by comparing the leader’s in-group’s conflict expo-
sure during the leader’s time in office with other times. We differentiate between
autocratic and non-autocratic regimes because autocrats face a greater threat of coup
d’état compared to non-autocratic leaders (Thyne and Powell, 2016). Additionally,
the characteristics of autocracies (elite-centered, fewer checks and balances and con-
centration of power) facilitate favoritism (e.g. Hodler and Raschky, 2014b; De Luca
et al., 2018b).
Our analysis combines self-gathered data of the birthplaces and ethnic affiliations of
836 political leaders (Dreher et al., 2020) with geo-coded conflict data provided by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Stina, 2019)
around the globe. We determine home regions on the second administrative level of
a country based on the GADM database (GADM, 2019) and ethnic homelands based
on the spatial settlement patterns of ethnicities from the GeoEPR2019 dataset (Vogt
et al., 2015). We measure conflict both by the occurrence of at least one conflict event
during a certain year in the respective region and by conflict intensity with the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the number of battle-related deaths. Countries are classified into
autocratic and non-autocratic regimes based on the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions (Scartascini et al., 2018).
Using a region-year panel consisting of 44,025 regions and 27 years, our analysis
controls for time-invariant regional effects and time-varying factors on the country
level with two-way fixed effects. Region fixed effects absorb the geographic and
socioeconomic variation in the average propensity to experience conflict and to
become the birth region of the national leader, leader region,2 in 44,025 regions across
2We will refer to the birth region of the national political leader as “leader region” for the duration of
the leader’s time in office.
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the globe. We use country-specific time fixed effects (and provincial time trends) to
capture yearly changes in the political and economic environment of the respective
country (and to control for provincial changes in the economy and politics). Moreover,
we account for time-variant regional factors like economic shocks and population
growth by controlling for extreme weather events, natural-resource shocks and the
logarithm of population density.
Our results show that regional favoritism reduces the intensity of conflict in the home
regions of autocratic leaders. In autocracies, regions are 1.9 percentage points less
likely to experience years with 25 and more conflict-related deaths while being the
birth region of the current leader as compared to other times. Regions also experience
on average around 10% fewer casualties during that time. The leader’s ethnicity is
less involved domestic conflicts during his/her time in office.
In the channel analysis, we consider three possibilities. First, concerning the welfare
channel, we argue that the rise in economic development through political favoritism
is likely to reduce the incentives to fight for citizens in the home region. We test
this channel by conducting a mediator analysis using regional nighttime lights as
a proxy for economic development. Second, in the in-group favoritism channel, we
argue, based on the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), that leaders are
more cooperative and benevolent towards their in-groups. Specifically, leaders may
use less repression and state violence in their home regions and/or may increase
security precautions in these regions. With the use of Afrobarometer data, we analyze
whether more armed forces are installed in the home regions of the current leaders
during their time in office. Moreover, we test whether leader regions experience
fewer state violence against civilians. Third, the coup-proofing channel captures that
leaders engage in coup-proofing strategies, such as the recruitment of senior officers
from their in-groups and the purge of rivals to prevent internal threats. This results
in a predominance of in-groups in the armed forces. Given the in-group bias, discrim-
inatory behavior of the armed forces towards out-groups and vice versa are likely.
Moreover, the dominance of the in-groups and the centralization of power encourage
corruption especially in the home regions. We address this channel in two ways.
First, using Afrobarometer data, we analyze whether the perception of public sector
corruption of citizens differs when residing in the leader region as compared to other
times. Second, we test if our baseline effect is more pronounced in countries with a
higher probability of coups. Our channel analysis provides evidence for the ‘in-group
favoritism channel’ and the ‘coup-proofing channel’. The preferential treatment of
in-groups in the recruitment and resource allocation within the military changes the
intensity of conflict in autocratic leader regions. We find a stronger effect of political
favoritism on conflict in countries that are more likely to engage in coup-proofing
strategies.
We complement the political-favoritism literature by adding the dimension of conflict.
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of conflict and the
13
Chapter 3. Political favoritism and conflict
role of the state in conflicts. Do and Iyer (2010) show that more conflict-related deaths
occur in poorer districts and in geographical locations that favor insurgents, such
as mountains and forests. Additionally, the intensity of conflict has been linked
to natural resources (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Berman et al., 2017), ethnic diversity
(Esteban et al., 2012; Corvalan and Vargas, 2015), and income shocks (Harari and
Ferrara, 2018; Hodler and Raschky, 2014a), among others. Since the feasibility hy-
pothesis’, state capacity has been argued to determine conflict (Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Collier et al., 2009). Hegre and Nygård (2015) point out that good governance
can rupture the conflict trap, reducing the likelihood of conflict. On the local level,
Wig and Tollefsen (2016) find that locations with better local institutions are less likely
to experience conflict. They propose two channels. First, local institutional quality
shapes the motivations of residents to engage in violence by affecting grievances.
Second, governmental quality influences the cost of violence. If state presence in a
locality is higher, insurgency is costlier.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a short literature
review on the link between political favoritism and conflict, while section 3 describes
the data and measurements used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the
empirical strategy and discusses issues of identification. In section 5, the results
are described, and further robustness checks are presented in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
3.3 Political favoritism and conflict
Political favoritism can affect the probability and intensity of conflict in a country
through multiple channels. In the following, we highlight a multitude of possible
pathways. Since these pathways are both positive and negative, the direction of the
(net) effect is unclear ex-ante.
On the one hand, a leader region may face a higher likelihood of conflict as rebel
groups are potentially keen to target the birth region when attacking the government
due to its symbolic value. Furthermore, political favoritism raises inequality among
regions (Hodler and Raschky, 2014b; Asher and Novosad, 2017), resulting in a higher
risk of conflict along the regional borders due to relative deprivation. Especially if in-
creases in inequality coincide with identity cleavages, they enhance group grievances
and facilitate mobilization for conflict (Østby et al., 2009). Political favoritism can
also have a conflict-increasing side effect. For instance, the beneficial treatment of the
leader region in the distribution of foreign aid (Dreher et al., 2019) may incentivize
rebel attacks stealing the aid (Nunn and Qian, 2014).
On the other hand, political favoritism can have a conflict-decreasing side effect. The
gain in economic and social development through favoritism in the leader regions
(Hodler and Raschky, 2014b; De Luca et al., 2018b; Kramon and Posner, 2016) raises
the opportunity costs of fighting and alleviates grievances (Hodler and Raschky,
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2014a; Miguel et al., 2004). Hence, the welfare gain in the home region reduces
citizens’ incentives to rebel. This is called the ‘welfare channel’.
Based on the social-identity theory, leaders may be more concerned about the well-
being of members of their in-group compared to other citizens. This can result
in a beneficial treatment of the in-groups with respect to safety precautions. For
instance, leaders can mandate to install more security personnel in their home regions.
The installment of armed forces is likely to deter attacks as it hinders insurgency
(McDougall, 2009), although it can also shift fighting into the region. Additionally,
leaders can command the armed forces to handle in-group members more softly,
which would reduce the intensity of conflict in the home regions. We refer to this
channel as the ‘in-group favoritism channel’.
Generally, autocratic leaders fear to be removed by coups. In order to protect them-
selves from internal threats, they engage in coup-proofing strategies (Quinlivan, 1999).
Among these strategies are the recruitment of military officers from the in-groups (e.g.
home region, family ties or ethnic affiliation) and the purge of rivals in order to secure
loyal behavior of the armed forces (Quinlivan, 1999). This results in a predominance
of the in-groups in the armed forces. Following the parochial-altruism theory (Choi
and Bowles, 2007), armed forces are then positively biased towards the home regions
(in-group) and have a tense relationship with other regions (out-group). Similarly,
regions which see themselves excluded from power may perceive the armed forces
with animosity, whereas citizens of the home regions may be sympathetic towards
them, increasing the likelihood of conflicts in non-leader regions and reducing the
likelihood in home regions.
A second coup-proofing strategy is to reduce the power of the military by reshuffling
and rotating officer positions, diminishing the capabilities of the military with the
division of the army into multiple forces or the establishment of a paramilitary
group that controls the regular army (Sudduth, 2017). These methods reduce the
effectiveness of the military in general, and increase the difficulty to unite all military
forces. They also lead to a shift in resources and skills away from the military and
possibly towards a paramilitary group consisting of loyal in-group members (Pilster
and Böhmelt, 2011).
Other coup-proofing strategies aim to reduce the willingness of the armed forces
to start a coup by providing personal interests and incentives of officers and align-
ing them with those of the leader (Sudduth, 2017). One tool to secure loyalty and
minimize defection is corruption (Harm and Charap, 1999). Pivotal groups, such
as senior officers, may be bribed by the leader to maintain power (Acemoglu et al.,
2004). The offering of private privilege in exchange for political loyalty can reduce
the likelihood of revolts and thus conflict (Fjelde, 2009). We refer to these mechanisms
as the ‘coup-proofing channel’.
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The extent of political favoritism and its effect on conflict depend on the form of
government. Whereas in democracies, the national leader is elected or appointed
by a parliament, in other systems, the leader inherits the office or takes over via
coup. The distinct forms certainly provide different incentives (how) to run for office
and affect the motivation to engage in political violence. Additionally, the form of
government determines the extent to which political favoritism is possible. Based
on the findings of previous literature (Hodler and Raschky, 2014b; De Luca et al.,
2018b), we hypothesise that political favoritism is more likely in autocratic than in
other regimes. Autocratic leaders concentrate more power and face fewer checks and
balances compared to non-autocratic leaders, which facilitates political favoritism.
Hence, we differentiate between autocratic and non-autocratic systems.
3.4 Data and measurement
In the empirical analysis, we combine geo-coded conflict-event data from the UCDP
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) global version 19.1 (Sundberg and Melander,
2013) with information on the birth places of political leaders from the Political Lead-
ers’ Affiliation Database (PLAD) (Dreher et al., 2020). Our dataset is based on several
further sources that, together with detailed variable definitions and measurements,
are listed in the Data appendix. The unit of observation is region-year, whereby
‘region’ refers to the second administrative level of a country provided by the GADM
dataset v3.6 (GADM, 2019). Our final sample consists of a panel dataset with 44,025
regions in 2,963 provinces and 172 countries over the years 1989 – 2015 resulting in a
total of 1,177,805 observations.
The main explanatory variables are Leader autoc and Leader non-autoc, which are
defined as dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a region is the birth region of
the current national leader in an autocratic and non-autocratic political regime. In
years with a change in office, two regions can be defined as the leader region. We
identify the birth regions of national leaders with the PLAD database. Figure 3.1
depicts the leader regions.
Our dependent variables are three different indicators of conflict. Conflict is measured
a) as a dummy variable, indicating if there is any conflict event in a given region and
year, b) as a dummy variable for conflict events resulting in at least 25 battle-related
deaths in a given region and year or c) by the inverse hyperbolic sine function of
the number of casualties. The variables are based on the UCDP GED dataset, which
offers information on the exact geographical location of conflict events, the involved
actors and the corresponding reported number of casualties from 1989 until 2015. In
the channel analysis, we subdivide the conflict events based on the UCDP definition
into state-based and non-state-based conflicts as well as one-sided violence.
The frequency of conflict, measured by the number of years in which at least one
conflict event occurred, is shown in figure 3.2. Conflict events are regionally clustered,
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FIGURE 3.1: Spatial distribution of leader regions
Note: The figure reports the number of years of being the leader region for each second administrative
region over the time period of 1989 – 2015. A leader region is the birth region of the effective leader
during the time in office. Sources: Archigos, own data collection.
FIGURE 3.2: Spatial distribution of conflict years
Note: The figure reports the number of conflict years for each second administrative region during the
sample period 1989 – 2015. A conflict year is a year in which at least one conflict event occurred in the
region. Source: UCDP.
with a higher frequency of conflict events in Africa, the Middle East and parts of
Asia. Most regions experienced 0 years of conflict, others were exposed to conflict
during the entire sample period. The average probability of a region to experience
a conflict event in any given year is 2.2% in our sample. On average, 1.45 conflict-
related casualties per region and year occur. The average probability of conflict rises
to 3.5% (6.37 casualties) for regions in autocracies and drops to 1.9% (0.6 casualties)
in non-autocratic countries. In general, leader regions have a higher likelihood to
experience conflict (6.24% with an average of 16.06 casualties per year). Similarly,
the probability (8.03% vs 5.79%) and intensity (58.02 vs 2.83 casualties) of conflict is
higher in autocracies. This unconditional comparison shows a) that autocracies are
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more prone to conflict than non-autocracies and b) that leader regions on average
experience more conflicts than non-leader regions.
Political favoritism is not only targeted towards the birth regions of national leaders
but also towards their ethnic in-groups (De Luca et al., 2018b). We use the information
on the ethnic affiliation of national leaders provided by the PLAD dataset in order
to link the leaders’ ethnicity to conflict in two different ways. First, we stick to the
regional approach and observe the conflict exposure of ethnic homelands based on
the GeoEPR2019 dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Second, we link ethnicity to conflict via
(ethnic non-governmental) conflict actors provided by the Geographical Research On
War Unified Platform (Growup) database (Girardin et al., 2015). This allows us to
observe whether ethnic groups of national leaders are less involved in conflict events
while the leaders are in office. To do so, we create dummy variables that indicate
the ethnic homelands of the current political leader and identify the conflict actors
belonging to the same ethnicity as the current leader. Analogous to the birth regions,
we separate by political regime type.
In order to investigate the channels of action, we use geo-localized data from the
Afrobarometer rounds 1 to 6. We aggregate the individual survey data at the second
administrative level. This provides us with regional measures for the presence of state
forces (military or police), trust and evaluated performance of the national leaders,
and measurements of corruption. Since the Afrobarometer data is only available for
35 countries and at most 6 years, the sample is reduced to around 7000 observations.
A detailed description of all variables used can be found in the data appendix, and
table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables.
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TABLE 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regional favoritism
Conflict 1,177,805 0.02 0.15 0 1
Number of casualties 1,177,805 1.47 311.39 0 321,999
Leader region 1,177,805 0.00 0.06 0 1
Autocratic regime 1,177,805 0.13 0.34 0 1
Flood (sum of months) 1,177,805 2.26 2.14 0 12
Drought (sum of months) 1,177,805 2.00 2.03 0 12
Ln(population) 1,177,805 11.83 1.70 0.99 16.76
Oil x ln(price) 1,177,805 0.70 1.45 0 4.65
Gas x ln(price) 1,177,805 0.80 1.67 0 5.19
Ethnic favoritism
Ethnic leader homeland region 14,954 0.16 0.36 0 1
Any conflict per ethnic homeland 14,954 0.26 0.44 0 1
Number of casualties per ethnic homeland 14,954 189.03 6182.72 0 524,477
Ethnicity leader region 15,094 0.16 0.36 0 1
Any conflict per ethnicity 15,094 0.05 0.22 0 1
Number of casualties per ethnicity 15,094 39.16 493.23 0 30,628
Channel analysis
Number of state casualties 1,177,805 0.52 32.53 0 16,060
Number of non-state casualties 1,177,805 0.08 5.77 0 2,494
Number of civilian casualties by gov 1,177,805 0.24 66.14 0 44,310
Polity 2 score 1,157,668 5.52 5.37 -10 10
Nighttime lights 957,939 6.75 12.04 0 63
Army 7,757 0.10 0.26 0 1
Police 7,763 0.32 0.36 0 1
State force 7,763 0.25 0.28 0 1
Trust leader 8,131 1.82 0.67 0 3
Performance leader 8,137 2.82 0.61 1 4
Activism 8,236 0.98 0.59 0 5
Corruption index 8,336 2.42 0.43 1 4
Political corruption 8,190 2.21 0.49 1 4
Police corruption 7,791 2.63 0.47 1 4
Coup 1,177,805 0.14 0.35 0 1
Resource 1,177,805 0.13 0.33 0 1
Ethnic 1,177,805 0.51 0.50 0 1
3.5 Econometric model and issues of identification
To infer the effect of political favoritism on conflict, we exploit the spatial and temporal
variation of leader regions in 172 countries over the years 1989 – 2015. We run the
following regression:
Conflictrct = β1Leader autocrct−1 + β2Leader non-autocrct−1
+X′rct−1θ + αr + µct + εrct,
(3.1)
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where Conflictrct represents one of our three conflict outcomes of region r located
in country c in year t. The main explanatory variables are Leader autocrct−1 and
Leader non-autocrct−1. These are two indicator variables identifying the region r that
is, in year t, the birth region of the current leader of country c in either an autocratic
or non-autocratic regime. We use the lagged form of the main explanatory variables
for two reasons. First, the leader region is determined on a yearly basis. Thus,
measurement error occurs due to the fact that leaders may take office at the middle or
end of a year. Second, it is likely that the allocation of public goods and transfers takes
some time to be carried out in a bureaucratic system (Hodler and Raschky, 2014b). In
all regression models, β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest that capture the average
effect of political favoritism on conflict in autocratic and non-autocratic countries.
Xrct−1 is a vector of control variables including weather and natural-resource price
shocks as well as population growth. All control variables enter the regression in a
lagged form. αr and µct describe region and country-year fixed effects, whereas ε is
the error term. We cluster the standard errors at the country level.
The determination of a political leader is not random but follows political, social
and economic causes. Dal Bó et al. (2017) show that politicians are well educated
and often stem from richer households. Hence, regions that are better developed
and have a higher human capital share are more likely to be the birth region of
the national leader. Yet, these regions are less likely to be exposed to conflict due
to higher opportunity costs of fighting (Do and Iyer, 2010; Østby and Urdal, 2011).
To account for the heterogeneous initial conditions of regions that determine the
likelihood of the national leader to originate from this region and experience conflict,
our regression model includes region fixed effects (αr) absorbing all kinds of time-
invariant factors influencing the likelihood to be the birth region of a national leader
and to experience conflict. Country-year fixed effects µct of 172 countries and 27
years absorb nationwide shocks in a flexible manner. They account for changes in
the political system such as election reforms, global economic crises or changes in the
relevance of political topics.
Region fixed effects deal with time-invariant differences of regions. Yet, time-varying
factors, such as regional economic development, can still confound the estimates, as
recent regional economic conditions determine political preferences and behavior
(Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016; Brunner et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2005) and at the
same time affect the likelihood of conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Hodler and Raschky,
2014a). Additionally, political trends such as provincial independence efforts can
influence election outcomes and result in political violence. We address these potential
endogeneity issues in two ways:
First, our regressions control for two major regional economic shocks with the in-
clusion of weather and natural-resource price shocks. Extreme weather events have
a crucial impact on the local economy. Periods of drought or abundant rain not
only influence the agricultural productivity and that of downstream industries, but
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also limit the transportation of goods and persons. In the long run, they also affect
consumer prices (Ding et al., 2011). Natural resources are another important eco-
nomic factor on the local level. We interact the world-market price of oil and gas
with indicator variables that determine whether oil or gas deposits are present in a
region and include them as controls. As a robustness check, we add price shocks
of 10 further major minerals into the regression model in the same way. On top of
that, we control for population growth. Population growth means a higher number
of potential voters and a bigger pool of potential candidates to run for office. Thus,
the likelihood that a leader originates from a certain region raises with the increase
of its population. Following the logic of the Malthusian theory, population growth
increases the likelihood of conflict as there is a stronger competition over scarce
resources (Brückner, 2010).
Second, we provide further robustness checks that address potential omitted variable
biases. We run an additional regression that includes provincial time trends, account-
ing for the average political, social and economic development in 2,963 provinces.
Moreover, we control for past conflict experiences in the country and investigate
pre-trends. The robustness checks validate our main results.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Descriptive results
FIGURE 3.3: Evolution of conflicts before and after leader took office
Note: The figure reports the average number of casualties in leader regions and non-leader regions
before and after a leader took office. ‘Autocracies’ and ‘Non-Autocracies’ refer to ‘stable’ regimes,
where a political regime has already existed for at least 5 years. Countries that recently switched from a
non-autocracy to an autocracy are dropped from the sample in this figure.
Figure 3.3 presents the unconditional descriptive evidence. It shows the average
number of casualties per region before and after the assumption of office by the
new national leader. In the left graph, we report the conflict trend for autocracies
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and in the right for non-autocratic regimes. To avoid large changes in the sample
composition, we omit countries that have recently switched political regimes in the
observed time period.3 To identify any possible political favoritism, we distinguish
between the home regions of national leaders and other regions.
The higher conflict intensity in autocracies, as described in the data section, is strik-
ing. The intensity (and probability) of conflict is higher in autocracies than in non-
autocracies at any time. Especially in t=-1 and 0, the difference in the number of casu-
alties between the political regimes is large. While the average number of casualties
augments to close to 300 in autocracies, no increase can be found in non-autocracies.
This strong rise in casualties before and as a leader comes into power implies the
prevalence of coups or election violence in autocracies. We therefore specifically test
if our findings are driven by coup d’états and the way in which power was seized.
Referring to the difference between leader and non-leader regions, the increase
in violence in t=-1 and t=0 in autocracies can be observed in both. Nevertheless,
the increase is stronger in non-leader regions. In the years before the immediate
takeover period (t < −1), the difference between the (soon-to-be) leader regions
and other regions is very small. After taking office, the conflict intensity of leader
regions is lower or equal to non-leader regions. The right graph documents only
small disparities between leader and non-leader regions in non-autocratic regimes
throughout the sample period.
Overall, we observe more fatalities in autocracies than in non-autocracies, especially
before a leader takes office. Leader regions have a lower number of casualties com-
pared to non-leader regions in autocracies but not in other political regimes. While
the aforementioned correlations are informative, we cannot interpret them in a causal
way, since 3.3 only shows unconditional relations over time. In the following section,
we thus proceed with a more thorough and robust regression analysis.
3.6.2 Regional favoritism and conflict
To establish a baseline result, we regress our conflict outcomes on the autocratic and
non-autocratic leader-region indicators. The results are presented in table 3.2. In
column 1, we use our broad conflict measure, whereas column 2 focuses on conflict
years with moderate to high intensity. In this specification, a conflict year refers to
a year with at least 25 battle-related deaths. Column 3 reports the results on the
outcome variable of the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of casualties. All
regressions include region and country-year fixed effects as well as standard controls.
As shown in column 1 of table 3.2, there is no significant difference in the likelihood of
conflict in leaders’ birth regions during their time in office compared with other times.
The estimates in column 2 show a statistically significant and negative coefficient
3We omit countries that have switched from an autocratic to a non-autocratic regime in the last 5
years or vice versa.
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of the autocratic leader region dummy on medium to high intensity conflict years.
More specifically, a region is 1.9 percentage points less likely to experience a conflict
year with at least 25 casualties while being the leader region as compared to other
times. Relative to the average likelihood of such a conflict year in autocratic leader
regions (3%), the magnitude of the effect is huge. We find no significant difference in
the likelihood of conflict among regions in non-autocratic regimes.
TABLE 3.2: Regional favoritism, autocracy and conflict
Any conflict Conflict (death ≥ 25) IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3)
Leader autoct−1 -0.004 -0.019** -0.099**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.043)
Leader non-autoct−1 -0.002 0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.019)
Observations 1,177,805 1,177,805 1,177,805
R-squared 0.364 0.264 0.387
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing our conflict outcomes on the
lagged leader region dummies. Unit of observation is the yearly second administrative level.
All regressions include region and country-year fixed effects as well as controls for weather and
natural-resource shocks and population growth. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
However, the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths is arbitrary. A more flexible way to
account for conflict intensity is by recording the number of casualties directly. The
estimates in column 3 show that autocratic regions on average experience around 10%
fewer casualties per year while being the birth region of the current leader than at
other times. Again, we find no indication of political favoritism with respect to conflict
in non-autocratic systems. Given that over 80% of our country-year observations are
non-autocratic, we also find no significant coefficient on a joint indicator of being the
leader region. The results are shown in table A.1 in the appendix.
3.6.3 Time dynamics
In the baseline analysis, we lagged the explanatory variables by one year as we
assume that, for instance, the allocation of public goods and transfers may not be
effective at once. Yet, it is possible that the effect arises immediately or that leaders
need a longer time in office until they can engage in favoritism. Figure 3.4 shows how
the conflict intensity in leader regions evolves over time conditional on country-year
and region fixed effects as well as our standard controls. Whereas in non-autocratic
leader regions, there is no change of conflict intensity over time, it varies visibly for
autocracies. The graph depicts on average more battle-related deaths in the year of
taking office in autocratic leader regions, hinting election violence. Afterwards, the
intensity of conflict gradually decreases. It reaches a statistically significant, negative
difference four years after the entrance into office. The estimation coefficients remain
negative in the following years except for the years 5 and 6. A potential explanation
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for this rise is that office terms end and the re-elections of leaders are accompanied by
violence. We find no statistical significant difference in conflict intensity in years prior
to taking office, reassuring us that our results are not driven by pre-trends. Hence, we
conclude that political favoritism affects the intensity of conflict after the autocratic
leader has held office for a few years.
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Non-autocratic leader region Autocratic leader region
Conflict intensity before and after leader enters office
Note: The figure reports the development of conflict intensity in the leader regions over time.
3.6.4 Ethnic favoritism and conflict
The anecdotal evidence and the previous literature on ethnic favoritism (De Luca
et al., 2018b; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Dickens, 2018) suggest that political leaders
may not only change the allocation of public goods and transfers to the benefit of
the leaders’ birth regions but also to the benefit of the leaders’ ethnic tribes. To check
whether members of the leaders’ ethnicity are affected differently by conflict, we
conduct two further pieces of analysis. First of all, we follow the approach of De Luca
et al. (2018b) and test whether ethnic homelands of political leaders are less affected
by conflict during their time in office. The results are reported in column 1 and 2 of
table 3.3. The coefficients on Ethnic leader autoct−1 and Ethnic leader non-autoct−1 are
statistically insignificant in both model specifications. Hence, we find no indication
of a change in the risk and intensity of conflict in ethnic homelands with the leader’s
ethnic affiliation.
Given that in some countries, there is no geographical segregation of ethnic groups
and people move substantially within countries, maps of ethnic homelands are prone
to measurement errors. Moreover, whereas certain public goods and transfers have a
geographical dimension, for instance the construction of roads, the distribution of
others is targeted individually. Therefore, as a second approach, we depart from the
regional strategy and analyze whether persons belonging to the leader’s ethnicity
engage less in conflict during the leader’s time in office. This changes our unit of
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TABLE 3.3: Ethnic favoritism, autocracy and conflict
Any conflict IHS(casualties) Any conflict IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit of observation Ethnic homeland Ethnicity
Ethnic leader autoct−1 -0.011 0.035 -0.114** -0.845***
(0.028) (0.163) (0.051) (0.315)
Ethnic leader non-autoct−1 -0.008 -0.068 -0.012 -0.096
(0.020) (0.124) (0.018) (0.118)
Observations 14,954 14,954 15,094 15,094
R-squared 0.757 0.821 0.657 0.706
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing (1-2) any conflict or the number of
casualties in the ethnic homelands and (3-4) any conflict or the number of casualties per ethnicity (of
non-state-based conflicts) on the indicator variables of ethnic leader affiliation. All regressions include
country-year, standard controls and (1) ethnic home region fixed effect or (2) ethnicity fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
observation to an ethnicity-year panel. Based on the ACD2EPR dataset provided
by the Growup data project, we identify the ethnic affiliation of non-governmental
conflict actors and count the number of battle-related casualties per ethnicity in a
country. A non-governmental conflict actor is defined as belonging to an ethnicity
if the group recruits from the respective ethnic group and has announced that it
is operating on behalf of this group (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). The results are
presented in column 3 and 4 of table 3.3. The estimates in column 3 show that an
ethnicity is less likely to be involved in any conflict event in the country while one
of its members is the national leader as compared to other times. The ethnicity
also experiences fewer battle-related deaths during that time (column 4). Thus, we
conclude that organized ethnic groups belonging to the same ethnicity as the current
leader are less likely to be involved in conflict during the leader’s time in office.
3.6.5 Channels
Political leaders may shape the intensity of conflict within a country in various ways.
We consider three of these channels: the welfare channel, the in-group favoritism channel
and the coup-proofing channel.
The welfare channel
We investigate the welfare channel in two ways. First, we follow Hodler and Raschky
(2014a), showing that leaders’ birth regions have a faster economic growth during
their time in office, and Hodler and Raschky (2014b), linking economic development
to conflict. Table 3.4 presents the results. Column 1 shows that in our sample and
with the classification of countries into autocratic and non-autocratic the economies
of autocratic leaders’ birth regions do not grow faster (measured by nighttime light
intensity) during the leaders’ time in office than at other times. However, we find a
significant negative correlation between economic development measured by night-
time lights and the number of battle-related deaths, as shown in column2. Given that
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we find no welfare effect of regional favoritism in autocratic countries, it appears less
likely that a part of the reduction in conflict intensity in home regions of autocratic
leaders results of the gain in economic development caused by regional favoritism.
TABLE 3.4: Welfare channel
Ln(nightlight) IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leader autoct−1 0.013 -0.09969** -0.09978**
(0.041) (0.04587) (0.04586)




Observations 957,939 957,939 957,939 957,939
R-squared 0.950 0.412 0.412 0.412
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the inverse hyperbolic sine function of
the number of casualties on the lagged indicators of (non-)autocratic leader regions and the logarithm
of nighttime light. Column 1 regresses lagged leader region indicators on the logarithm of nighttime
light. Regression models as specified in table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Another way to test and measure the welfare channel is by comparing the effects
of being the leader region on the intensity of conflict with and without controlling
for economic development. If the reduction in conflict intensity is caused by an
increase in welfare in the home region, the effect should be absorbed by inclusion
of nighttime light into the regression equation. The results are shown in column 3
and 4. A comparison of the magnitudes of the estimates of autocratic leader regions
reveal a marginal smaller coefficient in the model controlling for nightlight. Hence,
we conclude that nighttime light only explains a negligible part of the total effect.
The in-group favoritism channel
The ‘in-group favoritism channel’ captures a beneficial treatment of in-groups by the
leader, in particular with respect to violence. Therefore, we first investigate whether
the decrease in conflict intensity in autocratic leader regions is caused by a decrease
in state violence or by a shift of conflict incentives of non-state actors. To do so, we
divide the number of casualties into three categories: deaths related to state-based
conflicts, deaths related to non-state-based conflicts and deaths resulting out of state
attacks against civilians. State-based conflict events refer to conflicts between a
government and another organized actor, whereas non-state-based conflicts refer to
clashes between two non-governmental actors, such as rebel groups. We run separate
regressions for each conflict type. The results are presented in table 3.5 and reveal
that the reduction in conflict intensity is driven by fewer casualties in state-based
conflict events. We previously hypothesized that leaders would use less violence
against civilians in their home regions. The insignificant coefficients in column 3,
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however, do not support our hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that the decrease in
conflict intensity in autocratic leaders’ birth regions is mainly driven by state-based
conflicts.
TABLE 3.5: In-group favoritism channel: types of conflict
IHS(state casualties) IHS(non-state casualties) IHS(civilian casualties)
Leader autoct−1 -0.100** -0.012 -0.013
(0.045) (0.022) (0.029)
Leader non-autoct−1 -0.001 0.010 0.004
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 1,177,805 1,177,805 1,177,805
R-squared 0.390 0.188 0.305
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the inverse hyperbolic sine function
of the number of casualties categorized by type of conflict on the lagged indicators of autocratic and
non-autocratic leader regions. Regression models as specified in table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Second, we analyze whether leaders mandate to install more security precautions in
their home regions using Afrobarometer data. The use of Afrobarometer reduces our
sample substantially. It covers 33–35 African countries.4 The baseline effect cannot be
replicated in this very restricted sample. Nevertheless, we believe that the additional
analysis is helpful in understanding the channels of action. In the Afrobarometer
surveys, enumerators are asked if they have seen any solider, policemen, their vehicles
or a police station on their way to the specific survey location. We use this information
as an indicator of military and police presence in the respective region and compare
whether significantly more or less presence is reported in the home region of the
leader compared to other regions in the country over time. Columns 1 and 2 of
table 3.6 report the single items of army and police presence, whereas column 3 is
a joint indicator of the presence of armed forces. The results in column 1 document
that there is a higher likelihood of encountering a soldier or army vehicle in the
birth region of an autocratic leader while the leader is in office than at other times.
No significant difference is apparent for non-autocratic countries. In column 2, the
results show less police presence in the birth regions of non-autocratic leaders and no
significant difference in police presence in autocratic leaders’ birth regions during the
leader’s time in office compared to other times. Hence, we conclude that there is some
evidence supporting the hypothesis that autocratic leaders mandate the installment
of more military in their home regions.
4We list them with the time of observation in table A.5 in the appendix.
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TABLE 3.6: In-group favoritism: presence of armed forces
(1) (2) (3)
Army Police State force
Leader autoct−1 0.057* 0.033 0.041
(0.033) (0.067) (0.036)
Leader non-autoct−1 -0.029 -0.099*** -0.076***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.026)
Observations 6,682 6,686 6,686
R-squared 0.516 0.553 0.564
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing index vari-
ables on the lagged leader region dummies. Outcome variables are based on
the Afrobarometer rounds 1 to 6. Regression models as specified in table 4.2.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The coup-proofing channel
The use of coup-proofing strategies to address internal threats may reduce violence
in leader regions. As one coup-proofing strategy, leaders may engage in corruption to
secure loyalty and minimize defection (Harm and Charap, 1999). Especially the armed
forces’ and the home regions’ loyalty and support are crucial for maintaining political
power. Anecdotal evidence indicates that leaders prefer assigning officers’ positions
to people from the own ethnic tribes and home regions, who are often less experienced
and less interested in fighting (Lezhnev, 2016; Hashim, 2003). Hence, it is likely that
conflicts of interests are settled by corruption instead of fighting. We compare citizens’
perceived extent of political and police corruption over time using the Afrobarometer
data. We would expect to see a higher degree of corruption in the birth regions
of leaders during their time in office than at other time, if our hypothesis is valid.
The results are reported in table 3.7. Column 1 shows the differential perceptions
of political corruption between respondents in the birth region of the leader during
office compared to prior and subsequent times, whereas column 2 reports perceptions
of police corruption. Column 3 combines the two forms of corruption and provides a
general measure of the perceived extent of public-sector corruption. The results show
that citizens of autocratic leaders’ birth regions perceive a higher level of political,
police and public-sector corruption while the leader is in office. The effects are highly
statistically significant and robust to the exclusion of single countries.
If political favoritism leads to fewer conflict in the home regions of autocratic leaders
due to coup-proofing strategies, countries that are more likely to engage in such
strategies should show a stronger effect of favoritism on conflict. We investigate
heterogeneous effects along three dimensions.
First, we argue that the use of coup-proofing strategies depends on the perceived
likelihood of an internal threat. Autocratic leaders may face a stronger internal threat
if a coup happened in the country prior to their time in office. Therefore, we divide
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Leader autoct−1 0.186** 0.277*** 0.240***
(0.072) (0.063) (0.077)
Leader non-autoct−1 -0.092* -0.023 -0.055**
(0.047) (0.042) (0.023)
Observations 7,106 6,717 7,270
R-squared 0.643 0.674 0.677
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing index variables on the
lagged leader region dummies. Outcome variables are based on the Afrobaromter
rounds 1 to 6. Regression models as specified in table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
countries into countries that have ever and never experience a coup during the past
30 years. The results in column 1 of table 3.8 confirm our hypothesis. We find a
negative and statistically significant effect on conflict of autocratic leader regions in
countries with recent coup experience and no statistically significant effects of other
leader regions. The home region of an autocratic leader in a country with at least one
past coup attempt in the last 30 years experiences on average 16.1% fewer casualties
during the leader’s time in office.
Second, the use of corruption to reduce the willingness of the military to engage
in coups, needs a financing source. Windfall gains, like the extraction of natural
resources, provides a good possibility of rent-seeking. Hence, it appears likely that
leaders of countries that are rich in natural resources are more likely to use bribing as
a coup-proofing strategy compared to those with no natural resources (Girod, 2015).
To test this hypothesis, we define a country to be rich in natural resources if a mine of
the 14 major minerals exists in the country and classify countries into non-resource
and resource-rich countries. Column 2 shows the heterogeneous effects of regional
favoritism along this dimension. The results support the coup-proofing channel,
showing that leader regions in autocratic regimes with natural resources experience
fewer conflicts. No heterogeneous effect is found for non-autocratic leader regions.
Third, the granting of powerful positions to in-group members is more important
in countries with existing polarization or segregation. We operationalize this by
dividing countries along their ethnic fractionalization into less and more ethnically
fractionalized countries at the median. As shown in column 3, we find a significant
negative effect of autocratic leader regions in ethnically fractionalized societies but
no significant effect of the other leader regions. Specifically, the home region of an
autocratic leader in an ethnically fractionalized country experiences 18.9% fewer
casualties during the leader’s time in office. Hence, combining the evidence from
all three coup-proofing regressions, we conclude that the reduction of conflict in
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home regions of autocratic leaders is likely to be driven by the use of coup-proofing
strategies.
TABLE 3.8: Coup-proofing channel: heterogeneities
IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3)
Leader autoc non-coupt−1 -0.069
(0.052)
Leader non-autoc non-coupt−1 -0.005
(0.020)
Leader autoc coupt−1 -0.161**
(0.057)
Leader non-autoc coupt−1 -0.010
(0.042)
Leader autoc non-resourcet−1 0.010
(0.037)
Leader non-autoc non-resourcet−1 -0.009
(0.023)
Leader autoc resourcet−1 -0.024***
(0.008)
Leader non-autoc resourcet−1 0.100
(0.064)
Leader autoc non-ethnict−1 0.046
(0.056)
Leader non-autoc non-ethnict−1 -0.005
(0.022)
Leader autoc ethnict−1 -0.189***
(0.078)
Leader non-autoc ethnict−1 0.004
(0.036)
Observations 1,177,805 1,177,805 1,089,755
R-squared 0.387 0.387 0.384
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the inverse hyperbolic sine of
the number of casualties on the lagged indicators of (non-)autocratic leader regions. (Non-
)autocratic leader regions are divided along three dimensions. First, into non-coup countries
and countries with past coups, second, based on natural resources and third, based on ethnic
fractionalization. A country is classified as ethnic if the ethnic fractionalization index is above
the median and as natural-resource rich if it has at least one major natural resource deposit.
Regression model as specified in table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.7 Robustness checks
Our estimation strategy already captures many potential confounding factors with
the country-year and region fixed effects. Nevertheless, regional time-varying factors
can potentially bias our results. In the main analysis, we control for two kinds of local
economic shocks and for population growth. In table 3.9, we provide three additional
robustness checks. First of all, conflict and political decisions likely depend on past
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conflict events. To check whether our result is driven by pre-trends, we control for the
share of past conflict years within the last three years. The results in column 1 of table
3.9 show that conflict events are positively correlated over time but the inclusion of
past conflicts in the regression only marginally changes the estimates of the leader
region indicators. Second, we include additional natural-resource shocks other than
oil and gas as controls. For this purpose, we use the natural-resource information
provided by Berman et al. (2017). The inclusion of 10 major minerals changes our
regional favoritism effects on conflict intensity only marginally. Third, political trends
like provincial independence efforts can influence election outcomes and potentially
result in political violence. If this is the case, our estimation results so far are biased.
We address this potential endogeneity with the inclusion of provincial time trends
that control for average political developments and conflict dynamics in a province.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of provincial time trends and very similar in
magnitude compared to the baseline regression.
TABLE 3.9: Further controls
IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leader autoct−1 -0.086* -0.096** -0.101** -0.101**
(0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Leader non-autoct−1 0.007 0.011 -0.002 -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Past conflict 0.323***
(0.056)
Observations 1,053,512 1,053,512 1,089,755 1,177,805
R-squared 0.413 0.440 0.384 0.429
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource controls Yes
Provincial time trends Yes
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the inverse hyperbolic sine of
the number of casualties on dummies of (non-)autocratic leader regions. Regressions include
fixed effects and control variables as indicated in the table. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Attitudes and behavior towards the government may be more benevolent in the
home region of the political leader compared to other regions in the country as
they are in-group members with the leader. Coming from the same region and
potentially sharing the same values and tradition, citizens of the home regions may
feel more sympathetic towards the leader and have more trust in his/her government,
reducing the likelihood of attacks or revolts against the leader in the home region.
If this is the case, we would have falsely attributed the reduction in the intensity of
conflict in the birth regions of autocratic leaders during the leaders’ time in office
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to political favoritism. We analyze this potential bias by comparing the reported
attitudes and behavior towards the leaders in their home regions during their time in
office and prior or after that time. More precisely, we compare whether respondents
of Afrobarometer surveys report to have more trust in the leader, are more likely to
approve the performance of the leader and to be politically active when the region is
the birth region of the current leader compared to other times. The results in table
3.10 show that persons residing in the birth regions of autocratic leaders do not report
and evaluate the leaders differently than other citizens, once we control for region
and country-year fixed effects. Only citizens in the home regions of non-autocratic
leaders report to have more trust in their leaders. Hence, we find no difference
in attitudes and behavior towards the government between regions in autocratic
countries, validating our main results.




Leader autoct−1 -0.098 -0.195 0.071
(0.166) (0.192) (0.044)
Leader non-autoct−1 0.160*** 0.139 0.053
Observations 7,036 7,097 7,170
R-squared 0.746 0.728 0.817
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing index variables
on the lagged leader region dummies. Outcome variables are based on the
Afrobarometer rounds 1 to 6. Regression models as specified in table 4.2. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To examine the geographic scope of regional favoritism, we re-estimate our baseline
result on a higher (the first) administrative level, which we refer to as provinces.
The results are shown in table A.2. We estimate two distinct regression models. In
column 1, we control for country-year and province fixed effects, whereas column
2 adds the control variables accounting for economic shocks at the provincial level.
Throughout all regression specifications, we find no statistically significant coefficient.
Yet, the magnitudes of the coefficients are comparable to our baseline regressions.
This emphasizes that favoritism with respect to conflict has a rather local scope.
Lastly, we check whether the effect is driven by regime changes or irregular entries
into office. Political transitions like the concentration of power to the leader can
be accompanied by or achieved with political violence. In order to test whether
the effect is driven by countries that recently switched from an autocratic or to an
autocratic regime, we classify countries as switchers if there has been a change in
the political system in the last five years and estimate a differential effect for these
countries. The results are presented in column 1 of table A.3. We find no significant
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difference between well-established autocracies and countries that recently switched
to an autocratic system in the regional favoritism effect on conflict.
Leaders, in particular autocratic leaders, may take over a country through violent
means, potentially leading to an increase in conflict in the capital region. This rise
in violence at the end or beginning of the time in office, may provoke a difference
in conflict intensity between the home region of a leader and other regions in the
country (including the capital region) that we would falsely interpret as a reduction
of conflict in the home region. To check whether the effect is driven by these kinds
of irregular entries into offices, we estimate heterogeneous effects between leaders
that regularly or irregularly entered office as defined in the Archigos database. The
results presented in column 2 of table A.3 show no differential effect of home regions
of autocratic leaders that entered office irregularly compared to home regions of
autocratic leaders with regular entrance.
3.8 Conclusion
In this study, we have investigated the effect of political favoritism on the occurrence
and intensity of conflict in a global dataset of 172 countries. Using a region-year
panel with information on 836 national leaders, our analysis extends the political
favoritism literature by providing empirical evidence on a further dimension of
favoritism namely with respect to conflict and security precaution. We combine geo-
coded conflict information from the UCDP with data on the birthplaces and ethnic
affiliations of political national leaders over the years 1989 to 2015. We include fixed
effects along two dimensions (region and country-year) and controls for regional
economic shocks and population density to estimate the causal effect of political
favoritism on conflict. As politicians may shape the distribution of violence in various
ways, we investigate the mechanisms of the effect. More specifically, we analyze
three channels: the ‘welfare channel’, the ‘in-group favoritism channel’, and the
‘coup-proofing channel’.
Our results show that political favoritism is not linked to the incidence of conflict but
reduces the intensity of violence in the birth regions of autocratic leaders while they
are in office. These regions experience around 10% fewer casualties during that time.
We find no evidence for a reduction in conflict intensity in leaders’ ethnic homelands,
but ethnic groups that belong to the same ethnicity as the current leader are less
involved in conflict. We identify two channels through which the effect occurs: the
‘in-group favoritism channel’ and the ‘coup-proofing channel’. In leader regions
fewer state-based casualties occur, potentially due to an increase in military presence.
Moreover, in the leader regions, there is a higher extent of perceived public-sector
corruption. This supports the anecdotal evidence showing that patronage in the
allocation of officer positions leads to higher corruption and a change in behavior
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Water scarcity and conflict
Joint work with Tilman Poser and Krisztina Kis-Katos
4.1 Abstract
Climate change, population growth and the increasing demand for water are altering
the distribution of water in space and time. As water is key to life, water scarcity
is likely to provoke social conflict. Using grid-cell data for Africa, Latin America,
and the Caribbean over the years of 2002 to 2017, we establish a causal empirical
link between the likelihood of local conflict and water mass declines. We measure
water mass anomalies based on changes in Earth’s gravity field recorded by GRACE
and link them to social conflict events recorded in the SCAD data. To account for
potential endogeneity in the demand for water, we instrument water mass change
by the number of drought months per year. Our results show that drought-induced
decreases in local water mass more than double the local likelihood of social conflict.
The effect is substantially smaller in locations with access to groundwater. We find
no robust differential effects by water demand factors.
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4.2 Introduction
The massive rise in the demand for blue water in the agricultural and industrial sector
starting in the 1950s, together with continuous population growth, have amplified
water scarcity in several parts of the world. Climate-change induced increases in
temperatures and in the frequency of extreme weather events may intensify the
unequal distribution of water availability. As a result, water crises are often listed
among the largest global risks for the future (e.g., World Economic Forum, 2020).
The global prevalence of water-related conflicts and crises is already quite substantial,
highlighting the conflict inducing potential of the competition over scarce resources
as proposed by Homer-Dixon (1994). International disputes over the use of Nile
water reappeared with the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt in 2020. In India, numerous inter-state conflicts
over state-crossing rivers have erupted in the past five decades (Richards and Singh,
2002; CNA, 2017). Violent clashes between herders and farmers in Nigeria resulted in
more than 1300 deaths in 2018 and led to the displacement of thousands of people.1 In
2013, protests against the government arose in Senegal, when the capital was running
out of water due to a damage in the water pipeline.2
Beyond triggering conflict onset in its own right, water also plays a critical role in
exacerbating already existing tensions. Longer periods without rainfall, combined
with bad water management and rapid population growth, caused a surge in thirst-
and hunger-related deaths in Yemen as around half of the population struggled
to fulfill their basic daily water needs.3 The increase in grievance and inequality
contributed to the onset of the civil war.4 Additionally, water stress is used as
leverage in conflicts. During the ongoing Syrian civil war, violent extremist groups
have captured major dams in order to increase pressure on the government and
coerce the local population (CNA, 2017). These examples and many others suggest a
causal link between water shortage and conflict.
Although empirical evidence on the direct link between water scarcity and conflict is
limited, a substantial literature documents the effects of climatic shocks on violent
conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Ciccone, 2011; Hsiang et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2015;
Harari and Ferrara, 2018). Yet, no consensus has been reached (Scheffran et al., 2012;
Theisen et al., 2013). Given the wide range of the consequences of climate change, the
1Human Rights Watch (2018): Farmer-Herder Conflicts on the Rise in Africa, available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/06/farmer-herder-conflicts-rise-africa, accessed on 17.07.2020.
2Human Rights Watch (2013): Senegal seeks French, Chinese help as water crisis hits capital, available
at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-water/senegal-seeks-french-chinese-help-as-water-
crisis-hits-capital-idUSBRE98Q0MS20130927, accessed on 17.07.2020.
3Atlantic Council (2017): Running out of water: Conflict and water scarcity in Yemen and Syria,
available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/running-out-of-water-conflict-and-
water-scarcity-in-yemen-and-syria/, accessed on 17.07.2020.
4The Guardian (2015): Water scarcity in Yemen: the country’s forgotten conflict, available
at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/apr/02/water-
scarcity-yemen-conflict, accessed on 17.07.2020.
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controversial findings are not surprising. From the various channels through which
climate change may trigger conflict, our paper focuses on increases in the local scarcity
of water, which is an essential resource for livelihood. Couttenier and Soubeyran
(2014) use the Palmer drought index as a measure of exposure to water stress and find
a weak positive link between droughts and civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almer
et al. (2017) show that droughts, measured by the standardized precipitation and
evapotranspiration index (SPEI), lead to a higher likelihood of conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa using a grid cell-month panel. They conclude that droughts are especially
conflict-increasing in cells with higher water demand (high agricultural activity) and
low water supply.5 These studies provide important insights on the short-term effects
of economic shocks arising out of relatively low rainfall, yet they fail to estimate the
total and longer term effect of water scarcity, including hydrological droughts and
the lack of water due to a misuse of resources. Additionally, they often neglect the
capacity of groundwater to buffer rainfall anomalies.
We contribute to close this gap by providing empirical evidence on the direct link
between reductions in water availability and conflict. Using a novel dataset that
measures total water mass changes (at the surface as well as underground) at the
grid-cell level, we are able to track water mass changes arising not only from rainfall
anomalies but also from an overuse of water resources and groundwater droughts.
We estimate the effect of a change in total available water mass within a grid-cell
on the likelihood of conflict. Additionally, we identify which locations are the most
affected ones based on time-invariant demand factors (capturing the presence of
irrigation, mining activities and urbanization) and supply-side characteristics such
as surface water and access to groundwater. By that, our paper also speaks to the
literature investigating the mediator role of water supply characteristics in driving
conflict (such as Döring 2020 and Sarsons 2015).
In order to establish a causal effect, we instrument water mass change by the number
of drought months within each year derived from SPEI data (Croicu and Sund-
berg, 2015). The IV strategy rests on the assumption that the duration of a drought
determines reductions in water mass and affects conflict incidence only through
the channel of water availability. As the water supply of a location is determined
by groundwater storage, rainfall, runoff and underground water flows, rainfall
anomalies are an excellent predictor of changes in water mass. We argue that after
controlling for cell and country-year fixed effects, the number of drought months is
exogenous to the likelihood of conflict. In order to exclude other channels of causation
(e.g., droughts being correlated with excessive temperatures that make people more
violence-prone, Hsiang et al. 2013), further robustness checks control for variation in
average temperatures and wind speed within each cell.
Our analysis combines satellite data on water mass movements at a 0.5 grid-cell level,
provided by the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) mission from
5See Dell et al. (2014) for an overview of the literature.
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US and German space agencies (NASA and DLR) (Wiese et al., 2018; Watkins et al.,
2015; Landerer et al., 2020; Wiese et al., 2016) with geo-localized social conflict data
from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012). Changes
in water mass are measured by deviations in the gravitation attraction of satellites
circulating in Earth’s orbit. We focus on social conflict as we believe that water
scarcity directly provokes social disputes, and elaborate on the combined effect of
water scarcity with already existing tensions by analyzing the effects on distinct types
of conflict. Our dataset is a cell-year panel that consists out of 11,075 cells and covers
Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, over the years 2002 to 2017.
The results show that a one standard deviation larger reduction in the water mass
within a cell more than doubles the local likelihood of social conflict, increasing it
from a baseline of 1% percent by 1.4 percentage points. The effect is substantially
smaller in locations with access to groundwater. We find no evidence for stronger
effects in locations with a higher water demand. Changes in water mass respond
not only to current droughts but also to past droughts, emphasizing that studies that
do not account for temporal dependencies may underestimate the magnitude of the
effect of droughts on conflict.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
all measures used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses issues of identification, while
section 5 concludes.
4.3 Data, measurement and descriptives
4.3.1 Data and measurement
We combine data of water mass change at the grid-cell level with information on
geo-referenced social conflict events to estimate the effect of water mass change on
the likelihood of conflict. The analysis is at the cell-year level, whereby a cell refers
to a resolution of 0.5 degrees (approximately 55× 55 km). Our final panel dataset
consists of 177,200 observations from 11,075 cells, located in 68 countries over the
years 2002 to 2017. In our sample, the average yearly likelihood of a conflict is 1%
per cell. The average cell experiences 3 drought months per year, and its mean yearly
water mass change is about 0.55 centimeters of equivalent water thickness. Further
descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Sd Min Max N
Social conflict 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 177200
∆ Water mass 0.00 1.00 -11.30 27.30 177200
Drought months 3.23 2.88 0.00 12.00 177200
Surface water 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 177200
Low groundwater depth 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 177200
Groundwater access 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 177200
Irrigation 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 177200
Urban 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.66 177200
Mining 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 177200
State target conflict 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 177200
Non-state target conflict 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 177200
Resource conflict 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 177200
Temperature 24.48 3.99 4.96 33.11 177136
Meridional velocity 0.11 0.95 -5.78 4.09 177200
Zonal velocity -10.63 8.18 -32.41 13.92 177200
Conflict measures
Our main dependent variable measures Social conflict incidence and indicates whether
a cell experiences at least one conflict event in a certain year. We use conflict event
information from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (version 3.3) that
reports social conflict events over the years 1990 to 2017, covering all of Africa, Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean, with exact information on the location and time
of each event (Salehyan et al., 2012). The dataset is unique in that it focuses on
smaller scale social and local conflict events, which are more likely to be triggered by
water shortage. Social conflict includes protests, riots, inter-communal conflict, and
repression among others. It excludes large-scale conflict like civil wars, organized
rebellions and international wars (Salehyan et al., 2012). The spatial distribution of
the conflict events in figure 4.1 shows that social conflict is widely distributed across
the geographical area of the sample, with two major conflict clusters in the North of
Nigeria and another one in Tunisia.
To investigate which types of conflict are especially driven by water scarcity, we clas-
sify conflict events based on definitions of the SCAD dataset. First, we divide conflict
events by their target into State target conflict, capturing conflict events targeting the
central government, and Non-state target conflict that targets other actors. Second,
we limit our attention to Resource conflict, defined as such if food, water, subsistence,
or environmental degradation were mentioned as the first, second or third most
important source of tension.
39
Chapter 4. Water scarcity and conflict
FIGURE 4.1: Distribution of conflict events
 
Note: The figure shows the location of conflict events during the sample period. Source: SCAD.
Water mass change
Our main explanatory variable is the change of water mass per grid cell and year,
expressed in standard deviations. Water mass incorporates all kinds of water, in-
cluding soil moisture, groundwater as well as surface water like rivers and lakes.
Hence, it measures the change in total available water within a certain grid cell.
To compute this measure, we rely on a novel data source that records water mass
movements based on satellite data for the years 2002 to 2017. More specifically, we
use the processed GRCTellus JPL Mascon monthly mass grid dataset (release 6) that
is based on observations of global mass flux gathered by the Gravity Recovery and
Climate Experiment (GRACE) mission from US and German space agencies (NASA
and DLR) (Wiese et al., 2018; Watkins et al., 2015; Landerer et al., 2020; Wiese et al.,
2016).
Water mass changes are measured by the small changes in the distance between two
satellites that follow each other in orbit when circulating around the Earth. The small
changes arise out of shifts in the Earth’s gravity field. Less water mass on Earth
results in a weaker gravity field, whereas more water mass leads to a stronger gravity
(Cooley and Landerer, 2019). The Mascon processing procedure uses geophysical con-
straints on the regional level to filter out noise and does not need further de-striping
algorithms or smoothing, like traditional spherical harmonic gravity solutions do
(Watkins et al., 2015).6 Additionally, a Coastal Resolution Improvement (CRI) filter is
applied to the data. The processed data records water mass anomalies of each month
with respect to the time average of 2004 to 2009 at the 0.5 degree grid-cell level in
equivalent water mass thickness in centimeters. However, it is important to note
that the native resolution of measurement is at the 3 degree grid level. Therefore, we
cluster standard errors at that level to allow for the interdependence of measurement.
Gain factors derived from a CLM hydrological model are applied to the data to
6For a detailed description of the processing procedure see Watkins et al. (2015) and Wiese et al.
(2016).
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extrapolate the GRACE estimates from their effective spatial resolution to the finer
spatial scale. As these factors are much closer to a resolution of 1 for the spherical
harmonic gravity solutions, we provide additional regressions at the 1 degree level as
a robustness check. This novel dataset has been validated with other data sources
(Scanlon et al., 2016; Chambers and Bonin, 2012; Klosko et al., 2009).
We aggregate the data on a yearly level by taking the average over all months in a
year. Figure 4.2 depicts the spatial distribution of negative changes in water mass in
our sample. It shows that the decline in water mass visibly varies in our sample area,
and that there are geographical clusters. The Northern part of Central America and
the Sahel-region experienced water declines in almost all years of the sample period,
whereas Burundi and Rwanda experienced only few years of water reduction.






Note: The figure reports the number of years with negative changes in water mass. Source: GRACE
Tellus and FO, Nasa and DLR.
Drought months
In our empirical analysis, we instrument the change in water mass by the duration
of drought measured by the number of drought months within a year. We base
our drought indicator on the standardized precipitation and evapotranspiration
index from the SPEIbase (version 2.5), computed at a 3-month scale. The SPEIbase
reports monthly information on drought conditions at a 0.5 grid cell resolution. It
measures precipitation anomalies by a standardized z-score that is based on monthly
precipitation and potential evapotranspiration information provided by the Climatic
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). We define
a month to be affected by a drought if the SPEI value is below −1 in a given grid
cell and count the number of months with drought per year. The spatial distribution
of average drought months per year is shown in figure 4.3. During our sample
period, Central Africa has been less affected by droughts than North Africa where
droughts were pervasive, with an average of more than 6 drought months per year.
The majority of cells located in Central America experienced on average 2 to 4 months
of droughts per year.
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 Note: The figure reports the average number of months with SPEI values below -1 per year during the
sample period 2002 - 2017. Source: SPEIbase.
Demand and supply factors
In the heterogeneity analysis, we investigate differential effects of water mass change
on conflict by interacting them with time-invariant measures of water supply and
demand. As supply factors we consider the availability of surface water and access to
groundwater. We define a cell to hold Surface water if a river or lake is located within
the respective cell. Information on the geographical location of rivers and lakes is
taken from the river and lake centerlines map (version 4.1) provided by (Natural
Earth, 2020). Groundwater access is an indicator variable that combines information
on groundwater storage and depth to groundwater. We define a cell as having
access to groundwater if two conditions are fulfilled at the same time: it is part of a
high groundwater storage area and the depth to groundwater is low. Information
on groundwater storage is taken from the Groundwater Resources of the World
database (WHY map BGR version 1.0) provided by the World-wide Hydrogeological
Mapping and Assessment Programme. It classifies groundwater sources based on
the geological components of the aquifer in three categories: major groundwater
basin, complex hydrological structure and shallow and local aquifer. Based on this
information, we define a cell as having high groundwater storage if its groundwater
source is classified as a part of a major groundwater basin or of a complex hydrological
structure (Richts et al., 2011). Information on the depth until reaching groundwater
is taken from Fan et al. (2013). Their map gives water table depths in meters below
land surface at a 1 km grid resolution. The map is constructed by integrating over 1
million data points measured at well sites into a groundwater model. We aggregate
the information to a 0.5 degree resolution and divide locations along the median
(approximately 25 mbgl). Based on these definitions, around 30% of our sample has
access to groundwater.
With around 70% of total water use, agriculture is the far biggest consumer of water
in the world (Siebert et al., 2013). In agriculture, water is mainly used to irrigate crops.
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Therefore, we operationalize agricultural water demand by identifying areas that are
irrigated. We base our measure on the global irrigated area map (GIAM) provided
by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) (Thenkabail et al., 2009).
Using satellite images, the map identifies irrigated areas in 2000 at a 10 km resolution.
Based on these data, we construct the indicator variable Irrigation that takes the value
of one if an irrigated area is located in a cell. 30% of the grid cells in our sample have
irrigated areas.
Mining is another sector that can heavily rely on water. Water is needed for a
broad range of activities in the mining process such as mineral processing and
dust suppression (Garner et al., 2012). We use the major mineral deposits of the
world dataset provided by U.S. Geological Survey (Schulz and Briskey, 2005) in
combination with the global-scale data set of mining areas to identify locations with
mining potential (Maus et al., 2020). The USGS dataset provides the geographical
location of deposits of major non-fuel mineral commodities whereas the latter dataset
identifies mining areas using satellite images. Based on this information, we define a
cell as potentially active in Mining if at least one major known mineral deposit or a
mining area is present in the cell.
Water consumption increases with population size. Therefore, as a third water
demand factor, we distinguish grid cells based on their population size. We rely on the
Urban Extents Grid database provided by the Socioeconomic Data and Application
Center (SEDAC) that differentiates urban and rural areas based on population size,
settlement areas, and the presence of nighttime lights. On a 30 arc second resolution,
urban areas are identified by connected lighted cells or settlement points for which
the total population is greater than 5,000 persons (SEDAC, 2011; Balk et al., 2006). We
aggregate the data to the 0.5 degree resolution and define cells with any urban area
as Urban.
Atmospheric factors
As a robustness check, we control for two atmospheric factors potentially threatening
the exclusion restriction of our instrument. We control for average Temperature per
year in a cell and two dimensions of wind speed. We rely on monthly averages
provided by the NCEP/NCAR 40-year reanalysis project from the Physical Science
Laboratory (PSL) that processes daily data on wind speed and temperature from
the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NOAA) (Kalnay et al., 1996).
Temperature data are reported in degree Celsius, whereas wind speed is measured
as Zonal wind velocity and Meridional wind velocity. Zonal wind velocity measures
the wind speed in meter per second in the west-east direction, whereas meridional
wind velocity captures wind speed in north-south direction. We separate wind speed
by direction because the direction of the wind flows is associated with different
meteorological conditions. Meridional flows tend go along with extreme weather
events, whereas zonal wind is connected to quiet weather conditions (Milrad, 2017).
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We aggregate the data to the spatial resolution of 0.5 degrees and to a yearly level by
taking averages.
4.3.2 Temporal trend in the change of water mass
The novel dataset on water mass change enables us to observe how water movements
change over time. The left panel of figure 4.4 presents the average water mass change
in equivalent water mass thickness in centimeters over the sample period of 2002 to
2017 (compared to the time average of 2004 to 2009). It reports average water mass
change for the whole world as well as for the two continents included in our conflict
data sample, Africa and Central America combined with Mexico. The right panel of
figure 4.4 shows how the standard deviation of water change developed over time.
FIGURE 4.4: Change of water mass over time
 
 
Note: The figure reports the average water mass change over the years 2002–2017. Water includes all
kinds of surface and underground water. Source: GRACE Tellus and FO, Nasa and DLR.
On a global level, the data depicts the expected patterns associated with climate
change and the increased demand for water. On the one hand, the change in water
mass follows a strongly negative trend, with larger water mass declines in later
years. On the other hand, the spatial variation in water mass change has substantially
increased since 2006, reflecting the more unequal distribution of rainfall in the world.
This highlights that localized water scarcity is likely to become more prevalent in the
future.
Within our chosen geographical area, we see two distinct trends. Water mass change
in Central America follows a negative trend that is broadly similar to the global one.
However, it strongly surpasses the global declines by the end of our time period. By
contrast, average water mass in Africa has increased over the last decade. In both
areas, the variation of water mass change has substantially increased over time. It is
also evident that some locations are more affected by water decline than others (see
figure 4.2 and the description above). The following empirical analysis will utilize
this spatial and temporal variation of water mass change to infer the effect of change
in water mass on social conflict.
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4.4 Empirical strategy
In order to estimate a causal effect of change in water mass on conflict incidence, we
apply an instrumental variable approach, using the temporal and spatial variation of
negative rainfall shocks. Our baseline estimation model is defined as follows:
Social conflictict = β ∆Water massict + αct + µi + εict, (4.1)
where Social conflictict is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a social
conflict event occurred in year t and grid cell i, located in country c. ∆ Water massict
measures the change of water mass in standard deviations in the respective year and
cell. Throughout all estimations, β is the coefficient of interest, measuring the effect
of local water mass change on the likelihood of conflict. In all estimation models,
standard errors are robust and clustered at the 3 degree grid-cell level to account for
the native resolution of measurement of water mass change.
The regressions include cell fixed effects, µi, combined with year or country-year fixed
effects, αct. Cell fixed effects control for all time invariant differences, absorbing spatial
differences in average changes of water mass and the propensity to experience conflict.
Year fixed effects absorb major shocks, such as global economic crises or El Niño
years. Country-year fixed effects, which we use in our preferred specifications instead,
account for more idiosyncratic yearly variation in the national water management
system, climatic conditions, as well as of country-wide political, social and economic
shocks.
A remaining endogeneity problem arises as local changes in water mass are not
random but also reflect variation in water demand by the local population. For
instance, a massive immigrant inflow may increase local water demand, resulting
in a decline of water mass, and at the same time provoke conflict (Brückner, 2010).
This would lead to a spurious negative correlation between water availability and
conflict. Alternatively, positive income shocks due to an increase in commodity prices
may lead to a higher demand for water (due to more irrigation) but also increase the
opportunity costs of social unrest (Dube and Vargas, 2013), potentially biasing a true
negative relationship between changing water availability and conflict towards zero.
To deal with these endogeneity concerns, we instrument the change in water mass by a
measure of exogenous weather shocks that drive local water availability: the number
of drought months in the respective year and cell. Our second stage regression
remains as described by equation eq:model, but it is extended by a first stage that
takes the following form:
∆ Water massict = θ Drought monthsict + αct + µi + εict, (4.2)
and includes both cell fixed effects, µi, and year or country-year effects, αct.
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The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that the duration of drought deter-
mines the change in local water mass and affects the incidence of violent conflict only
through this channel. Apart from groundwater storage, runoff and underground
water flows, rainfall is the main determinant of local water supply. Hence, rainfall
anomalies provide an excellent instrument for water mass change. Rainfall anomalies
have been widely used in the conflict literature as an instrument for economic shocks
in developing countries (Miguel et al., 2004; Ciccone, 2011; Harari and Ferrara, 2018).
These studies argue that in agriculture-based economies, the lack of rainfall reduces
crop yields (because of water scarcity), acting as an economic shock. Our approach
follows this argument, yet we also emphasize that a change in water availability may
affect conflict directly as well, for instance because of arising water right disputes or
civil unrest. The drought instrument provides a local average treatment effect (LATE)
by isolating the effect of water mass change that is induced by exogenous weather
shocks.
We argue that conditional on cell and country-year fixed effects, the number of
drought months is exogenous to conflict incidence. Whereas the number of rainfall
anomalies varies across climatic zones and with geographical factors like terrain
or elevation, and the local susceptibility to climatic change (which potentially also
affects the likelihood of conflict (Breckner and Sunde, 2019)), the spatial and temporal
distribution of rainfall deviations within a grid cell and year is as good as random.
A final concern arises with respect to the exclusion restriction of the instrument as
droughts may be correlated with other atmospheric factors, like temperature or wind,
which can affect conflict directly. For instance, heat may trigger aggressive behavior
(Anderson, 1989), while at the same time, it is likely to accompany droughts. Heavy
wind speed can disrupt economic activities (Nelson, 2010; Slettebak, 2012), while
being correlated with the occurrence of precipitation (Waliser and Guan, 2017). If
rainfall anomalies are closely linked to such atmospheric factors, we falsely attribute
their effect to that of localized droughts. By that, we would overestimate the effect of
water scarcity on conflict. We address this concern in a robustness check in which we
control for the two main atmospheric factors, including Temperature and Zonal and
Meridional wind speed as control variables in both stages of our regressions.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Baseline results
Table 4.2 reports our baseline results from regressing the incidence of social conflict
on the change of water mass, conditional on fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS
estimates, whereas columns 3 and 4 present our preferred specifications in which
the change in water mass is instrumented by the number of drought months of the
respective year. In odd columns, the models include cell and year fixed effects. The
even columns present models with cell and country-year fixed effects, which are even
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more restrictive. The OLS results in columns 1 and 2 show no significant correlation
between a change in water mass and conflict after controlling for time-invariant
cell characteristics and global or nation-wide temporal shocks. The OLS results are
most likely biased though, as water mass change responds strongly to economic and
political factors influencing water demand and conflict at the same time.
TABLE 4.2: Baseline results
Dependent variable Social conflict
Model OLS IV: Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Water mass -0.000 0.000 -0.008*** -0.014*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008)
Dependent variable ∆ Water mass
Model IV: First stage
Drought months -0.045*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.004)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 49.11 24.01
Stock-Yogo critical value 10% 16.38 16.38
Observations 177,200 177,200 177,200 177,200
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports OLS and IV coefficient estimates of an indicator variable for social
conflict on the change of water mass within each cell. Models include fixed effects as stated
in the table. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 3 degree cell level.
We address the potential endogeneity concern by instrumenting the change of water
mass by the number of drought months. The first stage results show a highly signifi-
cant effect of drought months on the change in the local water mass. The significant
effect and the high Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic (49.1) confirm the relevance of our
instrument. Conditional on cell and year fixed effects, a further drought month is
estimated to induce a 0.045 standard deviations stronger decline in water mass. The
effect is significant at the 1% level. The more restrictive model, including cell and
country-year fixed effects (column 4), factors out large-scale climatic shocks that
affect whole countries. It relies on within country variation in drought months only.
In this specification, the effect decreases to 0.02 standard deviations. Its statistical
significance remains high. At the second stage, the IV results show a negative and sig-
nificant relationship between shifts in the water mass and conflict years. Controlling
for cell and year fixed effects, a one standard deviation larger decrease in the local
water mass increases the likelihood of social conflict by 0.8 percentage points. Con-
ditional on cell and country-year fixed effects, this effect increases to 1.4 percentage
points. With an average yearly likelihood of conflict of 1%, the effect is substantial
47
Chapter 4. Water scarcity and conflict
as one standard deviation lower change in water mass more than doubles the local
likelihood of conflict.
We conclude that changes in water availability, induced by exogenous variation in the
local duration of drought, shape the likelihood of conflict. Yet, we find no correlation
between change in water mass and conflict in the OLS setting, indicating that the
OLS estimates are biased upward. This suggests that increases in water demand go
along with factors reducing the likelihood of conflict. For instance, water demand is
likely to rise during economic upturns, e.g. when the local population is better able to
purchase additional water resources from other locations. At the same time, economic
growth reflects higher opportunity costs to fight. An alternative interpretation of
the results is that drought-induced changes in water mass have a different effect
as compared to changes in water mass caused by a higher water demand. We will
explore the differential effects by water demand and supply factors next. In what
follows, we will only focus on our more restrictive IV model from column 4 of table
4.2 that includes both cell and country-year fixed effects.
4.5.2 Heterogeneous effects by supply and demand factors
Water scarcity arises when local water demand exceeds the current water supply. It
can result out of a higher demand of water, a lower supply of water or a combination
of both. Around the globe, water supply varies strongly. Whereas some regions are
equipped with large and persistent groundwater storage, reducing their susceptibility
to rainfall shocks and water demand shocks, other regions lack such a buffer and
are more vulnerable to shifts in water demand or supply. Yet, even if groundwater
storage is high, it may be unreachable for the local population if it is situated deep
underground. Hence, we expect heterogeneous effects of changes in water mass on
conflict depending on the local accessibility and amount of water.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 4.3 present the heterogeneous effects of water mass change
on conflict by supply factors. We investigate the heterogeneity by estimating the
differential effect of drought in water-rich as compared to water-poor locations.
Therefore, we include an interaction term of water mass change and the respective
time-invariant supply factor in the regression as second, potentially endogenous,
explanatory variable. To deal with the additionally arising endogeneity, we add
the interaction of drought months with the respective supply factor as a further
instrument to both first stages. In table 4.3 we report only the first stage for water
mass change and suppress the first stage for the interaction. Column 1 presents
results differentiated by the availability of surface water and column 2 by access to
groundwater. First stage results show that drought months reduce the measured
water mass substantially more in places with surface water compared to locations
without surface water (column 1). We find no significant difference in the effect
of drought on total water mass change in places with a better or worse access to
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groundwater (column 2). Taken together, the two sets of results indicate that water
mass at the surface varies more strongly with drought than the one underground.
The second stage results show no significant difference in the effect of water mass
change on conflict depending on the presence of surface water (column 1). But, the
effect varies significantly with access to groundwater. In cells with an easier access
to groundwater, a standard deviation larger decrease in water mass increases the
likelihood of conflict by 0.6 percentage points only as compared to 1.8 percentage
points in case of inaccessible groundwater. Consequently, local access to abundant
groundwater can act as a buffer of climatic shocks, substantially reducing the effect
of drought shocks on conflict.
TABLE 4.3: Heterogeneous effects by water demand and supply factors
Dependent variable Social conflict
Interacted factor Surface Groundw. Irri- Mining Urban
water access gation
Model IV: Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Water mass -0.017** -0.018** -0.021** -0.016** -0.015*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
× Interacted factor 0.006 0.011* 0.014** 0.009 0.031
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.066)
Dependent variable ∆ Water mass
Model IV: First stage
Drought months -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
× Interacted factor -0.013** -0.005 -0.012* -0.007 -0.139*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.055)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 12.08 12.15 10.27 12.16 10.67
Observations 177,200 177,200 177,200 177,200 177,200
Note: The table reports IV coefficient estimates of the incidence of social conflict within each cell on
the change of water mass and interactions with supply and demand side factors. The interactions of
water change and the various supply and demand factors are instrumented by drought months and
the interaction of drought months with the respective factor (the latter first stage is not reported here).
Surface water measures the presence of rivers or lakes within the cell; groundwater access indicates
low depth to groundwater and high groundwater storage; irrigation indicates the presence of any
irrigated area within the cell; mining indicates the presence of major mineral deposits; urban marks
cells with urban areas. The models include cell and country-year fixed effects (see column 4 of table
4.2). The Stock and Yogo critical value for a 10% bias is 7.03 in all regressions. Standard errors are
clustered at the 3 degree cell level.
Like water supply, water demand is distributed unevenly in space. Accounting for
around 70% of the total water demand, agriculture is the main water consumer in
the world (Otto and Schleifer, 2020). Additionally, water demand is higher in more
populated areas and in locations where water-intensive industries are located such as
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mining and energy production (Otto and Schleifer, 2020). The pivotal role of water in
these areas leads us to hypothesize that the effect of water mass change on conflict is
stronger in locations with higher water demand compared to locations with lower
water demand.
We analyze the heterogeneous effects by water demand focusing on the wide-spread
prevalence of irrigation, the potential presence of mining and urbanization. The
demand factors enter the regression in the form of interactions, similar to the supply
factors above. Column 3 in table 4.3 presents the results for irrigation, column 4
for mining, whereas column 5 shows the heterogeneous effects by urbanization. In
the first stages, we estimate a stronger reduction in water mass in the aftermath of
drought both in irrigated and urbanized areas compared to non-irrigated and less
urbanized areas. We find no differential effect by mining potential. These results
indicate that during drought even more water is consumed in economically more
advanced rural as well as in more urbanized areas.
Surprisingly, the second stage results show a weaker increase in conflict with declines
in water availability in irrigated areas compared to non-irrigated areas. We find no
differential effects by mining activities or urbanization. A potential explanation of
the weaker effect in irrigated areas is the strategic location of irrigated agricultural
production in areas with groundwater access, which hampers a clean distinction
between the effects of irrigation and groundwater access. Overall, the results do not
confirm our hypothesis. They indicate that although water demand factors accelerate
water scarcity, they do not intensify the effect of water mass change on conflict.
4.5.3 Robustness checks
In our main analysis, we focus on social conflict. Yet, apart from social disputes
over a scarce resource and its fair distribution, water scarcity may exacerbate already
existing grievance, decreasing the opportunity costs to fight and increasing the
possibilities of rebel groups to recruit new members. Moreover, rebel groups can
strategically damage and capture water infrastructure in order to increase pressure
on the population and government, advancing their goals (CNA, 2017). Additionally,
water scarcity may provoke political unrest, holding the government accountable
for bad water management. Governments may be expected to control both water
demand and supply. On the one hand, governments can limit water demand by
regulating water-intensive industries and establishing water-use policies. On the
other hand, they can improve the water supply by investing in water infrastructure.
For instance governments can invest in the construction of dams or water reservoirs,
waste water management, and in facilitating access to groundwater sources.
In order to analyze what types of conflict are caused by water scarcity, we classify
the SCAD conflict events into conflict events targeting the state and non-state actors.
Additionally, we analyze resource conflict by focusing on those conflict events that
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were explicitly listed as arising out of tensions dealing with water, food, subsistence,
and environmental degradation. The results are reported in table 4.4, which shows
that the conflict inducing effects of water declines are driven by conflict events target-
ing the state but not those that are targeting other actors. Civil unrest, demonstrating
dissatisfaction with the government, is a major factor driving the effect of water mass
change on the likelihood of conflict in our study. Surprisingly, the results show no
effect of water mass change on resource conflict. However, this null result is most
likely driven by a lack of power (and a potential for mis-reporting) as out a total
of 1133 conflict occurrences at the cell-year level only 71 are classified as resource
conflict.
TABLE 4.4: Types of conflict
Dependent variable: State target Non-state target Resource
conflict conflict conflict
Model: IV: Second stage
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Water mass -0.011** -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Dependent variable: ∆ Water mass
Model: IV: First stage
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 177,200 177,200 177,200
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 24.01 24.01 24.01
Note: The table reports IV coefficient estimates of various types of conflict on water
change. State target conflict refers to conflicts that targeted the government and non-
state target conflict the rest of the conflicts. Resource conflicts are conflicts about water,
food, subsistence of environmental degradation. Models include cell and country-year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 3 degree grid cell level.
The exclusion restriction of our instrumental variable approach might not hold if
atmospheric factors, which enter our drought measures through the estimation of
evapotranspiration, affect conflict directly. In order to account for this second channel,
we include two main atmospheric factors, temperature and two measures of wind
speed, as control variables in the regression. The results are presented in table 4.5.
At the first stage, we see the expected relationship between water mass change and
atmospheric conditions. Higher temperatures go along with larger decreases in water
mass. Zonal wind speed (measuring wind flows from west to east or vice versa) is not
related to changes in the water mass, but meridional velocity, which is associated with
extreme weather trends (Milrad, 2017), is negatively linked to water mass change. At
the second stage, the inclusion of the additional control variables leads to at most
marginal changes in the effect of water mass change on conflict. Thus, the results
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fully support the validity of our empirical strategy. With respect to the atmospheric
factors, the results show ceteris paribus no significant relationship between conflict
and average temperatures or wind speed.
TABLE 4.5: Additional controls
Dependent variable Social conflict
Model IV: Second stage
(1) (2) (3)




Meridional velocity -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Zonal velocity -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Dependent variable ∆ Water mass
Model IV: First stage




Meridional velocity -0.052** -0.058**
(0.020) (0.020)
Zonal velocity 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 19.93 24.03 19.97
Observations 177,136 177,200 177,136
Note: The table reports IV coefficients of social conflict on water mass
change controlling for atmospheric factors. Models include cell and
country-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 3
degree grid cell level.
A decrease in rainfall will directly reduce water availability at the surface, but it also
has a retarded effect on groundwater recharge and groundwater levels, triggering a
groundwater drought (Han et al., 2019). The delay depends on the speed of water
movements, which is determined by geological and geographical characteristics (Han
et al., 2019). If a population relies mainly on groundwater sources, the retarded effect
may have a stronger impact on their behavior than the immediate one. Hence, past
water mass change may contribute to conflict, too.
To investigate the temporal dynamics, we include temporal lags of the explanatory
variables in our models. Table 4.6 presents the results. Column 1 shows the baseline
regression for the shorter sample period, column 2 includes the first temporal lag
of drought months, whereas column 3 includes temporal lags for both drought
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months and water mass change. The reduction in the sample period only marginally
changes the estimated coefficients. A one standard deviation larger water mass
reduction increases the likelihood of conflict by 1.8 percentage points as compared
to 1.4 percentage points in the main sample (cf. table 4.2). Column 2 includes the
temporal lag of drought months as an additional instrument, whereas in column 3
past water mass change is added to the second stage to measure the delayed effect
of water scarcity. In this latter specification, past water mass change is instrumented
by past drought months. The first stage results in both columns report that drought
indeed has a cumulative effect on water mass change over time. The duration of
drought in the previous year magnifies the decrease in water mass in the current
year. The second stage estimates of water mass change on conflict stay of a broadly
comparable magnitude throughout all three specifications. In column 3, the temporal
lag of water mass change is not significant. The weak instrument tests also show
F-statistics that lie below the critical values for a 10% potential bias in the IV estimates
and indicate that these dynamic results should be interpreted with more caution
than our baseline model. Nonetheless, the first and second stage results indicate that
droughts have a longer-lasting effect on conflict due to their cumulative effects on
water availability. Only current water mass decline seems to induce conflict, while
conditional on the current decline, past fluctuations in water availability do not result
in more conflict at the present time. Past droughts matter because of their longer
lasting effects on water availability, whereas water availability has only an immediate
effect on the likelihood of conflict.
TABLE 4.6: Time dynamics
Dependent variable Social conflict
Model IV: Second stage
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Water mass -0.018* -0.014* -0.015*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Water masst−1 0.007
(0.006)
Dependent variable ∆ Water mass
Model IV: First stage
Drought months -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Drought monthst−1 -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.76 8.573 6.813
Stock-Yogo critical value 10% 16.38 19.93 7.03
Observations 166,125 166,125 166,125
Note: The table reports IV coefficient estimates of social conflict on
present and past changes in water mass at the cell level. Water mass
change is instrumented by the number of past and present drought
months. Models include cell and country-year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the 3 degree grid cell level.
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As a final step, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the spatial resolution
used in the analysis. Our outcome variable, the incidence of social conflict, and our
instrumental variable, the number of drought months, are both measured at the 0.5
degree resolution. This allows us to establish a precise geographical link between
local climatic factors and specific conflict events. However, the main explanatory
variable, the change in water mass, is only spatially modelled (extrapolated) to a level
between 0.5 and 1 degrees. Its precise measurement is based at the 3 degree resolution.
We have addressed the spatial interdependence of the changes in water mass that
were caused by the higher level of original measurement by clustering the standard
errors at the 3 degree level throughout our analyses. This takes into account all
potential correlation between the error terms that is induced by measurement errors
within the 3-degree grid cell. Alternatively, we re-run the baseline regression on the 1
degree grid-cell resolution to analyze the sensitivity of our estimates to our selection
of the spatial resolution. The results are reported in table B.1. Column 1 presents the
estimates of the model using cell and year fixed effects and column 2 shows the results
of our main specification with cell and country-year fixed effects. In both regression
models, we find a negative and significant effect of change in water mass on conflict,
validating our main results. As shown in column 2, the magnitude of the effect more
than doubles compared to our baseline regression estimate (3.8 percentage points
compared to 1.4 percentage points), increasing the average likelihood of conflict at
this resolution from 1.3% to 5.1%. This indicates that the higher spatial resolution
may result in more measurement error and bias our estimated coefficients towards
zero.
4.6 Conclusion
Due to the ongoing climate change and a globally rising demand for water, the
consequences of water scarcity have been gaining policy importance. In this paper,
we assess the effects of changing water availability on conflict at the local level. In a
cell-year panel covering Africa, Central America and the Caribbean over the years of
2002 to 2017, we estimate the effect of changes in the total available water mass on the
likelihood of conflict. For this purpose, we combine novel satellite data on water mass
movements, provided by the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE)
mission from US and German space agencies (NASA and DLR), with social conflict
events from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD). In order to establish
a causal effect of water mass change on conflict, we implement an instrumental
variable approach, instrumenting changes in total water mass by the number of
drought months per year, based on the SPEI.
Our estimates reveal the total effect of a reduction in local water mass on conflict,
resulting from rainfall shocks, less runoff but also groundwater depletion. Thus, we
contribute to the literature by not only focusing on the effects of drought shocks in a
reduced form, but linking social conflicts to their true driver, the worsening access to
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water that is a vital natural resource. Our results show that a reduction in total water
mass increases the likelihood of conflict. A one standard deviation larger decrease in
water mass more than doubles the likelihood of local conflict, which is a substantial
effect. We find considerable heterogeneity in the effects by water supply factors.
Acting as a buffer, access to groundwater reduces the effect of water mass change on
conflict. We find no robust evidence for differential effects by water demand factors
on conflict. Yet, our results show that a higher water demand amplifies the negative
effects of droughts on local water mass. Moreover, the results indicate that studies
focusing on the effects of contemporaneous droughts tend to underestimate the scope
of their effects as local water availability responds strongly not only to current but
also to past droughts.
Our results highlight that governments’ water resource management strategies play
a crucial role not only for climate change adaptation but also for reducing the local
potential of social conflict. Facilitating access to groundwater can reduce the sus-
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5.1 Abstract
After a civil war, community support for the reintegration of ex-combatants is crucial
for peace-building. Using a crowdfunding campaign to promote business ideas of
trainees at a vocational school (SENA), we study the process of peace-building in
Colombia. We investigate whether university students discriminate against ex-rebels
and test if mediated inter-group contact generates positive attitudes towards them.
Our results show that compared with other trainees, there is no discrimination against
demobilized ex-guerrillas in terms of donations, but there is a substantial degree
of prejudice and skepticism towards them. Mediated inter-group contact improves
attitudes towards the demobilized. Hence, the use of media could be a suitable
instrument to sensitize people in post-conflict settings to support the peace-building
process and boost positive attitudes towards ex-rebels.
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5.2 Introduction
A peace declaration and the disarmament of fighters are the first steps in reconstruct-
ing peace after a civil war. In order to sustain the declared peace, a successful social
and economic reintegration of ex-fighters is necessary as post-conflict societies risk
recidivism once ex-combatants feel socially isolated and become economically worse
off (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Knight and Özerdem, 2004). Yet, the success of the
reintegration process depends crucially on the attitudes and behaviors of a society
towards its ex-combatants (Bauer et al., 2017; Kaplan and Nussio, 2018). If community
support for reintegration is either missing directly, through discrimination in personal
encounters with ex-combatants, or indirectly, through a lack of societal support, the
peace reconstruction efforts of policymakers may fail.
Community support for the reintegration of ex-combatants is a crucial but also
challenging point. On the one hand, the community has an incentive to overcome
violence; on the other hand, the civil society has suffered under the violent acts of
former combatants (e.g. Miguel and Roland, 2011; Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2014;
Bertoni et al., 2019), causing fear, mistrust and skepticism towards fighters. Moreover,
civil wars segregate and polarize a society, causing division among citizens along
diverse dimensions like “enemy vs. friend” or “offender vs. victim” (Cilliers et al.,
2016). These in-group/out-group stereotypes - once established – often persist even
when conflict ends and may be manifested in discriminatory behavior.
In this paper we study the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion (DDR) after the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC–EP) in 2016. Colombia is a suitable
setting for our research as peace construction is at the forefront of the political agenda.
However, a large fraction of the population (50.2%) rejected the peace referendum in
2016, showing that polarization and scepticism in the society is high, and raising the
question of what is driving the rejection of peace.
This paper addresses the relevance of discrimination against demobilized persons
in the peace-building process in Colombia. The objective of the paper is twofold.
First, by measuring attitudes and behaviors of university students towards former
combatants, we assess to what extent discrimination and prejudices are present
towards demobilized ex-guerrillas, and whether this discrimination is based on a
dislike of demobilized persons (’taste base discrimination (Becker, 1971)) or rather
on subtle automatic discriminatory behavior (‘implicit discrimination’ (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2005)). Second, we test a potential mechanism used to both sensitize a
civil society towards the peace process, and support acceptance towards reintegrating
ex-guerrillas by employing the contact hypothesis as first defined by Allport (1954).
Successful social reconstruction requires a change in attitudes towards former fighters,
rebuilding trust and removing threats to collective identities so that former conflicting
groups can live and work together peacefully and accept each other (Nadler, 2012).
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Given the doubts and skepticism in the society, it is relevant to understand what the
most effective mechanisms are to promote support for the peace process. We focus
on the population group of university students as they are a sizeable and growing
group that represents the potential employers, and policy makers in the future.1
To analyze the behavior and attitude of the civil population towards reintegration, we
run a crowdfunding campaign with more than a thousand participants in four private
and public universities in Colombia. Participants are invited to contribute part of
their earnings in a real effort task to support the business ideas of vocational trainees
enrolled at the National Training program (SENA). This institution has provided
technical and technological training for over 50 years. The crowdfunding campaign
is suitable setting to investigate reintegration, as it comprises two critical dimensions:
the integration of ex-combatants into the labor market as well as social acceptance of
different population groups.
Our experimental design exogenously varies the information that participants receive
about the beneficiary’s group identity. This manipulation allows us to determine
whether participants show less support for the business ideas of demobilized trainees
than to the business ideas of their non-demobilized counterparts. In a between-subject
design, we also vary the information available to participants on the socio-economic
characteristics of the beneficiaries, which allows us to capture two different forms of
discrimination: ’total’ and ’taste-based’.
Following the literature on mediated contact (e.g. Voci and Hewstone, 2003; Turner
et al., 2010), we test whether positive attitudes towards demobilized persons can be
generated through contact with ex-guerrillas via a video. Half of the participants
were randomly exposed to a 5-minute video in which two trainees presented them-
selves and their business ideas; in one video the trainees were demobilized and in
the other they were non-demobilized. By comparing differences in support in the
crowdfunding campaign given to non-demobilized and demobilized beneficiaries
in the contact treatments with those in the no-contact treatments, we evaluate the
effectiveness of the contact to decrease discrimination.
We decided to use a low-intensity, indirect, and temporarily brief contact situation, via
media, as a proxy for mass communication, which is a cost effective way to address
the general population. In addition, the video enables us to ensure that the contact is
overall positive and comparable. Due to the short contact duration, our estimates can
be regarded as a lower bound and a first step to sensitize the population.
Apart from donations, we investigate whether there is prejudice towards demobilized
ex-rebels, by asking participants about their attitudes towards demobilized ex-rebels
and the peace-building process. Using a single category implicit association test
(SC-IAT) (Karpinski and Steinman, 2006) we further study ‘implicit discrimination‘,
1Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education amount to 55% in Colombia and is on a positive trend
(Worldbank, 2020).
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which refers to subtle automatic discriminatory behavior (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2005).
This paper contributes to the growing literature on peacebuilding. While most ex-
isting studies focus on the reintegration process from the perspective of ex-fighters
(e.g. Annan et al., 2011; Betancourt et al., 2010; Gilligan et al., 2013; Humphreys and
Weinstein, 2007), we consider the attitudes of the civil population instead. Rela-
tively few studies investigate discrimination towards ex-combatants, and their results
vary. Osborne et al. (2018) find that Ugandan community members committed 15%
fewer resources to ex-combatants in a cooperation and sharing game, compared
to other community members. Cardenas and Mendez (2014) support this finding,
showing that in experimental games in Colombia less resources are distributed to
ex-combatants compared to displaced people. On the contrary, the findings by
Bauer et al. (2017) show no preference-based discrimination and mistrust towards
ex-combatants in Uganda. We advance this research by assessing the diverse dimen-
sions of discrimination towards ex-combatants undergoing reintegration, considering
support, attitudes, and implicit discrimination. Furthermore, we focus on the process
of changing attitudes towards ex-combatants by highlighting the fact that individuals
are reintegrating, rather than focusing on their past identity as guerrillas, and by
testing how mediated inter-group contact affects discrimination.
While ample empirical evidence shows that inter-group contact is a good tool to
change attitudes towards stigmatized groups (see for example Pettigrew and Tropp,
2006, for an overview), evidence on the impact of inter-group contact in post-conflict
settings is still limited (Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2013). Evaluating a 4-day peace
workshop with inter-group contact, Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) provide evidence
that the treatment increases empathy and donations towards the conflicting group.
Paluck (2009) analyzes the effects of listening to a radio soap opera involving positive
contact between Hutus and Tutsis on participants’ perceptions about social norms in
a field experiment in Rwanda. She shows that in inter-group settings participants’
perceptions and behavior change, whereas personal beliefs remain constant. Scacco
and Warren (2018) support this finding. Using a field experiment in Nigeria, they
conclude that positive inter-group contact decreases discriminatory behavior and
increases generosity towards the conflicting out-group, but no changes are observed
in stated prejudices. This paper provides evidence on the effects of indirect contact
on various behavioral and attitudinal outcomes in a post-conflict society from a
different cultural and geographical setting, namely from Colombia. By using a
mediated contact situation in the form of a video, we provide two distinct and
valuable contributions to the literature; first, we supplement the literature with a
distinct form of contact that is controllable, relatively cheap in its costs, and easy to
up-scale, and second, we contribute to the literature on the role of media in conflict
and peace transition (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Armand et al., 2020).
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Our results show that there is no discriminatory behavior towards demobilized per-
sons in the donation decisions of participants in the crowd-fund campaign. However,
since charitable giving might not be sufficient in demonstrating a willingness to
discriminate, we complement our analysis with attitudinal measures. We find that
non-discriminatory behavior coexists with discriminatory feelings of prejudice and
fear, as reported by the survey’s attitudes. The mediated contact treatment increases
donations for non-demobilized recipients and demobilized trainees once crucial skills
are highlighted. Participants in the contact treatment report feeling more comfort-
able with demobilized individuals, and like them more compared to the baseline
treatment. Hence, our findings indicate that increased contact decreases taste-based
discrimination. We find no evidence for crowding-out effects of donations by the
contact for any subgroup.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the geograph-
ical and historical context of the study. Section 3 presents the experimental design
and procedure, while section 4 discusses the data and the empirical methodology. In
section 5 the empirical results are presented. Section 6 shows some robustness checks
whereas section 7 discusses important findings and concludes.
5.3 Local Context
Colombia has a long history of armed conflict. The conflict between the government,
left-wing guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and criminal syndicates began in the mid-
1960s and is rooted in the civil war, called ‘La Violencia’ (1948-1958) (UNRIC, 2018).
Starting as a political and social conflict between left-wing rebel groups and the
government, it turned into a drug war with mostly economic incentives during the
1970s and 1980s. Overall, it is one of the most long-standing armed conflicts and
among the most violent, with over 220,000 deaths and 6 million internally displaced
people (Sánchez et al., 2013).
According to Memory History National Center (CNMH), Colombia has experienced
six DDR processes. The first one started in the early 1980s when president Belisario
Betancur Cuartas’ government and three guerrilla groups - the Colombian Revolution-
ary Army (FARC), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and 19th of April Movement
(M19) - agreed on the reintegration of over 2,000 ex-combatants. The second one
led to more than 7,000 demobilized people and occurred in the late 80s and early
90s when peace agreements were reached between president Barco and the M19,
and president Gaviria and the EPL plus other regional militia groupings. The third
wave started in 1994 and is still ongoing. It involves over 30,000 people including
all relevant guerrilla groups. The fourth wave happened between 2003 and 2006,
when president Uribe negotiated the DDR process with more than 31,000 individuals
connected to paramilitary groups. The fifth covered the period 2007 to 2015 (before
the last Peace Accord), with 16,310 demobilized ex-combatants. The last DDR wave
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started in 2016 with the Peace Process signed by president Santos with the FARC
when the reintegration of over 8,000 former guerrilla members was negotiated and
signified the end of the Colombian irregular war.
The 2016 Peace Agreement offered the relocation of demobilized ex-combatants to
transitory areas, and a 2 million COP (500e) lump-sum transfer to facilitate their
social reintegration. To reduce recidivism and poverty outbreaks, legally accredited
former FARC members were entitled to 90% of a minimum salary for up to two years.
Additionally, to promote economic reintegration, the parties negotiated the possibility
for subjects to be granted access to 8 million COP (2000e of seed capital for proven
productive projects). Finally, demobilized persons were given priority for formal
education, knowledge homologation and housing benefits, among others. In ex-
change, they were required to comply with the law, provide a truthful account of their
experiences, show remorse for their actions, and comply with the negotiated ceasefire
(Unidadvictimas, 2017). As part of the education program, demobilized persons re-
ceived vocational training courses at the National Training Service (SENA). SENA is
a public institution that provides technical and technological education to youth and
adults in fields like Administration, Agriculture, Architecture, Construction, Design,
Electricity, Electronics, Mechanics, and Technology. By 2017, approximately 28,000
ex-combatants had received vocational training, and recently more than 2,900 FARC
demobilized members enrolled in SENA (Valero, 2018). Many of the trainees want to
start their own business after completing the program. One limitation, though, is the
lack of access to credit sources. Based on the capital constraints that trainees face, we
decided to launch a crowdfunding campaign to provide support for their business
ideas.
The crowdfunding campaign took place in two major cities of Colombia: Santiago
de Cali and Medellín, the second and third largest cities in Colombia, with over two
million inhabitants. Both cities were strongly affected by the Colombian war and
suffered from major violence during the conflict. Drug cartels operated in Medellín
and Cali during the 1980s and 1990s and FARC was prominent in rural areas. The
two cities are important reintegration areas, too. In total, 73,532 persons have been
demobilized until November 2018 in Colombia; whereby 45,730 demobilized collec-
tively, and 27,802 individually. Medellín and its metropolitan area has the highest
concentration of reintegrating combatants, with around 5,232 persons, corresponding
to 8% of the demobilized population. In Cali, 1,778 demobilized persons are regis-
tered, corresponding to 3% of the population.2 Demobilized persons often like to live
in big cities, as it allows for an anonymous life and there are more job and educational
opportunities than in rural locations (Caramés et al., 2006).
2The numbers were given by the agency of reintegration, and normalization (ARN) in a personal
request.
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5.4 Experimental design and procedures
5.4.1 Experimental design
To study the existence and magnitude of discrimination and prejudices towards
reintegrating ex-guerrillas, and the impact of indirect contact on attitudes towards
demobilized persons, we use a three-stage experimental design. In the first stage,
participants solve a real effort task in which they receive an initial endowment.3 The
task is to observe three figures and pair the figures with the same shape, while one
image is a rotated version of the other. Participants receive a fixed payment of 10,000
COP (3e) if they manage to form 10 pairs. The task is constructed such that everyone
should be able to pass it, and in fact, each participant did so. After finalizing the
initial task, all participants watch a 3-minute video presenting the organization SENA.
In this stage, using a neutral frame, we explain that trainees at SENA are searching
for funding to realize their business ideas. We ask participants if they want to support
the trainees’ business ideas and, if so, the amount they want to donate from their
earnings. Participants can select donations between zero and 10 000 COP (3e), in
increments of 1000 COP (0.3e). In this stage, we introduce the treatments described
below.
In the second stage, we apply a single category implicit association test (SC-IAT)
based on Karpinski and Steinman (2006). In this test, participants have to quickly
associate the objects (figures and words) displayed in the middle of the screen with the
words that appear on the top. Each participant plays two rounds, with 72 randomly
chosen trials, in which the order of the rounds is randomized4. The rounds vary
whether the word demobilized is written below the word good or the word bad. The
idea behind this test is that persons will likely be faster in the round where the word
demobilized is correctly paired with their mental association (good or bad). To facilitate
understanding of the task, each participant plays introductory practice rounds of 24
trials. For a detailed description of the test, see the instructions of part 3 in Table C.6
in the appendix or the description of the test in Karpinski and Steinman (2006).
In the final stage, participants complete a post-experiment questionnaire. We ask
participants about their perceptions of the peace process; their attitudes towards
demobilized, poor and displaced individuals; their conflict experiences; general per-
sonality characteristics; and additional basic socio-economic characteristics like age,
gender, and the subject of study. The final questionnaire, as well as the experiment
instructions, can be seen in the appendix in Table C.6.
3The test is publicly available in the experimental library of psytoolkit.org constructed by Stoet
(2017).
4The pool of objects consisted out of 10 positive and 10 negative associated words and 10 images
associated with demobilized persons
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5.4.2 Treatments
We implement a 2x2x2 between-subject design, where the treatments vary the in-
formation that participants receive about the SENA trainees at the end of the first
stage. We manipulate three dimensions: a) the identity of the recipients (demobilized
or non-demobilized), b) the information about the socio-economic characteristics
of the recipients (SES or non-SES), and c) the indirect contact with persons with
similar identities as the recipients (contact or non-contact). Table 5.1 presents the
experimental design and number of observations per treatment.
TABLE 5.1: Treatments
NON-SES SES
Treatment No. of obs. Treatment No. of obs.
No contact Non-demobilized T1 132 T2 133
No contact Demobilized T3 139 T4 127
Contact Non-demobilized T5 137 T6 132
Contact Demobilized T7 136 T8 122
To introduce the identity of the recipients, we provide a short paragraph describing
the recipients on the screen. In the non-demobilized condition, we ask participants
if they want to support “persons that have been completing a one-year technical
training program in the National Training Service.” In the demobilized setting, we
ask whether they want to support “demobilized persons that have been completing
a one-year technical training program in the National Training Service.” As the
beneficiaries of the program include a large population pool, the first condition helps
as a control for non-demobilized population. We use the term "demobilized" as
opposed to "ex-guerrilla fighters" to focus the attention on peace-building and avoid
inducing negative views related to the civil war. Non-demobilized SENA trainees
are an adequate control group as they are similar in socio-economic backgrounds
to demobilized trainees, share a current activity, and have a comparable interest in
forming their own business. The difference in donation between the non-demobilized
and demobilized groups captures total discrimination.
In order to disentangle the role of perception of different abilities among the bene-
ficiary groups from discrimination, half of the participants receive supplementary
information on the socio-economic characteristics of the recipients. Participants in the
information treatment, which we also refer to as SES-treatment, are informed about
the general socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries. Hence, they read, “The
beneficiaries of the funding are between 45 and 60 years old, parents, have a technical
degree and few years of working experience.” If discrimination is due to perceived
differences in the ability of the demobilized persons, as measured by observable
characteristics such as education and working experience, this manipulation will
63
Chapter 5. Discrimination and inter-group contact in Colombia
reduce that effect. Hence, differences in donation under this treatment would reflect
taste-based discrimination.
In the contact treatment, which is our third manipulation, we expose participants to a
5-minute video with two personal stories about the respective SENA trainees.5 In the
video, two trainees – a woman and a man - present themselves and their business
ideas. The experimental condition varies whether the videos correspond to personal
stories of demobilized or non-demobilized trainees. The four SENA trainees - two
demobilized and two non-demobilized - recruited for the videos are comparable
in terms of general socio-economic characteristics like age, place of residence and
educational attainment, as well as in their business ideas. All four persons have
completed a one-year course in “sustainable living” or “environmental studies” in
the SENA in Cali. We conducted semi-structured interviews with them, which we
used as material for the videos.6 The variation in the identity of the trainees in the
videos allows us to measure how increased contact with demobilized individuals
changes social attitudes towards them, and also how it changes the distinct forms of
discrimination.
5.4.3 Experimental procedures
We conducted the lab-in-the-field experiment between August and September of
2018. Our experiments took place in the laboratories of four universities: two public
(Universidad del Valle in Cali and Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Medellín)
and two private ones (Universidad Javeriana in Cali and Universidad EAFIT in
Medellín). In total, we ran 42 sessions.
Participants in the study were university students. To increase heterogeneity in the
sample and capture variation in attitudes towards conflict, we invited students from
different areas of study and of different political orientation. Traditionally, public
universities are known for having more politically left-oriented students compared to
private universities. The students were recruited by a general announcement sent via
e-mail to all university students.7 Participants who responded to the announcement
received an e-mail with the dates of the sessions and a registration link. Once
registered for a session, they received a confirmation e-mail, as well as a reminder
the day before the experiment. Participants received a participation fee of 5,000 COP
(approximately 1.40e) in addition to the gains from the real effort task, minus the
5The coordinator in the SENA in Cali provided us with a list of eight trainees that fulfilled the
following criteria. a) Were taking a course in the SENA, b) have been developing a business idea, and c)
were willing to take part in the crowdfunding campaign. We interviewed them and produced a small
test video. We selected the four persons based on the interviews, the comparability in business ideas,
and socio-economic characteristics.
6The interview guideline is shown in Figure C.7.
7Additional promotion activities like spreading leaflets and hanging posters on the campus have
been used to raise the attention of students in Cali, where the recruitment was harder and show-up
rates lower.
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donations. Average earnings were 12,614 COP (3.60e), or approximately 124% of a
students’ hourly wage.
5.5 Hypotheses
Previous experimental evidence has shown that individuals discriminate against
ex-combatants (Cardenas and Mendez, 2014). Nevertheless, subjects’ proclivity to
discriminatory behavior might be sensitive to their characteristics. Victims are likely
to have stronger negative attitudes towards ex-combatants, as they may associate
them with violence and adverse effects. Alternately, persons with a left-leaning politi-
cal orientation and persons from lower socio-economic backgrounds may potentially
be in favor of the ex-combatants’ former work and their ideology (Åse and Wendt,
2018). Hence, we expect:
Hypothesis 1: Participants will discriminate against demobilized trainees. The degree
of discrimination will increase with negative experiences had during the civil war,
and will be lower in public universities than private universities. Furthermore, we
expect that discrimination is higher among politically right-oriented participants
compared to left-oriented counterparts.
We anticipate that participants will face considerable uncertainty about the abilities
of the demobilized. On the one hand, they might perceive affiliation to an armed
group as a sign of discipline and conviction. On the other hand, many ex-combatants
spent a significant proportion of their lives fighting and may lack education. Thus,
participants may regard them as less prepared to start a business compared to the
control group.
Hypothesis 2: Discrimination decreases when participants receive information on
the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries. However, this information is
not sufficient to eliminate discrimination.
Ample empirical evidence shows that positive inter-group contact improves inter-
group relations (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). However, a growing literature on
harmful inter-group contact contrasts the positive findings (Paolini et al., 2010, 2014).
Contact may humanize demobilized individuals and increase empathy, but it can
also exacerbate the subjects’ negative beliefs by activating their self-confirmatory
bias. Since our videos display mainly positive messages regarding the potential
recipients, we expect this treatment to improve attitudes and to reduce taste-based
discrimination.
Hypothesis 3: Indirect contact with beneficiaries will increase donations towards
business ideas and will help to reduce taste-based discrimination. Indirect contact be-
tween participants and demobilized individuals will generate more positive attitudes
toward demobilized.
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5.6 Data and empirical strategy
5.6.1 Measurement
In the analysis, there are two primary outcomes of interest: discrimination towards
demobilized persons and the potential mechanisms to reduce it. We use various
measures to capture different forms of discrimination. First, we utilize the differences
in donations between the treatment groups donating to demobilized persons and
those who donate to the control group to measure behavioral discrimination. We
use both the percentage of persons that donated as well as the amount donated. The
control and the demobilized group are quite similar in their characteristics. They only
differ in the fact that the demobilized persons were ex-fighters and are now going
through the governmental DDR program. Therefore, we argue that the difference
in donations is a good measure of discrimination towards ex-combatants due to
combat. We refer to the difference in donations in the non-SES treatments as "total
discrimination".
The comparison of the differences in donation between demobilized and non-demob-
ilized persons over the SES treatments allows us to separate different forms of dis-
crimination. In the SES-treatment, we provide additional information on beneficiaries’
educational attainment and working experience; hence, perceptions of the recipients’
abilities are expected to be the same. A difference in donations between these treat-
ments reflects a preference of one group over another based on personal preferences
and taste, rather than ability. Hence, it measures "taste-based" discrimination.
Next, we compare the judgments and stated attitudes towards demobilized individu-
als and other identities as declared in the final questionnaire, to draw inferences on
prejudices and differences in attitudes. We ask the participants to evaluate the intel-
lectual abilities, trustworthiness, overall working motivation, hostility, and neediness
of demobilized, displaced, and poor persons. Moreover, we ask them about their
preferences towards these groups. Each participant uses a 5 point Likert scale to rate
how much they like the respective group, how comfortable (s)he would feel meeting
a group member, and how likely it is that (s)he would become friends with a member
of the respective group. Out of these three items, we construct a “liking index” as a
general measure of a positive attitude towards the group. The liking index gives the
relative liking of demobilized compared to poor persons.
Finally, our third measure illustrates the subjects’ implicit discrimination through the
single-category implicit association test (SC-IAT) result. The test is a modification of
the well-known IAT test for non-binary categorical characteristics. As it measures
the strength of automatic mental associations using reaction times, it is hard to
manipulate and avoids social-desirability responses (Fazio and Olson, 2003). We
follow the improved scoring algorithm procedure first proposed by Greenwald et al.
(2003) to construct the D-score. The D-score gives the average difference response
latency between the two rounds divided by the "inclusive" standard deviation of
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subjects’ response latencies. It generally has a range of -2 to 2, whereby a positive
value indicates a positive attitude towards demobilized persons, and negative values
represent a negative attitude.
For the subgroup analysis, we classify participants’ political orientation on a 7 point
Likert scale ranging from "very left-wing" to "very right-wing"; values below 3
indicate left-leaning, values above 5 indicate right-leaning, and values of 3 and
4 represent center political leanings. Additionally, we group participants based
on their degree of past victimization and whether they attend a private or public
university. We measure victimization with the response to the questions "Have
you been victimized in the following sense: Displacement, Torture/fighting, and
kidnapping.". Participants are classified as "not victimized" if they answer "no" to
all three questions; "victimized" if they answer "yes" to at least one question, and
"strongly victimized" if they answered "yes" to more than one question.
5.6.2 Empirical strategy
In order to evaluate the degree of discrimination towards ex-combatants and disen-
tangle the effect of individuals’ perceptions towards differing abilities among the
beneficiaries, we estimate the following regression:
Yis = β0 + β1Demobis + β2SESis + β3Demobis × SESis + X′isθ + γs + εis (5.1)
where Yis is the outcome of interest; either donation (donation probability and the
donation amount), implicit discrimination, or the "liking index" of individual i that
participated in session s. Demobis is a dummy variable for treatment, indicating
the possibility to donate to demobilized persons, and SESis is a treatment dummy
showing that additional socio-economic information of the recipient was provided.
The regression includes a vector Xis of essential socio-demographic characteristics
(age, gender, major, social status, victimization, and political preferences), and stan-
dard personal characteristics (pro-sociability and religiousness) that, according to the
literature, might influence donation decisions. Study subjects are included as fixed
effects in the model. Session fixed effects γs are used to account for environmental
effects. εis represents the individual error term. A detailed description of how we
construct these measures is available in Table C.5.
To understand the impact of the mediated contact situation, a comparison between
the treatments is made in the following difference-in-difference model:
Yis = β0 + β1Demobis + β2SESis + β3Demobis × SESis + β4Contactis
+β5Contactis × SESis + β6Contactis × Demobis
+β7Contactis × Demobis × SESis + θXis + γs + εis
(5.2)
where Contactis refers to the treatments containing an additional video in which
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the two beneficiaries present themselves. In the analysis, we present the estimated
total effects by treatment group. β4 is the total effect of contact for non-demobilized
individuals when no information on socio-economic characteristics is provided, while
β4 + β5 is the effect for this group when information on SES is provided. The effect
of contact for demobilized individuals are β4 + β6 and β4 + β5 + β6 + β7, when no
information or information on SES is provided, respectively.
Finally, we explore the heterogeneous effects of discrimination and the impact of
contact. To investigate whether discrimination in charitable behavior occurs among
particular social groups, we pool data from both SES and non-SES treatments and
estimate the following model.
Yis = β1Demobis + βkZis + θkZis × Demobis + δ1Contactis + δkContactis × Zis
+η1Contactis × Demobis + ηkContactis × Zisis + θXis + γs + εis
(5.3)
where, Zis is a vector of categorical variables indicating socio-economic characteristics
that could be relevant to explain discrimination. We consider three types of group
dimensions: a) past experiences of violence (no victimization, victimization, high
victimization) b) type of university (public or private) c) and political orientation
(left, center, right). The heterogeneous degree of discrimination when there is no
contact is estimated as β1 for the reference group and β1 + βk for the subgroup k. In
addition, we are interested in evaluating whether contact changes discrimination
for each subgroup. Therefore, we estimate the impact of contact as δ1 + η1 for the
reference group and δ1 + η1 + δk + ηk for each subgroup.
5.7 Results
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics
We recruited 1,070 students (244 participants in the University EAFIT, 247 in the
University Nacional, 266 in the University Javeriana, and 301 in the University del
Valle), and excluded 12 participants whom we identified as not observing the video,
as they failed the understanding test. The distribution of subjects among treatments is
mainly balanced, except for the social status variable, which exhibits some statistical
yet inexplicable differences among treatments (see Table C.1 in the appendix). Ages
range between 16 and 42 years old, 605 participants are males and 453 are females, and
they belong to a diverse set of college majors, the most prominent beeing engineering,
economics, and business administration. Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of
the socio-economic characteristics of the participants and Table C.5 shows a detailed
description of each variable.
We ask participants about their political orientation, as well as other questions related
to their past victimization and pro-sociability. Our participants report on average
a 3.14 political orientation value (over 7), indicating a general left-center leaning
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TABLE 5.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Socio-economic characteristics
Age 20.85 20.00 3.10 16 42 1058
Female 0.43 0.00 0.50 0 1 1058
Social status 3.18 3.00 1.26 1 6 1058
Religious 4.40 4.00 2.11 1 7 1058
Political preference 3.14 3.00 1.20 1 7 1058
Prosocial 0.53 0.52 0.13 0 1 1058
Panel B: Outcome variables
Donation (Dummy) 0.57 1.00 0.50 0 1 1058
Donation amount 2.39 1.00 3.05 0 10 1058
IAT-test (D-score) 0.05 0.03 0.38 -1.32 1.51 1057
Liking index -0.39 -0.33 0.55 -4 1.67 1058
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of survey and experimental measures. A detailed
description of the measures is in Table C.5.
orientation. The victimization index ranging from 0 to 1, and measures exposure
to violence in terms of forced displacement, sexual assaults, direct attacks, and loss
of relatives due to violence. We find the average victimization score to be 0.084,
and find no significant differences among treatment groups. Finally, the mean pro-
sociability index, comprising altruistic, fair, and normative behavior, is 0.53, implying
our participants to have a good sense of other-regarding preferences. Again, no
statistical differences appear among treatments.
In the total sample, 56.9% of participants donated, and the average donation is
2,386.58 COP out of a possible donation of 10,000 COP, reflecting similar behavior as
is observed in standard dictator games. 30% of those who donated gave less than half
the endowment, 16% donated precisely half of it, and 8.5% donated all. In general,
donations were more generous in private universities than in public universities (38%
higher, p-value=0.0000) and in Medellín than in Cali (29% higher, p-value=0.0004).
There were no significant differences observed between genders.
5.7.2 Discrimination
Donations
The average value of the donations and the proportion of participants who sent a
donation in each non-contact treatment are presented in the upper graphs of Figure
5.1. We find that about half of the participants supported the crowdfunding cam-
paign. In the baseline treatment (T1), 51 percent of the participants made a donation.
The average donation represents 19 percent of the endowment. In the treatment
where participants could donate to support a demobilized person (T3), 59 percent
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of the participants donated, and the average donation was about 25 percent of the
endowment.
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Note: The figure reports differences in donation and perceptions with respect to (non-)demobilized
persons and the corresponding confidence intervals of 95%. In total, 531 observations are in these
treatments.
Defining total discrimination as the difference in average donations to SENA trainees
(1.92) and demobilized SENA trainees (2.48) in the non-SES treatment, we find that
there is no total discrimination. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows no statistically
significant difference at the 10% level in the distribution of the value donated to both
groups. We also find no significant difference in the likelihood to donate to both
groups (Person Chi-squared p-value=0.173 and Fisher exact test p-value=0.107).
Taste-based discrimination will occur if participants donate less to demobilized SENA
trainees than other SENA trainees, given that the beneficiaries are comparable in
terms of education and experience. We find that in SES treatments, where participants
receive additional information on the characteristic of the beneficiaries, the value do-
nated is not statistically different (2.15 vs. 2.04) between demobilized and other SENA
trainees (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value=0.8525), nor is the likelihood to receive a
donation (Person Chi-squared p-value=0.888 and Fisher exact test p-value=0.493).
Hence, our results show no taste-based discrimination towards demobilized persons.
Charitable giving not only depends on the characteristics of the beneficiaries, but
is also influenced by socio-economic and personality characteristics of the donor
(Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). To improve the precision of our results and to account
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for differences in the distribution of socio-economic status between treatment groups,
we additionally estimate the model in Equation 5.1 that includes basic socio-economic
and personality factors as well as session fixed effects. The estimates reported in
Table 5.3 are in line with the descriptive results. We find no significant differences in
the likelihood to donate (column 1) to demobilized compared with non-demobilized
trainees. If anything, demobilized beneficiaries received a higher value in donations
than the control treatment (column 2).
TABLE 5.3: Charitable behavior and attitudes towards demobilized
persons by treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation Donation amount Liking index IAT-test
SES 0.019 0.392 0.026 -0.000
(0.070) (0.345) (0.070) (0.049)
Demobilized 0.098 0.592* 0.038 -0.009
(0.065) (0.337) (0.081) (0.042)
SES X Demobilized -0.054 -0.602 -0.016 -0.003
(0.075) (0.467) (0.116) (0.075)
Total effect: Demobilized with SES 0.043 0.009 -0.021 -0.012
(0.053) (0.360) (0.061) (0.055)
Control Group
Mean Control 0.492*** 1.810*** -0.448*** 0.065*
Std. Dev. (0.046) (0.204) (0.045) (0.026)
Controls
Socio-economics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Orientation Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Yes Yes Yes Yes
Victimization Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 531 531 531 530
R-squared 0.199 0.234 0.171 0.148
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing the outcome variables on the 4
treatment dummies as well as its interaction terms. The regression includes controls as shown
in Table C.2. All models include session and study subject fixed effects. Clustered standard
errors at the session level are in parenthesis, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
level respectively.
In summary, we conclude that, on average, there is no discrimination against demobi-
lized SENA trainees. These findings show that, on average, university students are
as likely to support non-demobilized as demobilized SENA trainees. These results
are surprising. With respect to the referendum results, we expected our participants
to donate significantly less to ex-combatants. However, we know that giving in
this set-up does not necessarily refer to altruism, but it comprises subjects’ norms
about sharing (Camerer, 2011). Thus, it could be that our participants do not feel
comfortable directly discriminating against the demobilized, even if they implicitly
dislike them. Unfortunately, we have not elicited normative or empirical expectations.
Nonetheless, if subjects are secretly discriminating ex-combatants, we shall see some
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differences in the implicit association test or the attitudes towards them. In the next
section, we provide some complementary evidence in that direction.
Implicit association test
The implicit association test (IAT) captures automatic associations towards the de-
mobilized population. Figure C.1 in the appendix presents the distribution of the
IAT (D-score) test results overall treatments, and the bottom left graph in Figure 5.1
reports the average score in the no-contact treatments. If participants, in general, hold
subtle negative attitudes towards demobilized individuals, the IAT (D-score) will be
negative. Referring to Figure C.1, the test results follow a normal distribution. In
the treatments with no contact, the index is, on average, 0.06 with a 95% confidence
interval between 0.028 and 0.092. A student’s two sided t-test indicates that the mean
value is significantly larger than zero (p-value=0.001). This indicates that, on average,
participants hold a neutral to positive attitude towards demobilized persons.
Assignment to treatments is not expected to change implicit associations towards
the demobilized group. Yet we test this by estimating Equation 5.1 with D-score
as the dependent variable, and present the results in column 4 of Table 5.3. The
regression results confirm that there are no significant differences in associations
between participants in T1 and T3.
Attitudes towards demobilized
An alternative measure of discrimination is to consider differences in reported atti-
tudes towards demobilized persons compared with other population groups with
similar socio-economic characteristics. To measure attitudes, we built a "liking index"
for different population groups, consisting of the average value of the response to
three items measured on a 5 point Likert scale: a) ’willingness to become friends’,
b) ’comfortableness in meeting group members’ and c) ’general sympathy towards
the group.’ The bottom right graph in Figure 5.1 presents the average rating, on a
5-point Likert scale, of demobilized individuals, poor people, and displaced persons’
aggregate liking index in the baseline treatments. A detailed picture of the single
items and further dimensions is shown in Figure C.2 in the appendix. We find that
participants state that they like demobilized persons less compared with the other
two population groups (poor or demobilized people). The composite index is signifi-
cantly lower for demobilized persons than for displaced or poor persons (Wilcoxon
sign-rank test p-value < 0.01).
To investigate how our treatments change attitudes towards demobilized, we regress
the difference in the liking of demobilized compared with the liking of poor people
on treatment variables according to Equation 5.1. The regression result, which is
presented in column 3 in Table 5.3, shows that, on average, demobilized persons are
rated 0.44 points lower than poor persons are, which corresponds to around 63%
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of a standard deviation. This difference is significant at the 1% level. It is constant
across treatment groups and is robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing.
Participants report being significantly less willing to become friends with demobilized
persons than other population groups (Wilcoxon sign-rank test p-value<0.01). They
also report feeling less comfortable meeting with demobilized persons (Wilcoxon
sign-rank test p-value<0.01), and perceive them to be less sympathetic and less
trustworthy than other population groups (Wilcoxon sign-rank test p-value<0.01).
Regarding the degree of discrimination towards ex-guerrillas, we conclude that the
results partly support Hypothesis 1. In the no-contact treatments, the likelihood
of receiving a donation nor the value of the donation received are lower for ex-
combatants compared to other trainees at the 5% significance level. Yet, we find
a small but significant positive discrimination in the SC-IAT test, in contrast to a
large and significant negative attitude towards the demobilized population compared
with poor people. Why is it that negative feelings towards ex-combatants are not
translated into lower donations? One potential explanation is that despite the scars
of war, participants are hopeful that peace-building will work, and they understand
the importance of supporting it.
5.7.3 The effect of contact on discrimination
Donations
We expected that indirect contact with the beneficiaries, in the form of a video, would
increase donations. Confirming this hypothesis, we find that in treatments with
contact, participants are 12% more likely to donate and donate 21% more money than
in the no-contact treatments. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level
(Student’s t-test p-value=0.0334 and 0.0128).
More interesting questions, however, are whether the videos of demobilized persons
and other trainees have the same impact, and if the videos induce more positive
attitudes towards demobilized as suggested by the contact theory. Figure 5.2 presents
the differences in the outcome variables between no-contact and contact by treat-
ment. The upper graphs show the effect on the donation amount (left panel) and
the share of persons donating (right panel). Descriptively, we find that the non-
demobilized contact has mainly an effect on the donation amount. Donations to
non-demobilized persons increase by 820 COP in the non-SES treatment (Student’s t-
test p-value=0.0257), whereas the likelihood to donate does not increase significantly.
The inter-group contact theory states that one important channel to reduce prejudices
is through an increase in empathy. Therefore, we hypothesized that the contact
treatment would especially help to reduce taste-based discrimination. Our results
confirm hypothesis 3. The proportion of donating participants increases by 14% in the
SES treatment supporting demobilized persons (Student’s t-test p-value=0.0199) and
the value of the average donation to the demobilized raises by 980 COP (Student’s
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Note: The figure reports the differences in the donation, the IAT-test score and in perceptions with
respect to (non-)demobilized persons by contact and the corresponding confidence intervals of 95%. In
total, 1058 observations are in these treatments.
t-test p-value=0.0123). No significant changes are found for the non-demobilized
group.
To test for the robustness of the previous results, we estimate Equation 5.2 and
report the estimated total effects on the likelihood to donate by subgroup in column
1 of Table 5.4. We find that contact has a positive effect on the donations to non-
demobilized trainees. The likelihood to donate to non-demobilized beneficiaries
increases significantly, by 11.9%, when participants receive information on SES. In
the non-SES treatment, the magnitude is comparable yet insignificant. Contact
also increases the likelihood that demobilized participants receive a donation, but
only when participants receive information on their abilities. In the treatment with
contact and SES, demobilized beneficiaries are 13.1% more likely to receive a donation
compared to demobilized recipients in the SES treatment without contact. Contact
has a very similar effect at the intensive margin. Column 2 in Table 5.4 presents
the total effects of contact on the average value of the donation. The value donated
to non-demobilized increases by 879 COP compared to the no-contact treatment.
Whereas donations to demobilized increases by 928 COP when participants receive
information on SES, in the condition with no information on SES, contact has no
significant effect on the value donated to demobilized participants. Once corrected
for the family-wise error rate using the Sidak procedure, the effects on the likelihood
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TABLE 5.4: Evaluation of contact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation Donation amount Liking index IAT-test
Control 0.111 0.879** 0.009 -0.035
(0.078) (0.361) (0.062) (0.046)
Control + SES 0.119* 0.613 -0.043 -0.019
(0.060) (0.405) (0.048) (0.045)
Demobilized -0.074 -0.307 0.159** -0.029
(0.060) (0.350) (0.063) (0.058)
Demobilized + SES 0.131** 0.928** 0.124* 0.036
(0.059) (0.361) (0.069) (0.047)
Controls
Socio-economics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Orientation Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Yes Yes Yes Yes
Victimization Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1058 1058 1058 1057
R-squared 0.134 0.170 0.161 0.091
Note: The table reports estimated impact of contact on outcome variables as estimated in
Equation 5.2. The regression includes controls as shown in Table C.2. All models include
session and study subject fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level are in
parenthesis, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
to donate become insignificant. Yet, the results on the intensive margin hold.
To summarize, contact shows slight evidence for a positive effect on donations
of non-demobilized beneficiaries and a strong effect on donations of demobilized
beneficiaries once additional information is provided. Contact seems to decrease
taste-based discrimination.
Implicit association
The bottom left graph of Figure 5.2 presents the changes in D-scores between contact
and no-contact treatments for the different beneficiaries and treatments. Descriptively
we find that contact does not change implicit discrimination against the demobilized
in any of the treatments. To test for these results, we estimate Equation 5.2, taking
D-score as a dependent variable. Column 4 in Table 5.4 presents the total effects by
treatment. The results confirm that there are no significant differences across the
treatments in the implicit association test. This null-effect is not surprising, as implicit
associations are time-persistent and change slowly over time (Rydell and McConnell,
2006).
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Attitudes
Can increased contact with demobilized individuals mitigate their poor rating on the
liking index and promote personal encounters with them? The descriptive results
answering these questions are presented in the bottom right graph of Figure 5.2.
Figure C.2 in the appendix depicts the descriptive results for each sub-category. We
find that whereas contact has no significant effect on the liking index towards poor
people and displaced populations, it has a significant positive effect on the liking of
demobilized participants. In the contact treatments, the liking rating of demobilized
persons is 0.17 points higher compared to the no-contact treatments (Student’s t-test p-
value = 0.001). The increase is similar for treatment without SES (total discrimination)
and with SES (taste-based discrimination). While contact has a positive effect on
attitudes, it does not fully offset the difference between demobilized and poor persons.
Column 3 in Table 5.4 presents the total estimated effect by treatment when we use
differences in the liking index of demobilized and poor people as the dependent
variable in Equation 5.2. The results indicate that when participants have contact
with a demobilized individual, attitudes towards them improve significantly. The
gap in the liking index of demobilized individuals compared to poor people reduces
by one third after indirect contact.
With respect to the single components of the liking index (see Table C.3), we find that
the positive effect of contact is mainly associated with a higher willingness to have a
personal encounter with demobilized beneficiaries. The participants who watched the
personal video of demobilized beneficiaries expect a higher comfortableness when
meeting demobilized persons than participants in the baseline treatment (Student’s
t-test p-value<0.001). The likelihood of becoming friends with a demobilized person
does not significantly change with the video, nor does the rating of how sympathetic
demobilized participants are.
Thus, our results provide evidence that contact changes taste-based discrimination.
Attitudes and intentional behaviors change after contact by reducing fear (indicated
by a participant reporting feeling more comfortable in meeting with demobilized
persons) to a more positive perception.
5.7.4 Heterogeneity in behavior
Heterogeneity in discrimination
People may perceive ex-combatants differently and act differently towards demobi-
lized individuals depending on their conflict experiences and personal preferences.
In order to investigate heterogeneity in participant behavior, we focus on three di-
mensions that are likely correlated with perceptions towards the demobilized: degree
of victimization, socio-economic background as measured by private vs. public uni-
versity attendance, and political orientation of the participant. Table 5.5 reports the
degree of discrimination by each subgroup on the four relevant measures.
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Chapter 5. Discrimination and inter-group contact in Colombia
The first four columns report the differences for each of the outcomes of interest when
there is no contact, while columns 5 to 8 report the impact of contact on discrimination.
Panel A reports the different effects by victimization status. Panel B reports by uni-
versity type and Panel C depicts the heterogeneous effects by the political orientation
of the participants. All results are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. We focus
on total discrimination, only and do not distinguish between the SES treatment, both
for simplicity and to ensure we have enough participants in each subgroup. Overall,
there are only marginal differences concerning SES treatments.
Referring to the results in Panel A, we find no significant differences in charitable
behavior towards demobilized beneficiaries compared to non-demobilized beneficia-
ries depending on a participant’s experiences of violence. Neither the likelihood to
donate (column 1) nor the amount donated (column 2) are significantly different for
demobilized recipients compared to non-demobilized recipients for any subgroup.
Surprisingly, the results show that experiences of victimization do not affect attitudes
towards demobilized persons. All three groups prefer poor persons to the demobi-
lized, and the extent of preference does not vary by subgroup. Participants with no
exposure to violence have a positive and significant IAT-test, indicating some prefer-
ence for demobilized individuals. This result does not hold for participants exposed
to low or intense violence. However, the implicit discrimination is not statistically
different across subgroups.
Neither private university students nor public university students displayed dis-
criminatory behavior towards demobilized trainees in the crowdfunding campaign.
Regarding attitudes, private and public university students report to like poor indi-
viduals more than demobilized persons to a similar extent. Similarly, they achieve
equal positive implicit discrimination scores.
Concerning political orientation, the results in Panel C show no discrimination in
charitable behavior by any subgroup. Nevertheless, right-oriented persons report
disliking demobilized individuals relative to poor people to a more substantial degree.
This finding indicates that attitudes and behaviors do not necessarily need to align
with each other. Moreover, right-oriented participants have significantly lower IAT-
test scores compared to the left and center-oriented participants.
We conclude that the results only partly support Hypothesis 1. We find that experi-
ences of violence are not correlated with a higher degree of discrimination towards
demobilized individuals. Private university students donate as much to demobilized
trainees as to other SENA trainees and express the same degree of dislike as public
university students. Right-wing participants express more negative attitudes toward
demobilized.
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Heterogeneous treatment effects of contact
In order to check whether sub-groups react differently to the contact treatment, we
estimate Equation 5.3. Persons with negative experiences of violence or right-wing
political attitudes may watch the video, focusing more on the negative aspects of
the reintegration process. The indirect contact with demobilized might, therefore,
strengthen their existing opinion (confirmatory bias). If this is the case, our results
will show an adverse effect for prejudiced groups. Results in columns 5 and 6 in
Panel A of Table 5.5 show that indirect contact with demobilized individuals does
not increase nor decrease discriminatory behavior. The same is true for implicit
discrimination for participants with no experience or low or high experience of
victimization. Nevertheless, the results show a positive change in attitudes towards
demobilized for non-victimized participants with contact.
In Panel B, we investigate the heterogeneity between public and private university
students, which can be seen as an indicator of different socio-economic backgrounds,
since students from wealthier households are more likely to attend a private univer-
sity than students from poorer households. The indirect contact does not significantly
change discriminatory behavior toward demobilized persons for any of the subgroups.
We find that after watching the video, the attitudes of public university students
towards the demobilized relative to poor persons are more favorable. IAT-test scores
do not change with the contact.
For political preferences, we see a similar pattern. The contact does not change the
difference in the likelihood to donate, the amount donated to demobilized compared
to non-demobilized trainees, nor the IAT-test scores of left, center, or right-oriented
participants. Center-oriented participants show more positive attitudes towards
demobilized persons after they have watched the video.
We conclude that indirect contact with demobilized persons increases donations to the
same extent as contact with a non-demobilized person. Non-victimized participants,
public university students, and center-oriented persons show more positive attitudes
towards demobilized persons relative to poor persons after the contact treatment.
Hence, indirect contact has a positive effect on attitudes towards the demobilized
among specific population groups. We find no adverse effects of contact on dis-
crimination towards the demobilized. Hence, our results partly confirm Hypothesis
3.
5.8 Robustness check
We assumed that the videos of demobilized and non-demobilized trainees have a
similar valence and are perceived equally. However, the persons in the videos may
provoke different feelings in the participants, and the opinions towards their business
idea may vary. If demobilized persons in the video are systematically perceived
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differently from the non-demobilized persons, our estimates will be biased. At the
same time, perceptions are endogenous and can be seen as outcomes of discrimination
on their own. In order to investigate whether the estimated effects of contact stem
from differences in the perceptions of the video, we run further regressions controlling
for these factors on the sub-sample of observations in the contact treatments. The
results are shown in Table C.4 and give several insights. First, the results confirm
that participants’ perceptions of the persons in the video vary, and these factors
influence the donation decisions. A higher perceived sympathy for the persons in
the video is associated with higher support for the beneficiaries, whereas perceived
hostility decreases donations and is positively associated with implicit discrimination.
Moreover, support for beneficiaries is positively associated with their liking business
ideas. The evaluation of their working motivation and their neediness does not affect
the donation decision. Second, after controlling for these factors, the estimates of
the treatment indicators are not statistically significant with respect to the donation
outcomes. This means that contact has the same effect for all treatments once we
control for the perceptions of the video. Hence, the different perceptions of the two
videos are not driving our results.
We also test whether the distributions of liking the business ideas and the perceived
sympathy are significantly different in the contact treatments and show the dis-
tributions in Figures C.3 and C.4. We find no significant differences between the
distributions of the two treatments concerning liking the business ideas (Wilcoxon
sign-rank test p-value = 0.2017). However, non-demobilized persons in the video are
perceived as more sympathetic (Wilcoxon sign-rank test p-value < 0.01).
5.9 Discussion and Conclusion
To assess the role of community support in the peace-building process, we ran a
lab-in-the-field experiment in Colombia to investigate whether Colombian students
have prejudices and discriminate against reintegrating ex-guerrillas and, if so, in
which dimension. Our results show that demobilized recipients are, in general, not
treated differently than persons with comparable socio-economic characteristics in the
campaign and, if anything, they are even slightly preferred. This finding is consistent
with the idea that the affiliation to rebel groups and experiences in combat show
no lasting effects, and that attitudes concerning the peace-building process change
quickly. Moreover, we find no evidence for subtle negative mental associations with
demobilized persons in the SC-IAT test. However, the analysis of the statements in
the final survey clearly shows that the participants in our experiment are less willing
to meet and become friends with demobilized persons compared to the control group.
Hence, our results are in line with (Tellez, 2019), who shows that in conflict-affected
regions in Colombia, persons are willing to support the peace process and grant
concessions to demobilized individuals but fear for their security when it comes to
personal encounters.
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Two points have to be mentioned here: First of all, we measure discrimination in
relation to persons with lower socio-economic backgrounds, as we think that this
group is comparable to the demobilized population. Nevertheless, participants
with lower socio-economic backgrounds might be perceived as having negative
characteristics (i.e., lack of experience, low human capital, etc.). Thus, we cannot rule
out that discrimination overall is not present in the donation decisions. However,
the percentage of persons that donated and the amounts donated are in line with the
findings of previous literature on charitable giving. Second, supporting a person to
start her/his own business is an indirect behavior. No personal contact is necessary
in the decision-making process, in contrast to most real-life job interview situations.
Here our results are not clear-cut. Since we see that the participants are somewhat
less comfortable meeting demobilized persons, discrimination in such a situation
may be likely with respect to our results. The setting, nevertheless, is informative and
relevant for several reasons. With the crowdfunding campaign, we can give evidence
on two critical dimensions of reintegration, namely the reintegration into the labor
market and civilian life. Since Colombia has a high share of self-employed persons,
especially among those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, seeking access to
credit for opening a business is a relevant situation. Moreover, indirect support can
become crucial, as was the case in the peace referendum. Finally, concerning the
participants in the survey, we argue that university students are an essential group,
as these constitute potential future employers and customers. Future work should
explore the extent of discrimination among different population groups.
Two methodological concerns arise at this point: the external validity of our results
and experimental demand effects. As for the former, we know that by choosing
college students, we might be setting a lower bound for our effects, and replicating
the study to a non-educational sample is desirable. Nonetheless, relative to regular
lab participants, ours are bringing different levels of exposure to conflict to the lab,
which is a critical characteristic connecting our setting to a less controlled one. We also
notice that the donation behavior in our experiment does not depart much from other
lab and field dictator games, for which we believe that the incentives we provided
seemed to be enough to elicit the traditional norms for charitable giving. Finally, we
know that our experimental subjects could feel compelled to donate, since donating
is all they can do in the experiment. If that is the case, the experimental demand effect
will be present in all our conditions, and will not affect the net treatment effects.
We implemented a short-term mediated contact in our experiment to evaluate its
effect on community support for reintegration. Participants in the contact treatment
watched a 5-minute video, in which two recipients present themselves and their
business ideas. The evaluation of contact shows that inter-group contact succeeds
in increasing donations to non-demobilized and demobilized recipients. Contact
increases donations to demobilized beneficiaries, but only when relevant skills are
highlighted. We see that the effect mainly stems from the change in taste-based
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discrimination happening through a reduction in fear.
Post-conflict settings are contexts, where groups are relatively sharply segregated,
tensions between the groups are relatively high as well as the emotional costs of
personal encounters. Eller et al. (2012) show that in such contexts where personal
contact between groups is low, indirect forms of contact affect inter-group attitudes.
The critical advantage of indirect contact is its scope. Via public media, a broad
audience can be reached in a short time and with low costs. Additionally, it is easier
to promote positive contact and reduce the negative perceptions than in personal
contact situations that are less controllable. It can be regarded as a first step in
sensitizing the groups with respect to personal contact.
To answer the question, if inter-group contact is a suitable tool for peace-building,
a closer look at when inter-group contact works, and for whom, is needed. Our
sub-group analysis highlights that contact with demobilized individuals is likely
to work better for some population groups than for others. However, we do not
find a negative change of attitudes or behavior for potentially more prejudiced
participants that are potentially more inclined towards negative aspects in the contact.
Heavily victimized persons and more right-oriented participants change neither
donations nor attitudes after indirect contact. In conclusion, inter-group contact, and
in particular mediated inter-group contact, may be an adequate instrument for post-
conflict settings. It can efficiently sensitize society for ex-combatants and increase
support for the reintegration process. It is easily implementable, cost-effective, and
less risky in terms of potential adverse effects. However, further research is necessary
to get a clearer picture of when and for whom mediated contact works.
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The heterogeneous effects of conflict on
education: A spatial analysis in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Joint work with Krisztina Kis-Katos
6.1 Abstract
In this paper, we identify under which conditions and to what extent armed conflicts
harm the long-run educational attainment of children in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. By
combining 66 rounds of DHS surveys with geo-coded conflict information, our study
contextualizes the findings of a series of country-specific case studies on the effects of
conflict on education, and provides evidence on the mechanisms through which these
effects occur. Our main identification strategy compares educational losses of youth
living within the same household, while also controlling for local weather shocks and
countrywide dynamics in education. The effects of conflict on education are strongly
context dependent. High-intensity conflicts reduce local educational attainment, on
average, although this effect becomes insignificant in strong autocracies. By contrast,
education is generally unaffected by localized low-intensity conflict. Human capital
loss due to conflict is most severely felt in weak states, and in response to non-state
based conflicts, highlighting the importance of state capacity in mediating the educa-
tional costs of local conflicts.
Published as working paper
Unfried, Kerstin, and Krisztina Kis-Katos (2020): "The Heterogeneous Effects of Con-
flict on Education: A Spatial Analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa", IZA Discussion Paper
No. 13069, Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn.
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6.2 Introduction
Education is a basic human right and a crucial determinant of economic and social
development. However, despite recent global development goals pushing towards
universal education, around 61 million children worldwide are still unable to attend
primary school (UNESCO, 2017). Strikingly, nearly half of these children live in
conflict-affected countries, which raises the question about the role of conflict in
deterring education (UNICEF, 2017).
The literature on the effects of conflict on education is substantial, yet the available
case studies yield partly contradictory results (e.g. Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Arcand and
Wouabe, 2009; León, 2012). They present a wide range of estimates, spanning from
positive effects (0.2 years more of education per conflict year) to negative effects of
0.9 years of education lost (e.g., Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Arcand and Wouabe, 2009;
Bertoni et al., 2019; León, 2012; Lee, 2014; La Mattina, 2018; Shemyakina, 2011). These
country-specific studies focus on various types of conflicts with distinct intensities
and actors within specific country contexts, and fail to generalize their results to a
wider range of violent conflicts and their determinants.
This study contributes to close this gap by identifying under which conditions and
to what extent conflict exposure during childhood influences the subsequent educa-
tional attainment of youth in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. We consider conflict
characteristics (conflict severity, as measured by the conflict’s yearly death toll and
the types of conflict actors), individual characteristics (age of exposure to conflict
and gender) as well as country and location characteristics (political regime type,
economic development, ethnic fractionalization, availability of natural resources)
as important determinants of conflict effects. These conditions either follow the
previous literature (e.g., León, 2012) or are closely linked to the concepts of state
capacity and public goods provision – the two channels we investigate in detail in
this paper. By extending the geographical scope of the analysis to a regional sample
of 31 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, our empirical study generalizes the findings
of country-specific case studies on the costs of conflict in terms of lost education.
Sub-Saharan Africa provides the optimal setting for such a study, being one of the
most conflict-ridden regions in the world. Almost half of all armed conflicts during
the past 40 years have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa (Arcand and Wouabe, 2009).
At the same time, education is still far from universal in many countries of this region.
Our empirical analysis combines data from 66 Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) with geo-coded information on conflict events, provided by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). We determine
potential conflict exposure through an exact measure of the distance between the
current survey location of the 10 to 26 year old in the DHS sample and the geo-coded
location of past conflict events, calculating potential exposure to violent events that
have occurred within a 50 km radius of the survey location during different age
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periods. We measure only potential, and not actual, conflict exposure, as the DHS
does not systematically record full migration histories. In order to mitigate the issue
of wrongly attributed conflict history, we only focus on rural areas of Sub-Saharan
Africa, as rural areas tend to have fewer migrants and the majority of displaced
people either return to their homes after conflict or move to urban areas (IDMC, 2018;
Awumbila, 2017). We further assess the scope of the potential bias by repeating our
analysis for a sub-sample of data with migration information.
Any analysis of the link between conflict and education faces a central endogeneity
problem: Omitted factors may both explain a higher local propensity to experience
violent conflict at any given point in time and a lower quality of public goods pro-
vision or higher labor market incentives to drop out of school early. We address
this potential omitted variable bias by including an extensive set of fixed effects
along two main dimensions. First, household (or location) fixed effects absorb the
geographic and socio-economic variation in the average propensity to experience
conflict. Second, by including country-specific birth cohort fixed effects, we capture
yearly changes in the national economic, conflict, and political environment. In our
preferred specifications, we combine these two sets of non-nested fixed effects to
control for common drivers of education and conflict exposure across households as
well as over time within any country. We also account for time-variant local economic
shocks by controlling for the local presence of weather shocks, which contribute to
explaining conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Harari and Ferrara, 2018), but also other local
economic outcomes. We additionally validate our main results by using an interaction
of weather shocks with the distance to the next ethnic border as an instrumental
variable for past conflict exposure. In doing so, we control for the direct effects of
weather shocks and ethnic diversity on schooling, and identify the effects of conflict
exposure on education through the heterogeneous effect of extreme weather events
due to ethnic fractionalization.
Our results show that exposure to low-intensity conflict cannot be robustly linked to
educational attainment in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. But, conflicts of more substantial
severity are robustly linked to average losses in local education. One additional
conflict year of high intensity (with at least 1000 casualties) reduces average education
by 1.4 months. The effects of conflict concentrate among the most exposed children:
Among the upper 5% of children living in the most violence prone sample locations,
the average losses from high-intensity conflicts reach up to 7 months.
Conflicts are especially harmful to education when state capacity is impaired. Our
results show that especially conflicts by non-state actors, which are more likely
to target schools during conflict, lead to educational losses. Strongly autocratic
systems are more successful at sustaining public goods provision during periods
of intense violence compared to weak states and strong democracies. Education in
natural resource rich locations is also strongly affected by conflict. Rebel groups may
strategically capture natural resources, financing their actions and harming public
85
Chapter 6. The heterogenous effects of conflict on education
goods provision even in case of a conflict of similar intensity. When we compare
exposure at different age periods, we find no differences on average, confirming
both the early childhood as well as fetal origin theories. With respect to gender,
high-intensity conflict seems to affect boys’ education somewhat more negatively
than girls’ education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a theoretical
background, section 3 describes the data, while section 4 outlines the empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results and discusses issues of identification.
Section 6 shows further robustness checks, while section 7 concludes.
6.3 Violent conflicts and education
Violent conflicts affect both the supply and demand for education through a wide
variety of channels.
At a basic level, conflicts can directly affect the demand for education. In armed
conflicts, pupils are often fighting, fleeing, or hiding instead of attending school
(Sommers, 2002). Young boys are especially simple recruitment targets for armies
and rebel groups, as they are easier to manipulate than adults and rarely require to
be paid for their service. The fear of landmines or other physical dangers, as well
as sexual violence, on the way to school often cause school drop-outs, especially
among girls (Justino, 2011). Large-scale conflicts also provoke humanitarian crises,
leading to massive displacement and migration that is usually very disruptive to
education (Justino, 2011). Moreover, conflict affects school outcomes indirectly by
reducing the incentives to invest into education. Epidemics or economic crises caused
by conflicts can also inhibit necessary investments into skills (Cunha and Heckman,
2007). Physical destruction of schools increases the costs of education, through higher
transportation costs of reaching the nearest school, for instance. Violent conflicts also
shape the local labor market, reducing the returns to education.
The mental and physical health of school-aged children can be affected by conflict
as well. Injuries, deaths, and traumatic experiences leading to psychological distress
may cause children to stay home from school, compromising their cognitive and non-
cognitive development (Justino, 2011; Brück et al., 2019). Additionally, environmental
shocks, both in utero and in early childhood, can affect neurological development
and basic mental faculties that determine future abilities (Cunha and Heckman,
2007; Barker, 1995; Almond and Currie, 2011).1 In this regard, conflict experiences
before and immediately after birth may actually affect a child’s future educational
attainment in a number of ways.
From a supply standpoint, violent conflicts often destroy physical capital like school
buildings and road infrastructure, reducing the state’s ability to provide universal
1 See Currie and Almond (2011) and Bharadwaj and Vogl (2016) for reviews of the related literature.
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access to education. The loss of human capital through teacher absence further com-
promises the functioning of school systems and can lead to productivity losses in
the long run (Lai and Thyne, 2007; Monteiro and Rocha, 2017). During conflicts,
public funds may be redirected from education towards expenditures on the mil-
itary. Beyond these direct effects on education provision, a decrease in economic
development from a violent conflict can lead to reductions in the demand for public
goods, diminishing their marginal returns. Moreover, it can decrease tax revenues
diminishing the financial resources of the government (Besley and Persson, 2014).
Education is one of the most common state-provided public goods (Daviet et al., 2016).
Thus, the supply of education depends directly on state capacity, which includes the
financial resources, administrative knowledge, and military and political power to
establish and maintain well-functioning institutions that provide public goods and
services. Countries with lower state capacity, i.e. those with poorer incomes or less
quality of governance, provide fewer public goods on average, resulting in lower
levels of human capital development (Besley and Persson, 2014). Moreover, the need
to redirect funds from education to military activities in times of conflict is especially
high when state capacity is limited (Lai and Thyne, 2007).
Violent conflicts and state capacity have common underlying roots and influence
each other (Besley and Persson, 2010, 2014). While conflicts can limit state capacity, so
too can the lack of adequate state capacity enable the spread of violence. The decision
of a population to rebel is partially based on a state’s capacity to repress insurgencies
and accommodate grievances (Hendrix, 2010). Likewise, the under-provision of basic
social security decreases the opportunity costs of fighting for the local population
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Hence, countries with lower state capacity are more
likely to face revolts and at the same time have fewer resources to counteract them.
Moreover, violent conflicts influence the decision to invest in state capacity in the
future, preventing the establishment of robust and well-functioning institutions. This
creates a volatile system of short-term rather than long-term goals, which raises the
susceptibility to external shocks. Hence, we expect state capacity to be an important
moderator in the relationship between conflict and education. Education in wealthier
regions may be less affected by conflicts due to lower budget constraints.
Political systems face distinct incentives to invest in state capacity development:
Democratic politicians direct policies to the median voter to gain the highest share of
votes in order to stay in office (Downs, 1957), resulting in a high level of public goods
provision following the interests of the majority. On the contrary, autocratic regimes
favor transfers that target the elite (Deacon, 2009), resulting in a lower level of public
goods provision. Strong states have a robustly functioning administrative system that
is less susceptible to shocks. Additionally, they have more financial resources at their
disposal, which protects funds appropriated to basic services from being redirected
towards military engagements. Since autocratic regimes, generally speaking, direct
higher amounts of public funds to armed forces rather than public goods and services
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provision (Deacon, 2009), the likelihood of redirection in the face of conflict is even
smaller. Hence, we would expect that educational losses caused by violent conflicts
are the most pronounced among weak states, followed by strong democracies, and
are the least pronounced among strong autocracies.
Revenues from sources other than taxation, like natural resources, are often more
volatile as they depend on the world market demand, which raises vulnerability and
reduces long-term investments. As revenues from natural resources do not require
investments into administrative capacity, resource-rich countries tend towards lower
state capacity, on average (Besley and Persson, 2014). Moreover, natural resources are
often targeted by rebels because of their easy extraction and high monetary value,
providing a good source of financing. If rebel groups succeed capturing natural
resources, governmental revenues drop sharply, further damaging public goods
provision. Hence, the local presence of natural resources may fuel localized conflicts
and further increase educational losses.
The level of public goods provision further depends on the ethnic diversity of a
population (Habyarimana et al., 2007). A more heterogeneous population represents
a greater variety of tastes and preferences, raising the cost of governance as well as the
need for cooperation, and resulting in the possible under-provision of public goods.
During conflicts, group identification is often used to mobilize fighters, which can
further increase the existing social divide and reduce investments into state capacity,
worsening the decline in educational provision during crisis.
6.4 Data and empirical strategy
6.4.1 Data sources
Our analysis relies on two main data sources: household data from the DHS pro-
gram and the geo-referenced conflict event dataset from UCDP. The DHS program
offers globally standardized, nationally representative household surveys for a large
number of countries including all kinds of socio-demographic characteristics (ICF,
2016). We use the most recent rounds of the standard DHS surveys (2001 to 2016),
which include geo-located data on survey location accurate to less than 5 km for most
observations (ICF, 2016).2 Since we measure conflict exposure by direct geodesic
distance to the survey location and since distance translates to substantially different
travel times in urban as compared to rural areas, we restrict our sample to rural
areas of Sub-Saharan Africa only.3 More importantly, past migration experiences that
could potentially bias our estimates downwards by causing us to assign past conflict
history to unaffected youth are less prevalent in rural areas than urban areas, as the
2DHS randomly displaces the GPS codes of survey locations to secure confidentiality. For most of
the clusters, displacement occurs within a radius of 5 km. 1% of the rural clusters is displaced within a
radius of 10 km.
3Locations are classified as rural or urban by the DHS. The classification is country-specific some
based on population size others on infrastructure.
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overall migration patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa show a clear rural to urban trend
(Awumbila, 2017; IDMC, 2018).4
The UCDP geo-referenced Event Dataset (GED, Version 5.0) provides conflict event
data for the years 1989 to 2015 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). It contains information
on the date and location of conflict events as well as the estimated number of fatalities.
When restricted to Sub-Saharan African countries, the dataset reports 26,970 conflict
events for the period of 1989 to 2015.
Additionally, we use precipitation anomalies (at a resolution of 0.5×0.5 decimal de-
grees) taken from the SPEIbase v.2.5 dataset to control for local weather extremes
and the arising shocks to the local economy. The SPEIbase measures precipitation
anomalies with a standardized z-score based on monthly precipitation and poten-
tial evapotranspiration information (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). The geographical
information on location of ethnic groups and regional capitals used in the instrumen-
tal variable approach is taken from the Nardov Mira geo-referenced ethnic groups
(GREG) dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010) and the world map of national capital cities.
The GREG dataset is a digital version of the Atlas Narodov Mira showing the geo-
graphical location of ethnic groups. It reports 8,969 polygons marking various ethnic
homelands. We use the borders of the polygons to measure ethnic diversity and
potential inter-ethnic tensions.
For the heterogeneity analysis, income per capita of a country is taken from the Word
Development Indicators provided by the World Bank (WorldBank, 2016) and ethnic
diversity of a country is measured by the ethnic fractionalization index proposed
by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). To quantify the impact of political quality
and democracy, we use the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project, which ranks
a political regime’s form of government on a scale ranging from –10 (strong autoc-
racy) to +10 (strong democracy), and is among the most widely used data sources
in political science (Marshall et al., 2019). We proxy for local GDP and economic
development using satellite data on intensity of nighttime lighting, gathered from the
geographic data center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) Earth Observatory Group (NOAA, 2019). We use version 4 of the DMSP-OLS
Nighttime Lights Time Series, which provides yearly average visible stable lights at
cloud free coverage for the years 1992 to 2013 and aggregate it to the resolution of
0.5×0.5 decimal degrees. To identify survey locations rich in natural resources, we
utilize the major mineral deposit of the world dataset of the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) (Schulz and Briskey, 2005). The dataset provides the geographical location of
deposits of major non-fuel mineral commodities.
4In the sub-sample that record past migration experience, 45% of urban youth live in households
that have migrated within the past 25 years, whereas only 29% of rural youth are part of a household
that has a migration history.
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6.4.2 Measurement
Our outcome variable of interest is educational attainment, which we measure by
the reported number of completed school years in the DHS. We determine potential
conflict exposure during childhood by combining an individual’s birth year with
their residence as reported in the survey. We restrict our dataset to individuals born
between 1990 and 2003 and thus aged 10 to 26 years at the time of the survey for
whom we can observe a full conflict history starting from their pre-birth year.5
For our main explanatory variable, we utilize the UCDP dataset. Based on the UCDP’s
definition, we consider a conflict year to be one in which at least one conflict event
took place within a 50 kilometer radius of the survey location.6 According to this
definition, about 12% of all childhood years in the sample were conflict years.
In order to distinguish between the effects of conflicts of varying intensities, we
estimate a variety of models by gradually adjusting our definition of a conflict year
according to the number of casualties in a given year (based on the best estimate
category in the UCDP dataset). We re-define a conflict year as one in which at least
one conflict event has taken place within 50 km of the location of interest and in
which the conflict events resulted in at least N deaths, with N ranging from 0 to
5,000.7 We measure potential conflict exposure, Cjct, for an individual currently living





1(NO. DEATHS jcτ ≥ N); N ∈ [0, 5000], (6.1)
where 1 indicates years in which battle-related deaths in the local neighborhood
reached at least N. Total conflict exposure is measured as the sum of all conflict years
over the full childhood period, beginning in utero and lasting until the age of 12.
We then rank conflict exposure by intensity, using a threshold of 1000 battle-related
deaths; conflict years with fewer than 1000 deaths are defined as "moderate-intensity"
while years with 1000 or more battle-related deaths are defined as "high-intensity".8
For the heterogeneity analyses, we use an alternative measure of conflict intensity
by summing up the total number of battle-related deaths and taking the logarithmic
transformation, using the inverse hyperbolic sine function. For further analyses,
we categorize conflict exposure years by the type of violence, as classified in the
UCDP dataset, as well as the critical age periods at which the conflict occurs in an
5We only include children starting from the age of 10 years as the multitude of factors determining
delays in school entry would confound our regressions for younger children.
6Further robustness checks repeat our results for 25, 100 and 200 km.
7About 40.5% of all youth in the sample have potentially experienced at least one conflict year of any
severity; 11% experienced at least one conflict year with 200 deaths; 5% for conflicts passing the 1,000
deaths threshold and about 2.4% of children experienced conflicts with 5,000 or more deaths.
8Only outright civil wars surpass the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. Thus, “moderate-
intensity conflict” still includes instances of very substantial violence. We distinguish these from
instances of starkly extreme violence, labelled as “high-intensity conflict”.
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individual’s life. The UCDP dataset recognizes three distinct categories of violent
conflict: (1) state-based conflicts, directly involving a state government; (2) non-
state based conflicts, involving violence between two non-governmental organized
actors; and (3) one-sided violence against civilians, which can be perpetrated by any
organized actor (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Regarding "critical age periods", we
follow the literature and distinguish between in utero (in the year preceding the birth
year), early childhood (at age 0 to 3), pre-school age (age 4 to 6) and primary school
age (age 7 to 12).9
We control for location-specific economic shocks by measuring extreme weather
events. We base our extreme weather indicators on the SPEI index, measured at a
12-month scale. Months with SPEI values below –1.5 in a given grid-cell of 0.5 degrees
are defined as beeing affected by a drought, and those with SPEI values above 1.5 are
defined as being affected by a rainfall shock. The band of +/–1.5 standard deviations
is based on the SPI classification system of McKee et al. (1993). We then calculate
potential exposure to economic shocks during an individual’s childhood as the sum
of all past months during which the individual was subjected to drought or rainfall-
shock periods separately. We link this grid data to our DHS dataset by choosing the
grid cell with the closest centroid to the survey location (within a distance of 200 km).
To analyze the various channels through which conflict may affect education, we
first classify countries based on their system of government; countries with polity2
scores below -5 for at least 10 of the included time periods are classified as strong
autocracies, while those with polity2 scores above 5 for at least 10 years are classified
as democracies. Next, we classify a location as being rich in natural resources if it is
located within 50 km of a natural resource deposit. Geographic localities are further
categorized based on whether they are above or below median values for ethnic
fractionalization, income per capita, and local nighttime light intensity, on average,
over time.
Restricting the sample to rural areas results in a dataset of 541,480 observations.
Among these observations, 31 countries, 428 regions and 19,652 survey locations are
represented. All included surveys are listed in table D.8 in the appendix, and table 6.1
reports summary statistics. Youth in the sample have on average 3.8 years of schooling
and about 1.6 years of exposure to any conflict during their childhood. Figure 6.1
maps the average number of conflict years during childhood in all survey locations,
whereas figure 6.2 shows the average educational attainment per survey location.
Detailed definitions of all variables are displayed in table D.9 in the appendix.
9We use the year of birth, as no consistent information is available on the birth month. This introduces
measurement error, in particular biasing our estimates on in utero conflict exposure downward.
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TABLE 6.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Dependent and main variables
Years of education 3.81 3.11 0 18
Conflict years 1.64 3.04 0 14
Moderate-intensity conflict years 1.56 2.82 0 14
High-intensity conflict years 0.09 0.43 0 5
Conflict years in utero 0.12 0.33 0 1
Conflict years at age 0–3 0.51 1.08 0 4
Conflict years at age 4–6 0.37 0.82 0 3
Conflict years at age 7–12 0.64 1.37 0 6
Distance to border (in 100 km) 0.25 0.31 0 3
Drought months 11.17 9.87 0 119
Wet months 7.44 8.82 0 71
Age 14.39 3.67 10 26
Female 0.48 0.50 0 1
Heterogeneity analysis
Asinh(Conflict deaths) 1.95 2.99 0 12.62
Asinh(State conflict deaths) 1.04 2.31 0 10.80
Asinh(Non-state conflict deaths) 0.72 1.75 0 9.06
Asinh(One-sided conflict deaths) 1.34 2.64 0 12.62
Strong democracy 0.24 0.43 0 1
Strong autocracy 0.31 0.46 0 1
Higher ethnic frac. 0.60 0.49 0 1
Higher income 0.47 0.50 0 1
Natural resources 0.22 0.41 0 1
More nightlights 0.50 0.50 0 1
Higher schooling 0.50 0.50 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the full sample; N = 541, 480.
6.4.3 Econometric model
We exploit the spatial and temporal variation in potential conflict exposure to infer
the average effect of violent conflicts on educational attainment. Our econometric
model regresses the number of years of completed education Yihjct of an individual i
from household h, who is currently residing in survey location j, within country c,
and was born in year t, on their potential conflict exposure during childhood Cjct (see
eq. 6.1) and further controls:
Yihjct = βCjct + S′jctγ + X
′
ihjctθ + λhæ + µct + εihjct, (6.2)
Sjct is a vector that measures the number of months that have resulted in locally
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relevant (negative) economic shocks. The vector Xihjct captures a full set of gender-
age fixed effects, whereas µct denotes country-cohort and λh/j household or location
fixed effects. In all specifications, the coefficient β measures the loss in educational
attainment due to one additional conflict year of a given severity that the individuals
may have experienced during a given childhood period.
Since conflicts do not occur randomly across space and over time, but rather are
driven by political and economic causes, these driving factors could themselves be
related to educational outcomes. For instance, a weak local labor market reduces the
potential outside income of the local population, thereby reducing the opportunity
costs of fighting, yet it may also reduce the households’ ability and willingness to
invest in education and the quality of local public service delivery. If we do not control
for the underlying causes of conflict (weak institutions, ethnic tensions, economic
shocks, etc.), we may overestimate the disruptive effects of conflict on education.
We address factors driving general conflict dynamics by controlling for an extensive
set of fixed effects and further time-variant local controls. The location fixed effects,
λj, control for all time-invariant differences in local social and economic conditions
and the local capacity to deliver education (for 19,652 locations). As several of these
factors may also be linked to the likelihood of conflict (like ethnic composition,
local institutions, geography, access to infrastructure), factoring out these effects
should move us closer to measuring a causal effect. Alternately, household fixed
effects, λh, are used instead of location fixed effects, restricting the variation even
further (for a total of 232,890 households). These control for time-invariant household
characteristics and identify the educational losses incurred through conflict by directly
comparing youth of distinct ages residing within the same household. Additionally,
the country-cohort fixed effects, µct, control for yearly changes in the macroeconomic
and political environment of each country, including, among others, the country-
wide determinants and consequences of violent conflicts and the overall trends in
education provision.
Our preferred specifications rely on a combination of these two types of non-nested
fixed effects. They identify the effects of conflict based on within-household varia-
tion, comparing the educational attainment of different cohorts, living within the
same household, who were deferentially exposed to conflict, while at the same time
factoring out all common time-varying dynamics that would affect the same cohort
across all locations within a country. A remaining source of bias in our estimates
comes from time-variant location-specific economic shocks, like major weather shocks,
which could potentially affect different parts of a country to varying degrees and
which may affect both conflict and educational outcomes. Therefore, in our preferred
specifications, we also control for a series of weather shocks, denoted by the vector
Sjct.
We rely on robust standard errors clustered at the first sub-national administrative
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level. Alternative specifications in section 6.6 test the robustness of our results to
other cluster specifications.
6.4.4 Issues of interpretation
We measure conflict exposure by linking past conflict incidence near a certain locality
to the educational attainment of children and youth currently living in that locality.
This measure does not capture direct individual exposure to conflict, but rather a
location’s exposure to conflict. Since particularly high-intensity conflicts are likely
to induce massive (although potentially transitory) migration (e.g., Czaika and Kis-
Katos, 2009), conflict-exposed youth may not still reside in the same place they lived
during the specified age periods. Many may have moved to different locations, at
least temporarily, and some of them may not have returned. If migrant youth coming
from conflict-affected locations still lag behind in education in their new location, this
will lead us to underestimate the effects of conflict on average. Contrary, if children
with the best chances to complete their education (e.g., because of showing higher
ability or coming from the wealthiest families) are more likely to leave in the face of
conflict and/or are less likely to return after the conflict has subsided, our conflict
coefficients may be overestimated.10 Since DHS surveys do not collect information
on migration systematically, we are left with a sub-sample of DHS surveys that
distinguish between migrant and non-migrant households. In section 6.6, the role of
migration in the conflict-education link is analyzed in these two sub-samples.
The potential presence of migration-induced measurement errors cautions us to not
interpret our estimates as precise measures of the costs of conflict on education.
These limitations notwithstanding, our results have an unambiguous interpretation
on the local level. Taking a regional economic approach, our results show how the
distribution of human capital in a locality changes with its past conflict history. Local
development is most likely to suffer, even in the long run, due to a resulting gap in
human capital.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Exposure to conflicts of different severity
To establish a baseline result, we follow the bulk of the literature by relating individual
educational attainment to past exposure to localized conflict events in general. Table
6.2 depicts results from regressing completed years of education on conflict exposure
during childhood with a series of different specifications. Column 1 shows the
baseline correlation between the years of education and the potential conflict exposure
10Children from better socio-economic background suffer more in terms of their education due to
conflict (Akresh and De Walque, 2008). This makes it less likely that self-selection into migration drives
the negative effects. Nonetheless, the evidence is inconclusive at best.
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during childhood, including gender-age, location and birth cohort fixed effects as
well as weather shock controls.
TABLE 6.2: Baseline regressions: Conflict exposure and education
Dependent Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict years -0.057** -0.059*** 0.021 0.018
(0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Drought months -0.000 -0.002 -0.006* -0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Wet months -0.010 -0.009 -0.006* -0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 541,480 480,847 541,480 480,847
R-squared 0.528 0.757 0.550 0.772
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of education on the number of
past conflict Standard errors are clustered at the level of administrative
regions, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
The estimate on conflict shows a negative relationship between conflict exposure
and the years of schooling. Exposure to one additional conflict year is linked to
about 0.057 fewer years of schooling, or around 1.5% of a standard deviation. This
coefficient is statistically significant, but of a rather modest magnitude, and does
not suggest substantial losses in education due to conflicts, on average. In column 2
of table 6.2, we substitute the location fixed effects with household fixed effects to
control for confounding household characteristics. In doing so, we identify the effects
of conflict on education through the distinct potential conflict experiences of youth
living within the same household. The results stay the same. Education outcomes
may also vary by country and time, since government policies directly shape the
school system. Public policies together with national labor market prospects, can
be expected to drive individual education-investments decisions while at the same
time being correlated with the likelihood of conflict. In order to mitigate this bias, in
column 3 we exchange the birth cohort fixed effects for country-specific birth cohort
fixed effects. With this approach, we increase the validity of our estimates but lose
the ability to identify the average effect of a conflict in a country, as we only focus on
within-country differences in conflict exposure driven by the proximity to localized
conflicts. In our preferred and most restrictive model in column 4, we combine the
country-specific birth cohort fixed effects with the household fixed effects. With
the inclusion of country-specific time fixed effects, the conflict coefficient becomes
insignificant. This indicates that the broader economic and political shocks that
occur at the country level result in a more conflict-prone local environment, and also
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result in relatively poorer educational outcomes, without us being able to establish a
separate link between the variation in local conflict exposure and education.
Our general conflict measure combined a wide range of different types of violence
including low-level conflict of short duration (like a violent demonstration) as well as
more protracted fighting. The latter can be expected to have a more disruptive effect
on education than the former. In order to investigate the distinct effects of conflict
on education by conflict intensity, we first classify conflict years into moderate- and
high-intensity conflict years based on the threshold of 1000 casualties. The results in
table 6.3 confirm our expectations.
TABLE 6.3: Baseline regressions: Intensity of conflict and education
Dependent Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Moderate-intensity -0.050** -0.054** 0.019 0.017
conflict years (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
High-intensity -0.162** -0.135* -0.161*** -0.116***
conflict years (0.073) (0.069) (0.052) (0.043)
Observations 541,480 480,847 541,480 480,847
R-squared 0.528 0.757 0.550 0.772
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of education on the amount of
moderate- and high-intensity conflict years at the threshold of 1000 casu-
alties. Standard errors are clustered at the level of administrative regions,
***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
In the first two columns, coefficients on moderate- and high-intensity conflict are
both negative and significant, but the point estimates on high-intensity conflicts are
about three times larger than those of moderate-intensity conflicts. Once we focus on
within-country variation (columns 3 and 4), the significance of moderate-intensity
conflicts vanishes, but high-intensity conflicts still stay significantly negative. Our
most restrictive model in column 4 shows that while conflict of relatively lower
intensity has no effect on the within-country variation in education, a further high-
intensity conflict year reduces the number of school years by 0.116 years or 1.4
months.
Figure 6.3 paints a more nuanced picture of the role of conflict severity for education
by gradually adjusting our conflict definition to include only conflicts that pass a
minimum threshold of yearly casualties (ranging from 1 to 5,000).11 The left panel is
11As only 2.39% of all children in the dataset were subject to a local conflict with more than 5,000
deaths per year, we take this as our upper conflict severity threshold.
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based on the specification shown in column 3, whereas the right panel provides the
estimates of our preferred regression model (column 4).
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Note: The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of education on conflict exposure
during childhood within 50 km to the location. Regression specifications column 3 and 4 in table 6.2.
The threshold that defines a severe conflict-year varies according to a minimum number of battle-related
deaths displayed horizontally. The share of observations with at least one conflict year using the given
deaths threshold is depicted by grey bars (second vertical axis). Standard errors are clustered at the
level of administrative regions.
The estimates show no negative relationship between moderate-intensity conflict
and education. However, high-intensity conflict years reduce the number of years of
school attainment. There is a strong gradient, as conflicts of larger severity disrupt
education more strongly than conflicts of lower intensity. While exposure to one
additional conflict year with at least 500 battle-related deaths reduces education by
about 0.05 years, or around 1.6% of a standard deviation, the effect of a conflict
year with at least 5,000 deaths amounts to 0.29 years of education lost (9.7% of a
standard deviation). The costs of conflict are disproportionately large for those
children living in areas with the longest amount of past exposure to conflict. Children
in the upper quartile of exposure to at least medium-intensity conflict (500 casualties)
have experienced, on average, 2.4 years of such conflicts, resulting in an average
education loss of 0.05× 2.4 = 0.12 years, or 1.4 months. Among children in the
upper 5% of high-intensity conflict exposure (5000 deaths), the loss amounts to
0.29× 2 = 0.58 years, or around 7 months. These losses appear even more substantial
in light of the rather low average educational attainment within our sample (3.8
years). As the difference between the two specifications is marginal, we will focus on
the household fixed effects specification in subsequent estimations.
To consider an additional dimension of heterogeneity, we further differentiate the
effects of conflict by age at exposure, dividing our conflict measure into those occur-
ring within four distinct age periods in an individual’s life: in utero, early childhood,
preschool age, and primary school age. Figure 6.4 presents the estimation results.
Table D.1 in the appendix shows related results for age-group-wise regressions while
distinguishing between moderate- and high-intensity conflicts.
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Note: The figure reports estimates of the effect of conflict on education by age periods, whereby age
period-specific conflicts enter the regression jointly. Specification as the right panel of figure 6.3.
The results show that severe conflict experiences in all age periods are harmful
for educational attainment, whereas exposure to moderate-intensity conflicts does
not have statistically significant effects on the number of completed school years.12
Across the age periods, the effect sizes differ only marginally. Thus, the results reflect
educational losses from direct effects of conflict, like school closure or student and
teacher absence, and also point to the presence of indirect long-term consequences
in line with the early childhood and fetal origin theory (Currie and Almond, 2011;
Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
Boys’ and girls’ education is often found to respond differently to conflict (Shemyak-
ina, 2011). To test for heterogeneity by gender, figure 6.5 shows a common baseline
effect that turns more negative with conflict severity, and illustrates a differential
effect for females. In our broader sample, high-intensity conflicts reduce the edu-
cational attainment of boys more strongly than that of girls. However, there is no
marked difference with respect to the effects of moderate-intensity conflict years.
Table D.2 in the appendix shows regression results differentiating between moderate-
and high-intensity conflict (at the 1000 deaths threshold) by gender. The results
show a weakly positive relationship between moderate-intensity conflicts and boys’
education, whereas the effect is fully nullified for girls. One additional year of high-
intensity conflict leads to 0.19 years less education for boys, but only to a 0.04 years
loss for girls. The pattern is similar throughout all age periods (not shown).
12As there are only few observations in the age period 7-12 years with high-intensity conflict exposure,
the effect is likely under-powered.
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Note: The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of education on conflict exposure
during childhood and the differential effects for girls. Specification as in the right panel of figure 6.3.
6.5.2 Alternative sources of causal identification
Our models reduce the potential for omitted variable bias to a considerable extent,
but time-varying local shocks could still drive conflict and education alike. In order
to mitigate the possibility of unobservables driving the negative correlation between
conflict and education, we extend our fixed effects specifications even further and
substitute country-cohort fixed effects with region-cohort fixed effects. These regional
birth-cohort fixed effects absorb a wide range of time varying regional characteristics
like shocks to the regional labor market or changes in the regional provision of
education. They factor out all common variations in both the propensity to experience
a conflict and in educational outcomes across administrative regions within the same
year. The remaining identifying variation comes from a comparison of locations
within the same administrative region of tier one (GADM, 2011) that are within or
outside of the direct range of a given conflict. One downside of these specifications is
that, they will not be able to capture sufficient across-village variation in outcomes if
the administrative units are small or the conflicts relatively far-reaching. Figure D.1
in the appendix presents a full set of results. They show patterns similar to figure 6.3
but with slightly smaller education losses than our main results.
As a second consistency check, we implement an instrumental variable approach to
validate our fixed effects results and deal with the potential endogeneity stemming
from local time-varying factors. The instrument combines spatial variation in ethnic
heterogeneity with the presence of location-specific weather shocks by interacting
the distance to the nearest ethnic border with the number of extremely dry and
wet months experienced in any location, combining two well-known streams of
the literature on the causes of conflict. In economies based on rain-fed agriculture,
extreme weather events proxy for economic shocks, determining the likelihood of
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conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Harari and Ferrara, 2018). Both extremely dry as well as
extremely rainy periods may reduce agricultural income and lower the opportunity
costs of fighting. Lower incomes additionally result in lower tax revenues, weakening
the state’s capacity to fight against insurgencies (Harari and Ferrara, 2018). Unlike
in the case of droughts, rainfall-shock months may have further direct effects on
conflicts, since floods can act as a barrier to conflict by immobilizing people. Ethnic
heterogeneity increases the likelihood that groups compete over power and public
goods (Esteban et al., 2012). Often, one group dominates and discriminates against
the others, resulting in grievances (Caselli and Coleman, 2013). Ideological differ-
ences and incompatible preferences between groups can add to the conflict potential.
Moreover, group identification facilitates the mobilization of certain actors, making
conflicts more likely.
Both weather shocks and ethnic diversity may directly affect the provision of local
public goods, including education. Our regressions control for these direct effects
by including localized weather shocks as predictors of education and by factoring
out time-invariant spatial heterogeneities, including ethnic diversity, via location
or household fixed effects. However, the interaction of weather shocks and ethnic
fractionalization should not affect education directly, but rather through a differential
effect on conflict potential only, providing us with a viable instrument. We base
this instrument on Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014), who find that countries with a
higher ethnic fractionalization are more prone to conflict when affected by a drought
than less ethnically fractionalized countries, experiencing a similar drought. The
instrument identifies the effects of conflict through the heterogeneous effect of a local
economic shock, dependent on the risk of conflict due to ethnic fractionalization.
The exclusion restriction behind this instrument requires that education be more
negatively affected by weather shocks in ethnically heterogeneous regions due solely
to the increased conflict potential arising from ethnic heterogeneity and not because
of other factors. One potential confounding factor could arise if the distance to ethnic
borders measures not only ethnic heterogeneity but also remoteness from district
administrative offices, which could affect the government’s ability to respond to
localized shocks. To test for this alternative channel, we present results controlling
for the distance between a location and the nearest administrative center, interacted
with weather shocks.
The first and second stage regression results are reported in table 6.4. We use our
baseline conflict measure (total number of conflict years of any severity) as weather
shocks may result in conflicts of mild to moderate to severe intensity alike (Hendrix
and Salehyan, 2012).
Weather shocks can serve to trigger conflicts and are thus a good predictor of conflict
occurrence. However, the role of weather shocks in influencing the quantity of conflict
fatalities is weak. Hence, in this step we use instruments only to test the link between
past conflict events and education, without distinguishing conflicts by their severity.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instruments:
Distance to border × -0.024*** 0.002 -0.021*** 0.002
Drought months (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Distance to border × -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.012***
Wet months (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Controls:
Drought months 0.015*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Wet months -0.012*** 0.001 -0.025*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Distance to admin. center × -0.006*** 0.000
Drought months (0.001) (0.001)
Distance to admin. center × 0.015*** 0.006**
Wet months (0.002) (0.002)
R-Squared 0.954 0.977 0.954 0.977
Kleinbergen-Paap F-stat. 52.64 13.67 45.17 12.37
SECOND STAGE
Dependent Years of education
Conflict years -0.374*** -0.456 -0.397*** -0.401
(0.127) (0.327) (0.143) (0.347)
Drought months 0.000 -0.005*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Wet months -0.015*** -0.005** -0.017*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Distance to admin. center × -0.003* -0.004***
Drought months (0.002) (0.001)
Distance to admin. center × 0.001 -0.001
Wet months (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847
R-squared 0.753 0.767 0.752 0.769
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the first and second stages from the IV regressions of
education on the number of conflict years. Standard errors are clustered at the
survey location. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
Column 1 presents results for regressions using gender-age, household, and birth-
cohort fixed effects, whereas in column 2 birth-cohort fixed effects are replaced
by country-specific birth-cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
location level. In column 1 of the first stage, drought events increase the likelihood of
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conflict, on average, and the effect diminishes with the distance to an ethnic border,
highlighting the heterogeneous effect of droughts as expected. By contrast, rainfall-
shocks seem to act as a barrier to conflict, reducing the average conflict potential. This
reduction is stronger in locations farther away from ethnic borders. The inclusion of
country-specific birth-cohort fixed effects in column 2 absorbs the general effect of the
extreme weather shocks, indicating that they have a national rather than a local scope.
The interaction effect with rainfall-shock months still survives, showing that rainy
periods reduce conflict potential more in ethnically homogeneous areas. Our results
are closely related to O’Loughlin et al. (2012), which shows that climate conditions
have effects at the local and national level. In columns 3 and 4, we add interaction
terms of our weather variables with the distance to the regional capital to ensure that
our instrument does not merely capture the effects of remoteness. In remote areas,
the infrastructure is often less developed and aid programs may take longer to reach
the affected population, increasing the impact of the weather effects. At the first stage,
rainfall-shock months tend to increase the likelihood of conflict more in remote areas,
underlining the immobility argument.
At the second stage, one further conflict year during childhood reduces educational
attainment by 0.374 years (column 1) which is substantially larger than the OLS
estimate (-0.059). The difference could arise from a reduction in measurement errors
or omitted variables. When interpreting the IV estimates as local average treatment
effects, educational losses are especially large for conflicts arising from agricultural
shocks triggered by weather anomalies combined with ethnic fractionalization. The
estimated effects are highly significant when only cohort-fixed effects are included.
They stay of similar magnitude but lose their significance when we include country-
specific birth cohort fixed effects. The inclusion of the interactions between weather
events and the distance to the regional capital (column 3) does not change our
estimates of conflict effects, making us more confident that the instruments measure
the effects of conflict potential and not merely remoteness.
The IV estimates are of larger magnitude and still negative, supporting our OLS
results. Once we control for country-specific variation over time, the relationship be-
tween our generic measure of conflict exposure and educational attainment is insignif-
icant, showing that location-specific conflict occurrence does not affect educational
attainment, on average. As weather shocks combined with ethnic fragmentation
only provide a viable instrument for conflict occurrence and do not predict conflict
intensity, we cannot use the same procedure to analyze the effects of high-intensity
conflicts. However, we believe that our OLS results on higher intensity conflict are
also more likely to underestimate the educational costs of conflict.
6.5.3 State capacity and further mechanisms
How much a conflict impairs the educational attainment of local children also de-
pends on the actors involved in the conflict. As providers of education, governments
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have an incentive to maintain a functional education system, whereas non-state ac-
tors may destroy schools. Hence, we would expect that non-state conflicts have a
stronger negative effect on education than state-based conflicts. Following the UCDP
classification, we divide conflicts into state-based, non-state based, and one-sided
violence. We regress the years of education on these three distinct types of conflict,
including our standard controls. We focus on a summary measure of conflict intensity,
following the conflict literature, by using the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number
of casualties of the respective conflict type. This helps us to incorporate the heteroge-
neous effects by conflict severity and reduce the number of presented interactions in
a concise manner. Additionally, it is easily interpretable and avoids the placement
of arbitrary thresholds. Using our preferred specification, table 6.5 shows that on
average the log-transformed number of casualties is not significantly related to the
years of education. But, this measure still allows heterogeneous effects by the conflict
actors. Most importantly, the loss of education seems to be caused by non-state
conflicts, confirming our expectations. We find no significant effect of conflict severity
on education for state-based conflicts and one-sided violence. A potential explanation
for this latter null result is that attacks on civilians are, on average, of a lower intensity
and usually accompany other conflicts involving state- or non-state actors.13
TABLE 6.5: Heterogeneous effects of conflict intensity on education by
conflict type
Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asinh(Conflict deaths) -0.006
(0.011)
Asinh(State conflict deaths) 0.016 0.017
(0.015) (0.016)
Asinh(Non-state conflict deaths) -0.048** -0.049**
(0.021) (0.021)
Asinh(One-sided conflict deaths) 0.003 -0.001
(0.014) (0.015)
Observations 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847
R-squared 0.772 0.772 0.772 0.772 0.772
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of education on the the inverse hyperbolic sine
function of the number of casualties during childhood of distinct conflict types. Spec-
ifications include gender-age, country-cohort and household fixed effects and weather
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the level of administrative regions. ***,**,* denote
significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
In a next step, we analyze a series of factors which potentially moderate the effects of
conflict on education, distinguishing between a set of country and location character-
istics. Results are presented in table 6.6. All characteristics are interacted with past
conflict intensity (the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of casualties) one-by-one
first, whereas column 6 specifies the model to include all factors together.
13The correlation of one-sided violence and state-based conflict is especially high with ρ = 0.78.
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TABLE 6.6: Heterogeneous effects of conflict intensity on education by
country and location characteristics
Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asinh(Conflict deaths) -0.067** 0.008 -0.008 -0.001 0.005 -0.036
(0.034) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.033)
. . .× Strong democracy -0.019 -0.030
(0.020) (0.020)
. . .× Strong autocracy 0.076** 0.078**
(0.032) (0.032)
. . .× Higher ethnic frac. -0.022 -0.036*
(0.020) (0.019)
. . .× Higher income per capita 0.008 0.018
(0.026) (0.027)
. . .× Natural resources -0.027* -0.026*
(0.014) (0.014)
. . .×More nightlights -0.020* -0.015
(0.012) (0.011)
Observations 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847 480,847
R-squared 0.772 0.772 0.772 0.772 0.772 0.772
Note: The table reports OLS estimates from education on the inverse hyperbolic sine function of the
number of casualties during childhood and its interaction with country and location characteristics.
Specifications as in table 6.5. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
We expect that educational losses from conflict vary with the form of government in
power at the time of conflict. Classifying countries into strong autocracies, strong
democracies, and others, column 1 of table 6.6 shows that the number of fatalities in a
conflict decreases local school attainment both in weak states and strong democracies.
As only few strong democracies exist in our sample, and these countries have not par-
ticipated in large-scale conflicts, it is likely that these estimates are under-powered.14
There is no educational loss in strong autocracies due to conflict confirming our
hypothesis.
The provision of public goods may be more negatively impacted by conflict in ethni-
cally heterogeneous states than homogeneous ones, as cooperation costs generally
increase with heterogeneity. Similarly, states with a poorer population (measured by
lower average income) may face larger financial restrictions and be more susceptible
to crisis due to their budget constraints. We test these channels in columns 2 and 3 of
table 6.6. Both results turn out to be insignificant. Hence, conflict intensity is not sig-
nificantly differentially linked to educational losses in more ethnically fractionalized
or poorer states, on average.
At the local level, natural resources are often targeted by rebel groups because of
their easy extraction and their high monetary value. If rebel groups succeed in
capturing natural resources, government revenues drop sharply, reducing public
14We classified Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Namibia as strong democracies. These
countries did not experience any conflict of high intensity.
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goods provision. Consequently, the educational attainment of children from resource-
rich regions is likely to suffer more due to conflict. Results in column 4 of table 6.6
support the resource curse argument. Educational losses significantly increase with
conflict intensity in locations with natural resource deposits.
Local economic development may also be a relevant factor in education as the local
demand for education and the local ability to provide public education can be ex-
pected to rise with local economic development. Similarly, wealthier regions with
higher initial levels of educational attainment may face larger potential decreases
if education is disrupted by conflict. Hence, the direction of the effect is a priori
unclear. Our estimate in column 5 of table 6.6 shows a negative effect of conflict
intensity in regions with higher economic prosperity. This indicates that, ceteris
paribus, better-developed regions lose more education due to conflict.
Column 6 of table 6.6 includes all interactions, jointly testing heterogeneities at the
country level and at the local level against each other. In this specification, our proxy
for the state capacity channel turns out to be the most relevant differentiating factor.
Education suffers substantially less from higher intensity conflicts in strong autocra-
cies than under any other conditions. Regions with higher ethnic diversity are more
strongly affected by conflict in terms of lost education, indicating that public service
provision during times of conflict may be more limited in ethnically-heterogeneous
countries. All else equal, geographic localities closer to natural resource deposits
suffer substantially larger educational losses than geographic localities farther away.
This indicates that a local resource curse not only serves to trigger conflicts, but also
interacts with conflict intensity in affecting educational losses. Finally, the coefficient
for local nighttime light intensity becomes insignificant in this joint test.
6.6 Further robustness issues
Our measurement strategy relies on the assumption that we can assess the past conflict
exposure of an individual by measuring past conflict occurrences near the individual’s
current geographic location. Thereby, we neglect the potential measurement errors
from migration described in section 6.4.4. Although we cannot analyze the role of
migration in the whole sample, we observe migration patterns within a sub-sample
of the population.15 In this sub-sample, the share of migrants in the total youth
population is positively correlated with years of past conflict exposure (over the last 25
years) for high intensity conflicts (see table D.3 in the appendix), but are uncorrelated
with conflict in general, or moderate-intensity conflicts. Hence, our estimates for
high-intensity conflicts may be more prone to a bias due to incorrectly assigned
birthplaces. With respect to self-selection into migration, migrants are, on average,
better educated and tend to live in wealthier and better educated households than
15This sub-sample includes data from 20 countries.
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non-migrants (see D.4 in the appendix), suggesting that there may be a downward
bias in the high-intensity conflict estimates.
In the migration sub-sample, we can directly compare the conflict coefficients by
migration status. Table D.5 replicates our baseline results for the sub-sample of youth
with migration information. Even though the sample is reduced substantially (to
68,110 observations), we can still see the same link between exposure to conflicts of
high intensity and losses in education in column 1. In the model with household fixed
effects, we run into power issues, as the sample is further reduced by half (column
2). The substantially smaller sample size renders the resulting coefficient estimates
insignificant. However, the magnitude and direction of the effect are both comparable
to the first specification. In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the general effect of past
conflict exposure together with a differential effect for non-migrants. Migrants indeed
show worse education outcomes than non-migrants in locations exposed to moderate-
intensity conflicts, so migration may contribute to our estimate of the local costs of
moderate-intensity conflict. However, in locations which have experienced a high-
intensity conflict, non-migrants have decidedly fewer years of education on average,
indicating that migration is not the only factor driving our results. Overall, migrants
seem to be better off than locals. This could be because families who care more
about education are more likely to relocate before the outbreak of a conflict, thereby
reducing the human capital of the local population. Alternately, post-conflict locations
might attract relatively better-educated households. In either case, migration tends to
lead to an underestimation of the individual costs of high-intensity conflict.
Since the timing and location of conflicts are not exogenous, further placebo checks
can help us to assess the potential role of pre-trends or other confounding factors
driving local conflict and education. For this, we repeat our baseline regressions
linking conflict exposure to education, but focus on conflicts that should not have
directly affected children and youth in our sample, due to the nature of their timing.
As a first test, we regress individual years of education on conflict occurring in the
third and second year before the birth of a child. The results are shown in table
D.6. There is no residual correlation between late-life educational attainment and
pre-utero exposure to conflict even among high-intensity conflicts. It follows that, the
correlation between educational attainment and conflict exposure is unlikely to be
driven by pre-trends. As a second placebo test, we examine educational attainment
among those who were exposed to localized violence as adults, during a time when
they were likely to have already finished their secondary education. For this, we
focus on a sample of adults aged 26 to 47 (born between 1969 and 1986), and test for
correlation between their potential for conflict exposure between the ages of 20 and
25 and their completed years of education. The results in column 3 and 4 of table
D.6 show no significant negative coefficients, and coefficients for moderate-intensity
conflicts in fact depict a positive correlation, indicating that our previous findings are
unlikely to be driven by common underlying trends.
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Throughout all of our analyses, we reported estimates with standard errors clustered
at the regional level, allowing for unspecified correlation between the residuals of
individuals living in the same region. However, in our context, the correct level
of clustering is debatable. Since we are measuring conflict exposure by location,
measurement errors should similarly affect all individuals living within a certain
location. Hence, standard errors should at least be clustered at the locality level. The
presence of correlation at a larger level of analysis, for instance at the regional or even
national level, is plausible and partially captured via our fixed effects. To check for the
robustness of our results to the level of clustering, we compare our main specifications
using three additional steps. Columns 1 and 2 in table D.7 report regression results
with standard errors clustered at the locality level, allowing only for correlation
within specific locations. Columns 3 and 4 report results with two-way clustering at
the locality level and among country-birth cohort cells. This latter method relies on
asymptotics in the lowest level clusters, and is the most appropriate method to use
when there is within-correlation on both dimensions and each dimension has many
clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Columns 5 and 6 report results using spatial
standard errors, which correct for spatial dependence in the error terms. Since we
measure conflict exposure within a 50 km radius around the location, neighboring
locations will likely be affected by the same conflicts. In order to take this into account,
we run regressions with spatially corrected standard errors based on Conley (1999),
correcting for spatial correlation within 100 km to the survey location. The distinct
versions of clustering do not change our main results substantially.
In our analysis, we assigned each conflict event to all survey locations located within
a 50 km radius to the conflict. However, the average influence area of a conflict
could be both farther or nearer. Therefore, we re-estimate the effects of conflicts using
different severity thresholds for conflict influence zones, namely 25, 100 and 200 km.
The results are shown in figure D.2 in the appendix. Consistent with the literature
(see e.g., Hallberg, 2012), the 25 km distance measure does not seem to sufficiently
capture the full area of a conflict, and results yield substantially larger standard errors.
However, effect sizes diminish when using wider distance measures of up to 200 km.
As expected, the impact on educational attainment declines as the distance to the
original conflict event increases.
6.7 Conclusion
We study the link between localized conflict occurrence and educational attainment
of children in 31 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1989 to 2015. In doing so, we
are able to generalize the results of a large number of case studies on this link, and
investigate heterogeneous effects of different conflict types as well as context-specific
conflict characteristics. For this purpose, we combine DHS surveys with the UCDP
geo-referenced conflict dataset and link individual school attainment of youth to local
occurrence of conflicts during four specific age periods during childhood. We address
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the endogeneity of conflict across time and space by including two-way fixed effects
for households and country-specific birth cohorts, capturing time-variant shocks
to conflict and education at the country level and time-invariant differences in the
propensity of conflict across households. Additionally, we control for location-specific
weather shocks and implement an instrumental variable approach to address further
time-varying confounders.
Although we cannot identify robust effects from our generic conflict exposure, which
measure includes every type of conflict event, the most severe and prolonged conflicts
do result in substantial average costs of educational attainment. Educational losses
occur mainly in states with weaker governance, which are more likely to experience
declines in state capacity due to a conflict. Losses are also mainly triggered by non-
state conflicts, which are more likely to destroy school infrastructures and thus harm
the administrative capacity of the government. This highlights the crucial role of state
capacity in mediating the effects of conflict on education. Moreover, conflict exposure
during all age periods harms education, and the educational outcomes of boys are
more strongly affected by high-intensity conflicts than those of girls.
The results document longer lasting losses of education among youth cohorts cur-
rently living in locations previously affected by a high-intensity conflict. Although
we cannot distinguish direct disruptions to education from human capital losses
through the channel of out-migration of those more likely to receive an education,
we document shifts in the human capital composition of localities previously affected
by severe conflict, leading to economic and social costs in the long run. Contextual-
izing the findings of previous case studies, the paper highlights the diverse effects
of conflict on education. We confirm heterogeneous effects by conflict severity and
age at conflict exposure found by previous literature. With respect to gender, our
results show a stronger negative effect for girls in moderate-intensity conflicts and a
smaller effect in high-intensity conflicts compared to boys, potentially consolidating
the differential effects found in previous literature. We add new dimensions of hetero-
geneity by investigating conflict types as well as location and country characteristics,
especially highlighting the role of state capacity in the link between conflict and edu-
cation. In order to achieve universal education for all, remedial policy interventions





This thesis has dealt with the causes and consequences of conflict, helping toward
understanding violent conflict. Contributing to the recent micro-economic literature,
the empirical papers of the dissertation identify two causes and two consequences of
violent conflict.
For a better understanding of the roots of conflict, chapter 3 and 4 establish a causal
link between political favoritism as well as water scarcity and conflict. The results in
chapter 3 show that political favoritism reduces the intensity of violent conflict in the
home regions of political leaders in autocracies while they are in power. The effect is
strongest in regimes with a high likelihood of engaging in coup-proofing strategies.
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence for the Homer-Dixon model. We find that a
rise in the scarcity of water is increasing the risk of conflict. The effect is substantially
alleviated by access to groundwater.
Chapter 5 and 6 elaborate on the consequences of conflict with respect to social
segregation and education. In chapter 5, we find that non-discriminatory behavior
coexists with discriminatory feelings of prejudice and fear towards ex-combatants
in post-conflict Colombia. The mediated contact has promoted positive attitudes
towards reintegrating ex-combatants and increased monetary support once crucial
skills were highlighted. Chapter 6 concludes that the educational consequences of
conflict are strongly context-dependent. Educational losses are strongest in states
with poor governance and in highly intense conflicts fought by non-governmental
actors.
Based on the empirical findings presented in this thesis and the existing literature on
the causes and consequences of conflict, two main conclusions emerge.
First, countries are trapped in vicious circles of conflict. The identified consequences
of conflict simultaneously present causes of conflict, providing a potential explana-
tion why they are strongly geographically clustered and persistent. As discussed in
chapter 5, societies may be segregated by civil wars. If not addressed, this segregation
provides breeding ground for further conflicts (in post-conflict societies) (Esteban
et al., 2012). Moreover, conflict hinders social and economic development and con-
solidates existing grievances (Gates et al., 2012), for instance, by the interruption
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of human capital accumulation as shown in chapter 6. In turn, multiple factors
closely associated with underdevelopment, for example human capital, cause conflict
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). The clear connection between violent conflict and under-
development shows that the global challenges, which the international community
is facing, are interwoven. This provides two entry points for policymakers to break
the conflict trap: policymakers can focus on the termination of conflict with conflict
resolution and peace-building activities, or they can address the structural factors
causing conflict, mainly underdevelopment and associated factors. Both approaches
are valid and most likely a combined strategy is advisable. The call of a new direction
by ’Pathways to Peace’, however, shows that existing peace-building activities and
conflict resolution efforts have not brought the success expected (World Bank Group,
2018). Concerns about the effectiveness of such activities was also raised by others
(Anderson et al., 2007). Rather than shutting down these activities, the effectiveness
of peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives should be improved by critically
evaluating the activities and assisting research. The rather limited amount of research
on peace-building and conflict resolution leaves ample scope for improvement.
The second main conclusion is that governance and state capacity play a crucial role
in the connection between violent conflict and the structural factors causing it. The
empirical findings presented in this thesis provide support for this statement. First,
governments impact the costs of fighting, by augmenting the amount of resistance
and security precautions in the country, or by altering the penalties on violent felonies.
This is shown in chapter 3, where favored home regions of autocratic leaders, which
receive more protection and attention by the government, experience lower conflict
intensity. Second, governments can shape the incentives to fight by promoting social
and economic well-being of their citizens and addressing other causes of conflict.
This includes reducing the vulnerability to climate-related shocks, which spur conflict
(see chapter 4). Moreover, as shown in chapter 6, governments can alleviate the
consequences of conflict by successful crisis management, maintaining adequate
public goods provision. But, governments also directly affect the risk of conflict by
initiating violence or being the cause of conflict when misusing their power. This
phenomenon has received only few attention in the conflict literature. I join Blattman
and Miguel (2010) in encouraging research in this field. As chapter 3 shows, good
institutions that include checks and balances help to limit the misuse of power by
politicians. Taken together, governments can play a key role in preventing conflicts
and alleviating their consequences. Yet, one needs to admit that in order to undertake
such actions, financial and organizational resources are necessary. These are often
lacking among others as a result of conflict (Goldstone, 2008). Development aid
that targets the improvement of governance capabilities and the recovery of state
legitimacy can support to overcome the conflict trap (Brinkerhoff, 2007). This provides
a third entry point to break the vicious circle.
On a methodological level, the interdependence of conflict and the structural factors
111
Chapter 7. Conclusion
linked to conflict impedes the identification of causal effects. Therefore, attention
should be paid to causal identification and unidentified studies should be taken with
caution. Thereupon, the economic research can make a significant contribution to the
conflict literature.
In summary, countries are trapped in a vicious circle of conflict, explaining the recur-
rence and persistence of violence. There are three entry points to break this circle. In
all of them, policymakers hold a leading role. Future work could focus on evaluating
the diverse, implemented policies targeting the termination and prevention of conflict.
This would provide policymakers with feedback, and improve the effectiveness of
peace building and maintaining initiatives.
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Appendix for chapter 3
A.1 Further robustness checks
TABLE A.1: Political favoritism and conflict
IHS(casualties)
(1) (2) (3)
Leader regiont−1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.023
(0.004) (0.003) (0.017)
Observations 1,177,805 1,177,805 1,177,805
R-squared 0.364 0.264 0.387
Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the conflict
outcome variables on an indicator of the birth region of the effective leader.
Regressions include country-year and region fixed effects as well as standard
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Leader autoct−1 -0.132 -0.127
(0.331) (0.330)




Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the
inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of casualties on dummies
of (non-)autocratic leader regions at the first administrative level.
Regressions include country-year fixed effects, standard controls
and region fixed effects, whereas region refers here to the 1st
admin level. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Leader autoct−1 -0.118** -0.085*
(0.054) (0.050)
Leader non-autoct−1 -0.023 -0.009
(0.019) (0.019)
Leader autoct−1 x switcher 0.046
(0.045)
Leader non-autoct−1 x switcher 0.073*
(0.040)
Leader autoct−1 x irregular entry -0.027
(0.087)




Note: The table reports OLS regression estimates of regressing the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the number of casualties on dummies of (non-)autocratic
leader regions and their interaction terms with indicators of political regime
switchers and leaders’ irregular entries into office. Regressions include country-
year and region fixed effects as well as standard controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.2 Data appendix
Our analysis combines geo-coded conflict event data with information on the birth
places of political leaders. The unit of observation is region-year, whereby region
refers to the second administrative level of a country provided by the GADM dataset
v3.6 (GADM, 2019). Using the information of leaders’ birth places we define a region
as a leader region if the national leader was born in the respective region. Our final
sample is an unbalanced panel dataset with 44,025 regions in 2,963 provinces and
172 countries over the years 1989 – 2015 resulting in a total of 1,177,805 observations.
We define and describe all variables that are used in the empirical analysis in the
following.
Conflict data
The dependent variables in our empirical analysis are different measures of conflict,
which are taken from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) global version
19.1 provided by the UCDP (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Stina, 2019). It reports
violent events for the years 1989 until 2018 and entails information on the exact loca-
tion and timing of the event as well as the estimated number of casualties. The UCDP
GED conflict event dataset is one of the most accurate data sets on global conflicts
available. We exclude all conflict events with imprecise geo-coded information, that is,
conflicts for which the geo-precision is less accurate than at the second administrative
level.
We measure conflict in three ways. First, we construct a dummy variable that equals
one if there occurred at least one conflict in a given region and year. Second, we
readjust the conflict dummy according to the number of battle-related deaths by
setting the conflict variables only to one if the sum of all conflict-related fatalities in a
region and year is larger than 500. Third, in order to see changes in the intensity of
conflict, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine function of the number of battle-related
deaths per region and year.
In an extension of our baseline regressions, we further divide our conflict variables
by their actors, following the definition of the UCDP GED database, into state-based
conflict events, non-state-based conflicts and one-sided violence. According to the
UCDP definition, a conflict is characterized as state-based if a government of a state
is active in the conflict, whereas non-state based conflict refers to violence between
two non-governmental organized actors. One-sided violence includes attacks against
civilians of any organized actor (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). We readjust the third
category by eliminating the attacks against civilians from non-governmental actors.
According to these definitions, we define a year to be a state-based conflict year if at
least one state-based conflict event in the respective region and year has occurred and
use the inverse hyperbolic sine function of the number of fatalities in these events.
The same procedure applies to the other two categories.
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Data on political leaders
To identify political leaders around the globe, we rely on the Archigos database v. 4.1
(Goemans et al., 2009). Archigos lists the effective national political leaders in 188
countries during the years 1875 to 2015 and provides further information on their
time in office, type of entry (if the leader came into office regularly or via a coup) and
exit.
We complement the database with the leaders’ geo-referenced birth places from the
PLAD dataset from Dreher et al. (2020) and identify the corresponding regions on
the second administrative level. Out of this, we construct Leader region, which is an
indicator variable equal to one if a region is the birth region of the national leader
and 0 otherwise. For a graphical representation of the leader regions, see figure 3.1.
Ethnicity
In order to investigate the effects of ethnic favoritism on conflict, we use the ethnic
affiliation of national leaders provided by the PLAD dataset. We implement two
approaches. The first approach is a straightforward replacement of the second ad-
ministrative regions with ethnic homelands from the GeoEPR2019 dataset (Vogt et al.,
2015). Using this dataset, we identify the ethnic home regions of the ethnicities of the
politicians. Thus we identify the leader region identically to the approach with the
GADM regions. In the second approach, we change the level of observations from
regions to actors (ethnicities). The Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform
(Growup) database (Girardin et al., 2015) attributes ethnicities to conflict actors ir-
respective of where the conflict takes place. Combined with the ethnic affiliation of
national leaders, we can identify which ethnic conflict groups belong to the same
ethnicity than the leader in autocracies and non-autocratic regimes (Ethnic leader autoc
and Ethnic leader non-autoc).
In the channel analysis, we use the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF)
from Drazanova (2019) to divide countries by their ethnic fractionalization along
the median. The measure is an index that classifies countries based on their ethnic
fractionalization. It theoretically ranges from 0 (every individual belongs to the same
ethnic group) to 1 (every individual represents an individual group).
Political regime
We classify countries into autocratic and non-autocratic based on the Database of
Political Institutions (DPI2017) (Scartascini et al., 2018). A political regime is defined
as autocratic if there are no consolidated democratic institutions and the leadership
is personality-based. More specifically, the DPI defines a country as autocratic if it
either has no legislature, an unelected legislature, an elected legislature but only one
candidate or party, or if there are multiple parties but only one party won seats.
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The main variables of interest are Leader autoc and Leader non-autoc. Both are dummy
variables that are equal to one if a) the region is the home region of the national
leader and b) the country is an autocracy in case of Leader autoc or not an autocracy
respectively for Leader non-autoc. In our sample, 20 countries are classified as auto-
cratic throughout the whole sample period, 69 as non-autocratic and 83 countries
changed the political system during the period. Of the 44,025 regions in our sample,
632 regions are birth regions of any political leader, 204 regions are birth regions of
an autocratic leader and 533 regions are birth regions of a non-autocratic leader.
Weather shocks
In order to account for local economic shocks, we include indicators for drought and
abundant rain from the Global SPEI database (version 2.5). The database provides
standardized precipitation-evapotranspiration indexes (SPEI) for the years 1901 – 2015
on a monthly basis and 0.5 degree spatial grid resolution (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010).
It measures precipitation anomalies by a standardized z-score that is constructed
out of monthly precipitation data minus the potential estimated evapotranspiration.
Thus, it extends the popular Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) by also taking
surface evaporation and plant transpiration resulting from higher temperatures into
account (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). Based on the SPEI index measured at 3-month
scale, we define a month to be very dry if the SPEI index is equal or below –1 and very
wet if the value is equal or above 1. As a measure for local economic shocks, f lood
reports the number of very wet months in a year (or very dry months for drought,
respectively) that a region experienced.
Population density
Regions with a high number of citizens have mechanically a higher likelihood to
provide the political leader. At the same time, population size has been shown to be a
determinant of conflict incidence (Brückner, 2010). To take this potential confounding
factor into account, we control for the logarithm of yearly population size in a region.
Using data from GPWv4 (Gridded Population of the World) dataset (CIESIN, 2019),
we calculate the average population density for every region. Since the data is only
available on a 5-year basis, we use a linear interpolation for the missing years.
Regional economic development
For a measure of regional economic development and to investigate the ’welfare
channel’, we make use of the nighttime-light data provided by the NOAA’s national
geographic data center of the earth observatory group. We use the Version 4 DMSP-
OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series (NOAA, 2019) that provides average yearly visible
stable lights at cloud free coverage on 30 arc second grids for the years 1992 to 2013.1
1As the Nighttime Lights Time Series is available for the years 1992 – 2013, our sample is restricted
to these years in the ‘welfare channel’ analysis.
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We aggregate the data on the second administrative level of a country by taking the
area-sized weighted average.
Following Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), we use the logarithm of nighttime
lights plus 0.01. Nighttime light data are a good proxy for regional economic devel-
opment and especially helpful in developing countries, where precise information on
a geographical fine scale are rare (Bruederle and Hodler, 2018). Using nighttime light
data as a proxy for economic development mediating the relation between political
favoritism and conflict, we can investigate whether the effect of political favoritism
on economic development translates into changes in conflict.
Natural ressources
We use the PRIO-GRID database (version 2.0) (Tollefsen et al., 2012) to identify regions
with oil or gas deposits and to account for population growth. World-market oil and
gas prices stem from the World Bank.
Natural resources such as oil are another important economic factor on the local level
that potentially confound the relation between leader region and conflict. We interact
the world-market price of oil and gas with indicator variables that determine whether
oil or gas deposits are present in a region to control for these kinds of economic
shocks. As an robustness check we control for further natural resources in the same
way. Therefore, we use the information from Berman et al. (2017). We also use this
data in the channel analysis.
Afrobarometer
To investigate the ‘in-group favoritism channel’ and the ‘coup-proofing channel’ we use
information of citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards political institutions in
African countries provided by Afrobarometer (2019). The Afrobarometer is a repeated
survey on public and political attitudes that provides geo-localized data in 37 African
countries over the years 1999 to 2019. We use the survey rounds 1 to 6 and aggregate
perceptions and attitudes on the second administrative level of the country by taking
the average values. Our sample is thereby reduced to around 7,000 region-year
observations from 35 African countries.2
Enumerators of the surveys are asked to state whether they have seen a soldier or
army vehicle, policemen, police vehicle or station on the way to the survey location.
We use these statements as indicators of the amount of security protection. All an-
swers are aggregated on the region level, taking the weighted average. We investigate
the statements separately as well as in a combined index, named state force.
Changes in attitudes and behavior of citizens are analysed using the rating of trust in
the political leader, the approval of his/her performance and their reported political
2For certain outcome variables (corruption leader, trust leader and performance leader), we lose 1-2
countries, as the question is not asked in these countries.
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engagement. Additionally, participants in the surveys were asked about their percep-
tion of the extent of corruption in the police and leader office on a 4 point Liker scale,
which we take as an indicator of the level of corruption in the respective region.
A detailed description of the variables used can be found in the table A.6 in the
appendix, and table 6.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables.
TABLE A.4: List of countries in the main sample
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedo-
nia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nige-
ria, North Korea, Northern Cyprus, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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TABLE A.5: List of countries and years of the Afrobarometer sample
Country Years
Algeria 2013, 2015
Angloa 2006, 2008, 2012
Benin 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Botswana 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Burkina Faso 2008, 2012, 2015
Burundi 2012, 2014
Cameroon 2013, 2015
Cape Verde 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Ivory Coast 2013, 2014
Egypt 2013, 2015
Ghana 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Guinea 2013, 2015
Kenya 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Lesotho 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Liberia 2008, 2012, 2015
Madagascar 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2015
Malawi 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Mali 2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014
Mauritius 2012, 2014
Morocco 2013, 2015
Mozambique 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015
Namibia 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014
Niger 2013, 2015
Nigeria 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
Senegal 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014
Sierra Leone 2012, 2015
South Africa 2000 2002 2006 2008 2011 2015
Sudan 2013, 2015
Tanzania 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Togo 2012, 2014
Tunisia 2013, 2015
Uganda 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015
Zambia 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014
Zimbabwe 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014
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TABLE A.6: Definitions of variables
Variable name Description Source
Regional favoritism
Any conflict Dummy variable for whether a region experienced at least one
conflict event in a given year and region
UCDP GED
Conflict (death ≥ 25) Dummy variable for whether a region experienced at least one
conflict event resulting in 25 deaths or multiple conflict events
summing up to 25 deaths in a given year
UCDP GED
IHS(casualties) Inverse hyperbolic sine function of the number of battle-related
casualties a region experiences in a given year
UCDP GED
Leader region Dummy variable indicating if the national leader was born in this
region
PLAD
Autocratic regime Indicator variable for whether a region is in an autocratic regime at
time t. Autocratic regime is defined in the World Bank Database of
political institutions as a system with no consolidated democratic
institutions and a leadership that is personality-based.
WDPI
Leader (non-)autoc Based on the autocratic regime definition, we differentiate be-
tween autocratic and non-autocratic countries. Leader autoc refers
to leader regions in autocratic countries and leader non-autoc re-




Flood Number of wet months (defined as the z-score of SPEI being larger
than 1) in a given year and region
SPEIbase
Drought Number of dry months (defined as the z-score of SPEI being larger
than 1) in a given year and region
SPEIbase
Ln(Population) Logarithm of population density NOAA
Oil x ln(priceoil) Interaction of dummy that a region has oil reserves and the world-
market price of oil.
World Bank,
Prio-Grid
Gas x ln(pricegas) Interaction of dummy that a region has gas reserves and the




Ethnic homelands Region that is classified as ethnic homeland by the EPR dataset GeoEPR
Ethnicity We use the ACD2EPR dataset to connect conflict actors to ethnic
groups. A non-state-based conflict actor is connected to a certain
ethnic group if the actor recruits persons from this ethnic group
and states to act on behalf of the ethnicity.
ACD2EPR
Ethnic leader (non-) au-
toc
Dummy variable indicating the ethnic homeland or ethnicity that




IHS(state casualties) Inverse hyperbolic sine function of battle-related deaths of state-
based conflicts in a year and region. A conflict is a state-based




Inverse hyperbolic sine function of battle-related deaths of non-
state-based conflicts in a year and region. A conflict is a non-state-




Inverse hyperbolic sine function of battle-related deaths of con-
flicts against civilians by governmental actors in a year and region.
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Variable name Description Source
Nighttime lights Logarithm of nighttime lights + 0.01 NOAA
Army Share of responses of enumerators that have seen any soldier or
army vehicles on their way to interview per region and year
Afrobarometer
Police Share of responses of enumerators that have seen any policemen,
police station or police vehicles on their way to interview per
region and year
Afrobarometer
State force Share of responses of enumerators that have seen either army or
police presence on way to interview per region and year
Afrobarometer
Trust leader Average trust level towards political leader measured on a Likert
scale from 0 to 3 per region and year
Afrobarometer
Performance leader Average approval of the performance from national leader, mea-
sured on Likert scale from 1 to 4 per region and year
Afrobarometer
Activism Average level of “using violence for political cause or going to
demonstrations" from survey respondents in a region and year;
Likert scale from 0 (never would do) to 4 (yes, often)
Afrobarometer
Corruption index Index combining corruption leader and corruption police. Afrobarometer
Political corruption Average perceived level of corruption among president and of-
ficials in office per region and year; Likert scale from 0 (never
would do) to 4 (yes, often)
Afrobarometer
Police corruption Average perceived level of corruption among police per region




We classify countries into coup and non-coup based on its history
of coup attempts. A country is classified as coup if at least one
coup attempt occured in the country within the last 30 years.
Leader non-autoc coup then refers to a dummy variable that
indicates the leader region of a country that is non-autocratic and





We classify regions as natural-resource rich that have a least one
extracting mineral mine of the 14 major minerals. Based on this
definition, leader (non-)autoc (non-)resource refers to a leader







We classify countries into ethnically fractionalized and homoge-
nous by the ethnic fractionalization index of the Historical Index
of Ethnic Fractionalization by Drazanova at the median. Based on
this definition, leader (non-)autoc (non-)ethnic refers to a leader
region in a (non-)autocratic country with an above (or below)




Past conflict Provides the number of conflict years within the last three years





Based on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project, we classify
countries into autocracies, democracies and transition states. The
polity 2 score classifies countries on a scale between -10 and 10 into
democratic and autocratic. We define a system to be autocratic if
polity 2 score is -5 or below and into democratic if it is 5 or above.
Countries with a score inbetween are classified as transition states.
Polity IV Project
Switcher Indicator variable which classifies countries as switchers that
changed their political regime within the last 5 years.
Archigos, WDPI
Irregular entry Indicator variable which classifies leaders by their entry into office
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B.1 Further robustness checks
TABLE B.1: Regression on 1 degree grid cells
Dependent variable Social conflict
Model IV: Second stage
(1) (2)
∆ Water mass -0.011* -0.038**
(0.007) (0.019)
Dependent variable ∆ Water mass
Model IV: First stage
Drought months -0.047*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.004)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 47.72 23.05
Observations 44,688 44,688
Cell FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes
Country-year FE Yes
Note: The table reports IV coefficients of social conflict on water
mass change measured at the 1 degree grid cell level. Models
include fixed effects as stated in the table. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the 3 degree grid cell level.
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B.2 Variable descriptions
TABLE B.2: Variable definitions
Dependent and main variables
Social conflict Indicator variable that takes one if in the respective year and cell a conflict
event occurred, based on the SCAD conflict dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012).
State target conflict Indicator variable that takes one if in the respective year and cell a conflict
event occurred that was targeted towards the government, based on the
SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012).
Non-state target conflict Indicator variable that takes one in the respective year and cell a conflict
event occurred that was not targeted towards the government, based on the
SCAD conflict dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012).
Resource conflict Indicator variable that takes one if in the respective year and cell a con-
flict event occurred that was triggered mainly by a natural resource issue.
A resource conflict is defined as a conflict were the first, second or third
mentioned issue of tension is classified as food, water, subsistence or envi-
ronmental degradation. Source: Salehyan et al. (2012)
Drought months Records the number of drought months per year and cell. A drought month
is defined as a month with SPEI values below -1. Source: Vicente-Serrano
et al. (2010).
Demand and supply factors
Surface water Indicator variable that takes one if a river or lake is located in the respective
grid. Source: Natural Earth
Groundwater access Indicator variable that takes one if groundwater is accessible. We define
access by low depth to groundwater (below median) and medium to high
groundwater storage (no local and shallow aquifers). Source: Fan et al. (2013)
and WHYMAP from BGR
Irrigation Indicator variable that takes one if irrigated areas are located in the cell.
Source: GIAM .
Mining Indicator variable that takes one if in the cell a major mineral deposit or a
mineral extraction site is located. Source: Schulz and Briskey (2005) and
Maus et al. (2020).
Urban indicator variable that is one if any urban area is located in the grid. Source:
SEDAC.
Control variables
Temperature Gives the average temperature in degree Celsius of a year in a cell. Source:
Kalnay et al. (1996).
Meridional velocity Gives the average wind speed in meter per second of a year in a cell from
north to south. Source: Kalnay et al. (1996).
Zonal velocity Gives the average wind speed in meter per second of a year in a cell from
east to west. Source: Kalnay et al. (1996).
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C.1 Figures
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Results in IAT test
Note: The figure reports the distribution of the IAT test results.
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Poor persons Displaced persons Demobilized persons
Liking index per out-group
Note: The figure reports average points per contact treatment on a 5 point Likert scale on various
outcomes that have been asked in the final questionnaire. In total, 1058 observations are in the treatments,
whereof 531 in the no-contact treatment, 258 in the contact to demobilized treatment and 269 in the
contact and non-demobilized students treatment.
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of the variable "liking the business ideas" in the contact
treatments separately for non-demobilized and demobilized beneficiaries.
FIGURE C.4: Distribution of perceived sympathy of the persons in the

















































Note: The figure shows the distribution of the perceived sympathy of the persons in the videos
in the contact treatments separately for non-demobilized and demobilized beneficiaries.
144
Appendix C. Appendix for chapter 5
C.2 Further data analysis and robustness checks
TABLE C.1: Balance test
Kruskal-Wallis test
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 (p-val)
Age 20.95 21.24 20.73 20.56 21.00 20.59 20.55 21.16 0.5
(3.44) (3.29) (2.90) (2.87) (2.87) (2.82) (2.79) (3.70)
Female 0.48 0.35 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.48
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Social status 3.36 3.33 3.13 3.16 3.26 3.14 3.16 2.85 0.03
(1.24) (1.26) (1.26) (1.22) (1.22) (1.33) (1.27) (1.21)
Political orientation 3.14 3.14 3.10 3.17 3.17 3.26 3.02 3.11 0.83
(1.16) (1.30) (1.15) (1.18) (1.28) (1.28) (1.21) (1.03)
Prosocial 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.26
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Victimization 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.35
(0.19) (0.197) (0.20) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Note: The table reports the mean of socio-economic characteristics per treatment group and the Kruskal-
Wallis test p-value to signal significant differences per treatment group. The respective standard deviation
is shown in parenthesis below.
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TABLE C.2: The full dif-in-dif model specification with control vari-
ables
Donation Donation amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SES 0.011 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.251 0.155
(0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.327) (0.344)
Demobilized 0.082 0.078 0.084 0.077 0.526 0.488
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.057) (0.320) (0.305)
Demobilized x SES -0.074 -0.051 -0.050 -0.049 -0.542 -0.478
(0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.457) (0.441)
Contact 0.098 0.100 0.111 0.100 0.913*** 0.879**
(0.078) (0.075) (0.078) (0.073) (0.333) (0.361)
Contact x SES -0.003 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 -0.448 -0.266
(0.101) (0.103) (0.106) (0.102) (0.575) (0.602)
Contact x Demobilized -0.166 -0.178* -0.185* -0.178* -1.303*** -1.187**
(0.101) (0.098) (0.105) (0.096) (0.458) (0.462)
Contact x Demobilized X SES 0.216 0.219* 0.197 0.215* 1.801** 1.502*
(0.132) (0.126) (0.131) (0.125) (0.757) (0.764)
Female 0.038 0.028 0.039 -0.186 -0.304
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.211) (0.204)
Rich 0.075* 0.069 0.076* 0.529* 0.414*
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.280) (0.239)
Poor -0.013 0.033 -0.012 -0.321 -0.059
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.211) (0.205)
Left -0.050 -0.043 -0.051 -0.479** -0.402*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.211) (0.213)
Right -0.010 -0.021 -0.011 -0.654 -0.958**
(0.085) (0.090) (0.081) (0.436) (0.427)
Cali -0.063 -0.062 -0.501
(0.044) (0.043) (0.309)
Religious 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.128*** 0.119***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.043) (0.041)
Prosocial 0.615*** 0.637*** 0.622*** 3.774*** 3.661***
(0.110) (0.105) (0.110) (0.758) (0.770)
Victimization 0.006 -0.028 0.010 0.508 0.310
(0.075) (0.080) (0.074) (0.527) (0.559)
Support peace process 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.321*** 0.306**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.114) (0.118)
Age -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.010 0.065
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.032) (0.039)
Observations 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058
R-squared 0.012 0.073 0.134 0.091 0.170
Subject of study FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE Yes Yes
Probit model Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing the discrimination outcomes on the treatment
dummies as well as its interactions. The regressions include controls as shown in the table. Fixed effects
are included as indicated in the table. Clustered standard errors at the session level are in parenthesis,
***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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TABLE C.3: Perceived attitudes towards the recipient groups
Liking Encounter Friend Sympathy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demobilized -0.431*** -0.497*** -0.391*** -0.405***
(0.074) (0.124) (0.080) (0.063)
SES -0.035 -0.032 -0.021 -0.051
(0.057) (0.092) (0.080) (0.071)
Demobilized x SES -0.006 0.094 -0.076 -0.036
(0.075) (0.141) (0.089) (0.090)
Contact -0.024 0.014 -0.045 -0.041
(0.063) (0.092) (0.090) (0.086)
Contact x SES 0.027 0.015 0.049 0.016
(0.081) (0.133) (0.133) (0.094)
Contact x Demobilized 0.181* 0.290* 0.114 0.141
(0.096) (0.164) (0.107) (0.103)
Contact x Demobilized x SES -0.085 -0.157 -0.073 -0.025
(0.104) (0.189) (0.157) (0.127)
Total: Contact x Demobilized x SES 0.157* 0.304** 0.069 0.100
(0.064) (0.103) (0.084) (0.071)
Observations 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058
R-squared 0.300 0.199 0.204 0.235
Subject of study FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing the diverse stated perception of the
recipient group in the final questionnaire on a full set of treatment dummies and its interactions.
Encounter gives the comfortableness in meeting a recipients’ group member on a 5 point Liker
scale; Friend refers to the likelihood of becoming friends with a recipient group member and
Sympathy refers to the overall liking of the recipient group all measured on a 5 point Liker scale.
The Liking index is the index constructed out of these 3 items. The regressions include controls
as shown in table C.2. Fixed effects as indicated in the table. Clustered standard errors at the
session level are in parenthesis, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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TABLE C.4: The effects of contact controlling for perceptions of the
contact situation
Donated Donation amount Liking index IAT-test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contact x SES 0.010 -0.088 -0.002 0.020
(0.063) (0.435) (0.069) (0.047)
Contact x Demobilized -0.060 -0.281 0.165*** -0.016
(0.070) (0.424) (0.047) (0.055)
Contact x Demobilized x SES 0.133 0.845 -0.002 0.062
(0.094) (0.546) (0.088) (0.068)
Liking business idea 0.116*** 0.623*** 0.028 -0.010
(0.029) (0.169) (0.038) (0.025)
Perception hard working 0.014 -0.034 0.007 -0.002
(0.045) (0.338) (0.051) (0.039)
Perception neediness 0.004 -0.011 -0.022 0.019
(0.022) (0.130) (0.027) (0.018)
Perception hostility -0.015 -0.173 -0.028 -0.032**
(0.015) (0.112) (0.020) (0.013)
Perception trustworthiness 0.035 -0.107 0.013 0.007
(0.044) (0.265) (0.055) (0.029)
Perception sympathy 0.052 0.760*** -0.067 0.000
(0.037) (0.261) (0.044) (0.043)
Total effect: Contact x Demobilized x SES 0.073 0.564 0.163* 0.046
(0.059) (0.369) (0.066) (0.046)
Observations 527 527 527 527
R-squared 0.234 0.257 0.271 0.159
Subject of study FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing the 4 discrimination outcomes on the
treatment dummies as well as its interaction terms. The regressions include controls as shown in table
C.2 as well as perceptions of the video. Fixed effects are included as indicated in the table. The sample
consists out of 527 observations that have been in the contact treatments. Clustered standard errors at
the session level are in parenthesis, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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C.3 Variable definitions
TABLE C.5: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Age Age of the respective participant in years
Cali Dummy that indicates that the experiment has taken place in Cali
Contact Dummy variable that is one if the participant is in a contact treat-
ment
Demobilized Dummy variable that is one if the participant can donate to the
demobilized recipients
Donation Dummy variable that is one if the participant has donated
Donation amount Gives the amount of donation in 1000 COP
Encounter Gives the degree of comfortableness of meeting a member of the
recipient group (demobilized person or poor person) on a 5 point
Likert scale
Female Dummy variable that is one if the participant is female
Friend Gives the likelihood of becoming friends with a member of the
recipient group (demobilized person or poor person) on a 5 point
Likert scale.
IAT-test Gives the D-score that is constructed using the response time and
error rates in the IAT test.
Left We ask participants to state their political orientation on a Likert
scale from 1 to 7 and afterwards classified left oriented for values
1 and 2 referred to as "very left wing" and "left wing"
Liking (index) Liking is an index constructed out of the 3 items: "How com-
fortable would you feel meeting . . . (a demobilized, a poor, a
displaced person)." "How likely is it that you become friends with
.." "How much do you overall like the group x". Each item was
answered on a 5 point Likert scale. The liking index gives the
index given to the respective beneficiary group demobilized or
poor persons.
Liking business idea Gives the subjective liking of the business ideas presented in the
video in the contact situation on a 5 point Liker scale.
Perception of hard working person Gives the subjective evaluation of how hard working the persons
are presented in the video in the contact situation on a 5 point
Likert scale.
Perception of sympathy Gives the subjective evaluation of how sympathetic the persons
are presented in the video in the contact situation on a 5 point
Likert scale
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Perception of neediness Gives the subjective evaluation of how needy the persons are
presented in the video in the contact situation on a 5 point Likert
scale
Perception of hostility Gives the subjective evaluation of how hostile the persons are
presented in the video in the contact situation on a 5 point Likert
scale
Perception of trustworthiness Gives the subjective evaluation of how trustworthy the persons
are presented in the video in the contact situation on a 5 point
Likert scale
Private Dummy variable that is one for sessions at a private university
Prosocial Prosocial is a normalized index constructed out of the following
items: We ask participants in the final survey to agree or disagree
on a 5 point Likert scale to the statement: "In general, one should
help people in need.", "Everyone deserves a second chance." "One
should receive what one has worked for." "Everyone is responsible
for his/her own life." Additionally, we ask the participants how
often they have done the following activities: voluntary work,
donating, helping neighbors. We take this as an indicator of
prosociality.
Poor Dummy variable that is one if the participant lives in a social
strata of 1 or 2
Religious We ask participants to state how religious they rank themselves
on a Likert scale of 1 to 7.
Rich Dummy variable that is one if the participant lives in a social
strata of 5 or 6
Right We ask participants to state their political orientation on a Likert
scale from 1 to 7 and afterwards classified left oriented for values
6 and 7 referred to as "very right wing" and "right wing".
SES Dummy variable that is one if participant is in the SES treatment
Support peace process We ask participants in the final survey to agree or disagree on
a 5 point Likert scale to the statement: "I support the last peace
process." We take this as an indicator of the attitude towards the
peace process. Higher values represent a higher agreement with
the peace process.
Sympathy Gives the overall liking of the recipient group (demobilized per-
sons or poor persons) on a 5 point Likert scale
Victimization Based on the answers of "Have you been victimized in the fol-
lowing sense: Displacement, Torture/fighting and kidnapping"
we construct an indicator that is 0 (not victimized) if all three
questions have been answered with no; 1 (victimized) if at least
one question is answered with yes and 2 (strongly victimized) if
more than one question is answered with yes.
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C.4 Instructions
TABLE C.6: Experiment instructions and questionnaire
Introduction 
Dear participant, 
Thanks a lot for your willingness to participate in our study that is about perceptions and attitudes. 
The participation in this study is voluntary. 
At the end of the study, we will pay you in cash for your participation. The payment consists out of a 
fixed show-up fee (5.000 COP) and a variable amount depending on your actions and decisions in the 
study. 
Please read carefully through all of the instructions. In total, the study takes around 45 minutes.  
Thank you once more for participating. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Declaration of consent 
Please read carefully the following points: 
1. I approve to participate voluntarily in this study. 
2. I understand that the collected data are used for scientific research only. 
3. I approve to be asked about my opinion, emotions and perceptions towards different persons 
and situations.  
4. I understand that this can affect my mood. 
5. I approve the use of my data in an anonymous form. 
 
I have understood all the mentioned points above and I declare my consent to participate in this 
experiment. 
Yes No  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Anonymous code 
Your data will be saved and identified with a code. Please follow the following instructions to create 
the code. 
First letter of your surname 
First letter of your mother’s surname 
Numbers of the day you were born 
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2. About which institution they are talking in the video? 
SENA – University of Javeriana – Agency of reintegration 
 
3. How do you perceive the institution SENA? 
Trustworthy   Efficient 
Good    Useful 
Likert scale: A lot ------------------------------------- Not at all 
 
Donation 
The students of SENA are searching for funding to realize their business ideas. 
Who are they? 
They are [demobilized] persons who are studying a 1-year technical formation program in SENA. 
[They are parents, between 45 and 60 years old. All have completed a technical formation degree 
and have some working experiences in different simple tasks.] 
Do you want to make a donation to support their business ideas? 
Yes  No 
 
How much do you want to donate from the money you have gained in the task before? 
- 1.000 COP  - 6.000 COP 
- 2.000 COP  - 7.000 COP 
- 3.000 COP  - 8.000 COP 
- 4.000 COP  - 9.000 COP 
- 5.000 COP  - 10.000 COP 
 
Part 3: Implicit association test 
Classification task 
In this part, we will present you words and images. Your task consists out of classifying the words and 
pictures into the corresponding categories. The task consists out of two rounds. In each round, there 
will be a practice round to start with. 
Please classify the object in the center of the screen with the 
categories written down on the top of the screen using the 
keyboard. 
To classify with categories on the right of the screen use the letter I. 
To classify with categories on the left of the screen use the letter E. 
 
Please respond as fast as you can intending to make no errors. If your respond is incorrect, an X will 
appear on the screen. 
 
Good       Bad 
   or 
Demobilized 
 
          happy 
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Classification task 
Please collect your fingers on the letters E and I. 
If you see in the center of the screen… 
 … a word that is associated with good things, you have to press the letter E. 
 … a picture that is associated with demobilized persons, you have to press the letter E. 
 ... a word that is associated with bad things, you have to press the letter I. 
We will start with a practicing round. 
   Press the space bottom to continue. 
 
Classification task 
The practicing round is over. Please start with the real task. 
If you see ….    
A good word, press the letter E. 
An image of a demobilized person, press the letter E. 
A bad word, press the letter I. 
 
  
  Press the space bottom to continue. 
 
Classification task 
Please collect your fingers on the letters E and I. 
If you see in the center of the screen… 
 … a word that is associated with good things, you have to press the letter E. 
 … a picture that is associated with demobilized persons, you have to press the letter I. 
 ... a word that is associated with bad things, you have to press the letter I. 
We will start with a practicing round. 






Good       Bad 
   or 
Demobilized 
 
          happy 
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Classification task 
The practicing round is over. Please start with the real task. 
If you see ….    
A good word, press the letter E. 
An image of a demobilized person, press the letter I. 
A bad word, press the letter I. 
 
  
  Press the space bottom to continue. 
Classification task 
The task is over. 
 Press the space bottom to continue. 
 
Part 4: Questionnaire 
To finalize, we have some questions regarding your personal characteristics and opinions. Please 
choose the answer that fits the best to your case. 
 
Questionnaire 
1. What is your gender? 
Feminine masculine other 
 
2. How old are you? 
Your age _____________ 
 
3. What is your nationality? 
  Your nationality: ______________________ 
 
4. In which city and region have you lived the longest in your life? 
 City: ____________________ 
 Region: _______________ 
 
5. What is your study subject? 
Arts     Administration / Business 
Health studies    Natural sciences 
Economics    Politics 
Social sciences    Engineering 
Humanities 
 
Good       Bad 
   or 
Demobilized 
 
          happy 
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6. In which social strata do you live? 
1  4 
2  5 
3  6 
 
7. How do you evaluate your economic situation? 
             Very good – god – nor good nor bad – bad – very bad 
 
8. Often political preferences are classified in terms of right and left wing. On such a 
scale, how would you classify your personal political preferences? 
             Very right wing – right – center – left –very left wing 
 
9. Do you consider yourself as a religious person? 
             Very religious-------------------------------------------------------------------- Not at all religious 
 
 
Empathy + taking perspective 
1. How strong do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a. In general, it is easy for me to understand the arguments and viewpoints of other 
people. 
b. I easily can feel the emotions of others. 
c. I have asked myself different times, how various actors in the armed conflict in 
Colombia must have felt. 
(Agree a lot, agree, nor agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree a lot) 
 
Optimism and openness 
1. How strong do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 It is easy for me to talk to strangers. 
 Even in difficult situations, I think positively.  
 In general, I think there are more good than bad things happening in the world. 
 I am more reserved than social. 
(Agree a lot, agree, nor agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree a lot) 
 
Altruism / pro-sociality 
1. How often have you done the following activities in the last year? 
 Voluntary work without compensation  
 Donating 
 Helping neighbors 
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Social norms 
How strong do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 Everyone deserves a second chance. 
 One should receive what one has worked for. 
 In general, one should help the people in need. 
 Everyone is responsible for his/her own life. Everyone should look after him/herself. 
 In general, I belief the majority of the poor people are poor because of their own decisions. 
 (Agree a lot, agree, nor agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree a lot) 
 
Attitudes towards the outgroup 
1. How strong do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
o I support the last peace process. 
o It is fair that the government is helping the demobilized people economically. 
o I don’t want to live close by demobilized people. 
o I disapprove that the state is helping the demobilized people, because I belief they 
should take the consequences of their own actions. 
 (Agree a lot, agree, nor agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree a lot) 
Perceptions of outgroup 
1. How do you evaluate the intelligence of the following groups? 
Students, Demobilized people, Displaced people, Poor persons 
Very above average – above average – average - below average – very below average  
 
2. How much do you like the following groups?  
Students, Demobilized people, Displaced people, Poor persons 
Liking a lot – liking - nor liking nor disliking – disliking - disliking a lot 
 
3. How do you perceive the poor people? 
Trustworthy, sympathetic, hostile, hardworking, needy  
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
4. How do you perceive the demobilized people? 
Trustworthy, sympathetic, hostile, hardworking, needy  
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
5. How do you perceive the displaced people? 
Trustworthy, sympathetic, hostile, hardworking, needy  




1. How comfortable do you feel meeting a member of the following groups: 
Students, Demobilized people, Displaced people, Poor persons 
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Behavioral change 
1. How likely is it, that you will become friends with 
- A demobilized person that studies with you? 
- A poor person that studies with you? 
- A displaced person that studies with you? 
Very likely – likely- nor likely nor unlikely – unlikely- very unlikely 
 
Learning about the out-group 
How would you evaluate your knowledge about… 
- The armed conflict in Colombia? 
- The reintegration process of demobilized people? 
- The organization SENA? 
Very good – good – nor good nor bad – bad – very bad 
 
Victimization 
1. Have you been victim in the following senses? 
- Displacement 
- Terrorist attacks / fighting / landmines / torture  
- Extortion / kidnapping 
- Sexual delicts 
- Homicides of family members or close friends 
- None of these situations 
Attachment 
2. Do you know a person  
- That has been / is member of a guerrilla group? 
- That has been / is member of a paramilitary group? 
- That has been/ is very poor? 
Yes  No 
Video perceptions 
1. Have the stories presented in the video moved you emotionally? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
2. How much do you like the business ideas of the persons in the video? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
3. How much do you like the business idea of Marisol/Criselia? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
4. How much do you like the business idea of Paulino/Ramiro? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 








A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
 
6. How do you like Marisol/Ciselia? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
7. How do you like Paulino/Ramiro? 
A lot --------------------------------------- not at all 
 
End 
The study is over. Thanks a lot for you participation 
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TABLE C.7: Interview guideline of the videosStructured interview guide 
 
Part 1: Presentation of the person 
Personal facts:   
What is your name? 
 How old are you? 
 Where do you come from? 
Personality and interests: 
Name two positive personal characteristics or behavior that describe you well and 
describe a typical situation in which these characteristics are visible.  
What makes you happy?  
 What are topics, you are interested in?  
 What are the three most important values for you? 
Experiences / Life story: 
What have you done so far and what are you doing now? / What is your life narrative 
story?  
 
Part 2: Business idea 
Please present us your Business idea 
What kind of business do you want to open and why? 
What is it that would make you happy in this job? 
Who are your targeted clients and market? 
What do you think is the social impact of your business? 
What qualifies you for this job/business opening?  
What have you already done so far to fulfill the idea and what are the next steps that 
you need to do? 
For what do you need the credit?  How would you use the money? 
What are your future plans/visions? 
  
Note: The interview guideline served as a base of the video content and as a pillar for the interviewees.
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D.1 Figures
FIGURE D.1: Robustness: The effects of past conflict exposure on
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Minimum No. of deaths per year
Model with hh and region-cohort FE
Note: The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of education on conflict exposure
(from in utero to age 12) within 50 km to the survey location. The regressions include weather controls,
gender-age fixed effects and household combined with regional cohort fixed effects.. N = 480, 847. The
threshold that defines a severe conflict-year varies according to a minimum number of battle-related
deaths displayed horizontally. The share of observations with at least one conflict year using the given
deaths threshold is depicted by grey bars (second vertical axis). Standard errors are clustered at the
level of administrative regions.
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FIGURE D.2: Robustness: The effects of past conflict exposure on




































0 1 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
Minimum No. of deaths per year




































0 1 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
Minimum No. of deaths per year




































0 1 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
Minimum No. of deaths per year




































0 1 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
Minimum No. of deaths per year
Model with 200 km distance
Note: The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the regression from education
on conflict exposure (from in utero to age 12) within 25, 50, 100 and 200 km to the survey location. The
regressions include weather controls, gender-age fixed effects as well as household and regional cohort
fixed effects as stated in the graphs. N = 480, 847. The threshold that defines a severe conflict-year
varies according to a minimum number of battle-related deaths displayed horizontally. The share of
observations with at least one conflict year using the given deaths threshold is depicted by grey bars
(second vertical axis). Standard errors are clustered at the level of administrative regions.
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D.2 Further data analysis and robustness checks
TABLE D.1: Intensity of conflict and education by age periods
Years of education
(1) (2)
Moderate-intensity conflict in utero 0.012 -0.002
(0.027) (0.028)
Moderate-intensity conflict years at age 0–3 0.011 0.010
(0.020) (0.019)
Moderate-intensity conflict years at age 4–6 0.010 0.015
(0.024) (0.026)
Moderate-intensity conflict years at age 7–12 0.028 0.026
(0.024) (0.022)
High-intensity conflict in utero -0.171** -0.127*
(0.077) (0.074)
High-intensity conflict years at age 0–3 -0.157*** -0.126***
(0.054) (0.047)
High-intensity conflict years at age 4–6 -0.226*** -0.145**
(0.068) (0.060)




Gender-age FE Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes
Location FE Yes
Household FE Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing education on
the number of moderate- and high-intensity conflict years (between in
utero and age 12) per age period. Conflict events are counted if occurred
within 50 km to the survey. Moderate-intensity conflict years refer to
years with less than 1000 deaths; high-intensity years to 1000 and more
deaths. Standard errors are clustered at the level of administrative region.
, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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TABLE D.2: Intensity of conflict and education by gender
Years of education
(1) (2)
Moderate-intensity conflict years 0.032* 0.033*
(0.018) (0.018)
Moderate-intensity conflict years × Female -0.025** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.010)
High-intensity conflict years -0.222*** -0.185***
(0.050) (0.040)




Gender-age FE Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes
Location FE Yes
Household FE Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing education on
the number of moderate- and high-intensity conflict years (between in
utero and age 12) as well as its interaction with a female dummy. Conflict
events are counted if occurred within 50 km to the survey. Moderate-
intensity conflict years refer to years with less than 1000 deaths; high-
intensity years to 1000 and more deaths. Standard errors are clustered at
the level of administrative region. , ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and
10%.
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TABLE D.3: Robustness: Share of migrants and past conflict




Moderate-intensity conflict years 0.003
(0.002)




Year FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing the share
of migrants among youth of age 10-26 in a survey location on the
number of conflict years in the last 25 years, including further controls
as stated in the table. Conflict events are counted if occurred within
50 km to the survey location. Moderate-intensity conflict years refer
to years with less than 1000 deaths; high-intensity years to 1000 and
more deaths. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
TABLE D.4: Robustness: Differences in socio-economic status by mi-
gration status
Years of Highest educ. Poor hh. Rich hh.
education in hh.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-migrant -0.046* -0.111*** 0.031*** -0.051***
(0.027) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 68,110 68,110 68,110 68,110
R-squared 0.511 0.468 0.425 0.430
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing socio-economic
variables on the a dummy variable of non-migrants on a sub-sample with
migration information. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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TABLE D.5: Robustness: Conflict exposure and education by migration
status
Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Moderate-intensity conflict years -0.035 -0.061 -0.132*** -0.193*
(0.039) (0.080) (0.050) (0.101)
High-intensity conflict years -0.624*** -0.167 -0.213 -0.098
(0.188) (0.256) (0.227) (0.262)
Moderate-intensity conflict years × 0.109*** 0.148***
Non-migrant hh. (0.032) (0.048)
High-intensity conflict years × -0.509*** -0.087
Non-migrant hh. (0.191) (0.337)
Non-migrant hh. -0.057 0.074
(0.050) (0.070)
Observations 68,110 37,962 68,110 37,962
R-squared 0.502 0.767 0.502 0.767
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing education on the
number of moderate- and high-intensity conflict years (between in utero and
age 12) for a sub-sample with data on migration experiences. Specifications
include fixed effects and further controls as stated in the table. Conflict events
are counted if occurred within 50 km to the survey location. Moderate-intensity
conflict years refer to years with less than 1000 battle-related deaths; high-
intensity years to 1000 and more deaths. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and
10%.
TABLE D.6: Robustness: Placebo conflict exposure
Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Moderate-intensity conflict years in pre-utero 0.055 0.061
(0.043) (0.043)
High-intensity conflict years in pre-utero -0.049 -0.053
(0.039) (0.041)
Moderate-intensity conflict years age 20-25 0.016 0.058***
(0.012) (0.020)
High-intensity conflict years age 20-25 0.066 -0.010
(0.046) (0.071)
Observations 441,773 363,817 652,003 362,665
R-squared 0.562 0.781 0.545 0.836
Gender-age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results from regressing education on the number of
moderate- and high-intensity conflict years (two years before in utero and during age
20-25). Specifications include fixed effects and further controls as stated in the table.
Conflict events are counted if occurred within 50 km to the survey location. Moderate-
intensity conflict years refer to years with less than 1000 deaths; high-intensity years to
1000 and more deaths. ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
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D.3 Sample and variable description
TABLE D.8: List of DHS surveys
Angola (2015/2016), Benin (2001, 2011/2012), Burundi (2010, 2012), Burkina Faso (2003, 2010), Cameroon
(2004, 2011), Chad (2014/2015), Comoros (2012), DR Congo (2007, 2013/2014), Ethiopia (2005, 2011,
2016), Gabon (2012), Ghana (2003, 2008, 2014), Guinea (2005, 2012), Ivory Coast (2011/2012), Kenya
(2003, 2008/2009, 2014), Lesotho (2009, 2014), Liberia (2007, 2013), Madagascar (2008/2009), Mali (2001,
2006, 2012/2013), Malawi (2000, 2004, 2010, 2015/2016), Mozambique (2009, 2011), Namibia (2000,
2006/2007, 2013), Nigeria (2003, 2008, 2013), Rwanda (2005, 2010, 2014/2015), Senegal (2005, 2010/2011,
2012/2013, 2015), Sierra Leone (2013), Swaziland (2006/2007), Tanzania (2010, 2015/2016), Togo (2013/
2014), Uganda (2000/2001, 2006, 2011), Zambia (2007, 2013/2014), Zimbabwe (2005/2006, 2010/2011,
2015)
TABLE D.9: Variable definitions
Dependent and main variables
Years of education Records the reported individual educational attainment in years.
Gender-age FE Full set of interactions between age indicators and the reported gender.
Conflict years (in utero, at
age of 0–3, 4–6, 7–12)
Measures conflict exposure of an individual in years, from the year before
the birth year (in utero) until the age of 12 (or within the stated age brackets).
A conflict year is defined as a year in which at least one conflict event has
taken place within 50 km distance to the respective survey location.
Conflict years by severity (x
deaths)
Measures conflict exposure of an individual in years, from the year before the
birth year (in utero) until the age of 12 (or within the stated age brackets). A
conflict year is defined as a year with at least x battle-related deaths occurring
within 50 km distance to the respective survey location.
Moderate-intensity conflict
years
Measures conflict exposure of an individual in years from the year before the
birth year (in utero) until the age of 12 years. A moderate-intensity conflict
year is a year with less than 1000 battle related deaths. Conflict events are
counted within 50 km distance to the respective survey location.
High-intensity conflict years Measures conflict exposure of an individual in years from the year before the
birth year (in utero) until the age of 12 years. A high-intensity conflict year is
a year with 1000 or more battle related deaths. Conflict events are counted
within 50 km distance to the respective survey location.
Drought months (in utero, at
age of 0–3, 4–6, 7–12)
Measures the exposure to drought events of an individual in months, from
one year before the birth year until the age of 12 (or within the stated age
brackets). A drought month is defined as a year when 12-months scale SPEI
index is lower than -1.5.
Wet months (in utero, at age
of 0–3, 4–6, 7–12)
Measures the exposure to extreme wet months of an individual from one year
before the birth year until the age of 12 (or within the stated age brackets) in
months. A wet month is defined as a year when the 12-months SPEI index
was above 1.5.
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Instrumental variable approach
Distance to border The variable gives the geographical distance to the nearest ethnic border
in 100 km.
Distance to admin. center The variable measures the geographical distance to the regional capital
in 100 km (second administrative level).
Heterogeneity analysis
Asinh(Conflict deaths) Inverse hyperbolic sine function of the total number of battle-related
deaths that occurred in 50 km distance to the survey location of an
individual between one year before the birth and the age of 12.
Asinh(State conflict deaths) Inverse hyperbolic sine function of the total number of battle-related
deaths in conflicts where a state actor was involved. Conflict events
are counted if occurred in 50 km distance to the survey location of an
individual between one year before the birth and the age of 12. Conflict
type is based on the UCDP classification.
Asinh(Non-state conflict
deaths)
Inverse hyperbolic sine function of the total number of battle-related
deaths in conflicts where no state actor was involved. Conflict events
are counted if occurred in 50 km distance to the survey location of an
individual between one year before the birth and the age of 12. Conflict
type is based on the UCDP classification.
Asinh(One-sided conflict
deaths)
Inverse hyperbolic sine function of the total number of battle-related
deaths in conflicts with one-sided violence. Conflict events are counted
if occurred in 50 km distance to the survey location of an individual
between one year before the birth and the age of 12. Conflict type is
based on the UCDP classification.
Higher ethnic frac. Dummy variable that is one if the ethnic fractionalization index of the
country is above the median.
Strong democracy Dummy variable that is one if the polity2 score of the country is in more
than 10 years of all years above 5.
Strong autocracy Dummy variable that is one if the polity2 score of the country is in more
than 10 years of all years below -5.
Higher income per capita Dummy variable that is one if the average adjusted net national income
per capita over 1989-2015 (current US$) is above the median
Natural resources Dummy variable indicating that within 50 km of the survey location
there is a natural resources deposit
More nightlights Dummy variable that is one if the logarithm of the average nightlight
intensity over time (1992-2013) of the grid is above the median.
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